House of Representatives
18 November 1914

6th Parliament · 1st Session



Mr. Speaker took the chair at 3 p.m., and read prayers.

page 706

QUESTION

HIGH COMMISSIONER

Mr W ELLIOT JOHNSON:
LANG, NEW SOUTH WALES

– Has the Prime Minister any objection to stating whether it is intended to re-appoint Sir George Reid as High Commissioner of the Commonwealth in London?

Mr FISHER:
Prime Minister · WIDE BAY, QUEENSLAND · ALP

– The matter will be considered by the Government.

page 706

CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION BILL

High Court Judgments.

Mr GROOM:
DARLING DOWNS, QUEENSLAND

– As the Conciliation and

Arbitration Bill is based on judgments of the High Court in the Tramways case, will the Attorney-General cause copies of those judgments to be made available to honorable members?

Mr HUGHES:
Attorney-General · WEST SYDNEY, NEW SOUTH WALES · ALP

– Reports of the judgments are obtainable only by purchase. The Commonwealth is treated in the same way as private citizens. I received a letter from the honorable gentleman on the subject, and a consultation with the Secretary of the Department strengthened my opinion that the Commonwealth should be supplied with copies of these judgments. If that is the desire of the House, I shall take further steps in the matter.

page 707

QUESTION

CARGO FOR EXPORT

Mr TUDOR:
Minister for Trade and Customs · YARRA, VICTORIA · ALP

– On Monday morning I received a letter from the honorable gentleman, stating that he intended to ask for this information, and I have therefore had the following return prepared : -

New South Wales.

Frozen produce: - 370.000 carcases mutton and lamb. 25.000 quarters beef. 80.000 crates rabbits. 40.000 boxes butter, approximately (or 63,000 boxes in a week’s time).

Insulated space required - 2,897,622 cubic feet, or 72,440 tons measurement.

General cargo - no great scarcity of space.

Victoria.

Frozen produce and canned meats awaiting shipment at Melbourne and Geelong: - 13,751 quarters beef. 45,080 carcases calves. 467,703 carcases mutton and lamb. 508½ tons butter. 700 cases poultry. 364 crates rabbits. 6,070 cases canned meats. 2,000 packages frozen sundries.

Queensland.

Space required for: - 12,000 quarters beef, United Kingdom. 40,000 carcases mutton for United Kingdom. 1,000 boxes butter for United Kingdom. 2,750 boxes butter for South Africa.

Other butter shippers require space - exact quantities not obtainable.

South Australia.

Cargo awaiting shipment at: -

Port Adelaide. 25.000 bales wool. 3,000 bales sheep skins. 150 bales rabbit skins.

Frozen produce: - 47,000 carcases lamb. 20,000 carcases sheep. 1,500 carcases hoggets. 8,000 quarters beef. 350 sides veal. 5,000 bags beef.

Port Pirie. 65,000 tons concentrates.

Western Australia.

Goods awaiting shipment at: -

Fremantle. 4,000 to 5,000 bales wool. 218 bags wool. 300 to 400 bales skins. 100 tons lead concentrates. 10 tons gold slag.

Albany. 2,200 bales wool and skins.

North-west Ports. 3,000 to 4,000 bales wool.

Tasmania.

No cargo awaiting shipment overseas.

  1. Commonwealth figures for the main lines would be therefore: -

Butter, approximately, 65,000 boxes.

Beef, 58,751 quarters, and 5,000 bags.

Mutton and lamb, 946,203 carcases.

Veal, 45,630 carcases and 350 sides.

Rabbits and hares, 80,364 crates.

Mr MASSY-GREENE:
RICHMOND, NEW SOUTH WALES · LP; NAT from 1917

– Is the Minister of Trade and Customs able to say how much of the produce to which he has referred cannot be exported? How much of it must be held over?

Mr TUDOR:
ALP

– I do not know what vessels will be leaving Australia within the next six weeks, or how much refrigerated space will be available, but if the honorable member will give notice of his question, I shall do my best to secure the information, as I shall also do all I can to help to get the produce away.

page 707

QUESTION

RELIEF OF DISTRESS

Mr FLEMING:
ROBERTSON, NEW SOUTH WALES

– As Parliament re cently voted a large sum of money for the relief of distress in Belgium, I ask the Prime Minister what steps are being taken to relieve distress in this country ? I ask, particularly, what can be done to relieve the distress of a family in which there are five children, none over four years of age, the mother and the youngest child being outdoor patients at the Melbourne Hospital, and the father being an inmate of the hospital, about to undergo a serious operation there, having left only8d. in the home.

Mr FISHER:
ALP

– Parliament, with the approval of nearly all the electors, voted £100,000 for the relief of distress in Belgium. This Government arranged to lend £18,000,000 to five of the State Governments to enable them to proceed with public works, and thus to prevent unemployment within their borders, and we are ready and willing to render any other aid within our constitutional power, by social and industrial legislation, to prevent or mitigate unemployment and to relieve distress.

page 708

QUESTION

COLONEL PETHEBRIDGE

Mr THOMAS:
BARRIER, NEW SOUTH WALES

– I ask the Assistant Minister representing the Minister of External Affairs if his attention has been drawn to a statement in. the newspapers that Colonel Pethebridge has been appointed Administrator of some islands in the Pacific that have been captured from our enemies ? If so, will the Minister tell us what are to be the duties of Colonel Pethebridge?

Mr MAHON:
Assistant Minister · KALGOORLIE, WESTERN AUSTRALIA · ALP

– Colonel Pethebridge has been appointed by the Defence Department to inquire into certain matters connected with the administration of islands north of the Equator. I have read the paragraph referred to, and, except for the statement of fact just repeated, I regard it as the product of a lively imagination.

page 708

QUESTION

VACCINATION OF TROOPS

Mr WEST:
EAST SYDNEY, NEW SOUTH WALES

– Has the Assistant Minister representing the Minister of Defence seen a paragraph which states that the troops on their way to Europe have been vaccinated ? If they have been vaccinated, was the vaccination compulsory ; and, if so, by whose authority was it made compulsory ?

Mr JENSEN:
Assistant Minister · BASS, TASMANIA · ALP

– I have not seen the article referred to.

page 708

QUESTION

PRIZE VESSELS

Mr FINLAYSON:
BRISBANE, QUEENSLAND

– Is it correct that the High Commissioner has advised that arrangements are being made whereby goods can be sent to South Africa in German ships that have been interned during the war at cost? Can the Minister of Trade and Customs say whether an arrangement cannot be made for a similar service to Australia?

Mr TUDOR:
ALP

– I am not sure whether that question is a matter for my Department or for that of the Minister of External Affairs. I ask the honorable member to put it on the notice-paper.

page 708

BUDGET

Mr JOSEPH COOK:
PARRAMATTA, NEW SOUTH WALES

– Has the Treasurer yet fixed a date for the delivery of his Budget?

Mr FISHER:
ALP

– The Budget will be delivered during the week after next. I shall be absent next week.

page 708

QUESTION

EMPLOYMENT IN DEFENCE ESTABLISHMENTS

Mr HOWE:
DALLEY, NEW SOUTH WALES

– Will the Minister representing the Minister of Defence take * into consideration the advisability of employing men on the defence establishments in New South Wales at Garden Island, Cockatoo1 Island, and the Small Arms Factory three shifts, in order to alleviate distress?

Mr JENSEN:
ALP

– The Department has already adopted the system of working two shifts at Cockatoo Island and Garden Island, with a view to giving work to the unemployed. The matter of working three shifts has not been decided upon.

Mr Burns:

– Eight-hour shifts?

Mr JENSEN:

– Yes.

page 708

QUESTION

MILITARY RAIDS ON BUSINESS PREMISES

Mr THOMAS:

– Is the AttorneyGeneral in a position to make any statement concerning the recent raid on the offices of Broken Hill companies?

Mr HUGHES:
ALP

– I am not in a position to give a complete report as to the searches in the Broken Hill companies’ offices, but I should like to make a statement. This, I think, ought to he made at the earliest opportunity, in regard to those cases where there has been no evidence disclosed.

Leave granted.

Mr HUGHES:

– While it is to be regretted that loyal citizens should be inconvenienced or injured, in business or reputation by any action taken by the Government under the emergency legislation recently passed, it cannot be admitted that such action is not justified even when no evidence is disclosed upon which to base a charge. The safety of the Commonwealth at this juncture must be regarded as of supreme importance, and far outweighing any inconvenience or loss by individuals. Representations have been made that in some cases the premises of loyal and reputable citizens have been subjected to search by the military authorities. It may be that in some cases investigation has shown that the action taken was not warranted, but there seems to be a misapprehension of the position. It must not be assumed from the search of any citizen’s premises and the impounding of papers that there is evidence of any disloyal act or offence against the law. The circumstances demand prompt action. Information is received by the Government from very many quarters. This is in every case looked at, and where investigation seems called for the matter is pressed further, even at the risk that nothing justifying a prosecution may be disclosed. It is only by such means that the safety of the Commonwealth can be insured. It is surely better that a few individuals should suffer than that the safety of the Commonwealth should be imperilled. We are dealing with a resolute and powerful enemy who has deliberately built up, by a far-reaching system of espionage and vast expenditure of money and effort, plans menacing the national, commercial and industrial interests of this country. In order to circumvent these plans we must have freedom to act. We must, of course, take the responsibility for all that we do, and the Parliament may rest assured that we shall not act without cause. Wherever it appears, as the result of investigation, that a citizen has not acted to the detriment of the Commonwealth, we shall give publicity to the fact. The results of the inquiry so far have disclosed no evidence of trading with the enemy in regard to the Mount Morgan, Mount Lyell, Wallaroo and Moonta, Broken Hill North, and Broken Hill South Mines, and in the cases of W. S. Robinson, J. Hickmer and Sons, The Needham Carton Pierre Company, Ostermeyer, Van Rompaey and Company, R. Ritter, and Bernard and Company. The examination is not yet complete in regard to the Broken Hill Proprietary, Australian Metal Company, Max Gorier, and F. H. Snow, and George Fethers and Company.

Mr FOWLER:
PERTH, WESTERN AUSTRALIA

– I notice that in his statement the Attorney-General has mentioned none of the Perth business places that were recently raided. Has the AttorneyGeneral any information with regard to those raids?

Mr HUGHES:

– I have no information with regard to the raids in Perth, but I shall make inquiries, and inform the honorable member as to the results as far as I can.

Mr KELLY:
WENTWORTH, NEW SOUTH WALES

– Does the AttorneyGeneral recognise that the damage which is done to lawful traders by raids which in the public interest must be undertaken, arises not out of the raids but out of the publicity given to the raids? When the affairs of a company are being inquired into by the Commonwealth, will the AttorneyGeneral see that there is no publicity given where he has not evidence on which he can act?

Mr HUGHES:

– As far as possible, no publicity that is avoidable shall be given until evidence is disclosed.

Mr KELLY:

– I would ask the Assistant Minister of Defence whether there is any truth in the statement attributed, in the Argus, to Messrs. Bernard and Company to the effect that a military raid, in its true sense, was not made on their premises, but that a military officer went there, and retired upon being assured verbally that they had not been trading with the enemy?

Mr JENSEN:
ALP

– I have not seen the article referred to, and, therefore, cannot give the honorable member an answer.

Mr Kelly:

– Will the Minister have inquiries made?

Mr JENSEN:

– Yes.

page 709

QUESTION

EXPEDITIONARY FORCES

Mr WEBSTER:
MACQUARIE, NEW SOUTH WALES

– Will the Minister representing the Minister of Defence make inquiry as to whether the deaths of the four men in the Expeditionary Forces were the outcome of the compulsory vaccination forced on the troops?

Mr JENSEN:
ALP

– Yes.

Mr FENTON:
MARIBYRNONG, VICTORIA

– Is it a fact that the notice issued by the censor allowing publication of the accounts of the departure of the troops was not to expire until noon to-day? Can the Minister therefore, say why full reports of the departure of the troops appeared in this morning’s papers?

Mr JENSEN:

– I shall make inquiries into the matter, and give the honorable member an answer.

page 709

QUESTION

CLOSING AND RE-OPENING OF SHIPPING OFFICES

Mr P P ABBOTT:
NEW ENGLAND, NEW SOUTH WALES

– Does the Assist ant Minister of Defence know that the offices of the Deutsch-Australische Dampschiffs Gesellschaft, commonly known as the German-Australian Steam-ship Company, Sydney, have been closed since war was declared; and, if so, by whose order was that step taken ? Further, is he aware that the offices are now open again, with their brass plate and other advertising media in full view of the public? Can the Minister state the nature of the business now being carried on there?

Mr JENSEN:
ALP

– I know nothing of the matter, but I shall make inquiries and let the honorable member know.

page 710

QUESTION

TEMPERANCE BEVERAGES AT BROADMEADOWS CAMP

Mr FENTON:

– I desire to ask the Assistant Minister of Defence whether there is any regulation prohibiting the introduction of temperance beverages for the officers’ mess at Broadmeadows Camp, and whether there is any power, either within or outside the camp, to prevent their introduction?

Mr JENSEN:
ALP

– There are no regulations prohibiting the introduction of temperance drinks into the camp, and I do not know that any one has been refused permission to take them in.

page 710

QUESTION

FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO THE STATES

Loan of £18,000,000

Mr SAMPSON:
WIMMERA, VICTORIA

– According to a cable message published in this morning’s newspapers, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, when introducing his War Loan Bill, stated that, of the total of £225,000,000 proposed to be raised, a sum of £30,000,000 was to be devoted, in the form of a loan, to Canada, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand, so rendering it unnecessary for them to go on to the London money market. Will the Prime Minister inform the House if Australia is participating, and, if so, to what extent, in this loan?

Mr FISHER:
ALP

– The Imperial Government are raising for the Commonwealth Government £18,000,000.

page 710

QUESTION

DAY OF INTERCESSION

Mr PIGOTT:
CALARE, NEW SOUTH WALES

– In view of the fact that, with the approval of His Majesty the King, the first Sunday in January has been fixed upon as a day for intercession and prayer throughout Great Britain and Ireland, I would ask the Prime Minister if the same date could not be fixed for the Commonwealth?

Mr FISHER:
ALP

– His Grace the Archbishop of Melbourne, and, I think, representatives of the Presbyterian Church and other religious bodies, waited upon me as a deputation in regard to the matter.

Without consulting my colleagues I took upon myself the responsibility of telling them that I considered the matter was one for the churches themselves rather than for the civil authorities. Whilst expressing my full sympathy with them, I felt that some of my duties did not well fit in with the proposal.

page 710

QUESTION

EMBARGO ON WOOL EXPORTS

Mr BRUCE SMITH:
PARKES, NEW SOUTH WALES · FT; ANTI-SOC from 1906; LP from 1910; NAT from 1917

– Has the Prime Minster received any communication from the Secretary of State for the Colonies similar to that sent to New Zealand regarding the embargo on wool ?

Mr FISHER:
ALP

– I ask the honorable member to address his question to the Minister of Trade and Customs, whose Department deals with the subject.

Mr BRUCE SMITH:
PARKES, NEW SOUTH WALES · FT; ANTI-SOC from 1906; LP from 1910; NAT from 1917

– I shall do so, and shall ask, further, whether, as the result of such a communication, the Minister is arranging to modify the embargo in favour of the United Kingdom?

Mr TUDOR:
ALP

– The position is that the export of wool is prohibited except with the consent of the Minister. There is no prohibition against its export to the United Kingdom.

Mr BRUCE SMITH:
PARKES, NEW SOUTH WALES · FT; ANTI-SOC from 1906; LP from 1910; NAT from 1917

– But there must be a guarantee that the wool will not be sent to any other country.

Mr TUDOR:

– There is no intention of removing’ that requirement, and I do not think the honorable member desires that it shall be removed. If the honorable member is anxious to ascertain the position regarding the export of wool to the United States or to other countries, I ask him to give notice of his question, and I shall then be able to make a complete statement.

Mr Fisher:

– It is a little premature yet to deal with the subject. The honorable member had better interview the Minister himself.

Mr TUDOR:

– A couple of cablegrams have been despatched, but no final decision has yet been arrived at.

page 710

PAPERS

The following papers were presented : -

Dominions Royal Commission (Imperial) -

Despatch from Secretary of State for the Colonies in connexion with an erratum on page 35 of the Second Interim Report of the Commission (presented 15th April, 1914).

Invalid and Old-age Pensions - Statement re, for the twelve months ended 30th June, 1914.

Lands Acquisition Act -

Return of land disposed of - at Geraldton,

Queensland - Leased to Johnstone shire council, &c.

Landacquired under, at -

Kalgoorlie, Western Australia - For Rail way purposes.

Wardell, New South Wales - For Postal purposes.

Weston, New South Wales - For Postal poses.

Naval Expenditure - Copy of a return to the order of the House of Commons, showing, in detail, the Naval expenditure of the principal Naval Powers.

Post and Telegraph Act -

Regulations amended - (Provisional) - Statutory Rules 1914, Nos. 145 147.

Statutory Rules 1914, Nos. 139, 144, 146.

War, European - Papers relating to the support offered by the princes and peoples of India to His Majesty in connexion with the war.

page 711

THROUGH BILLS OF LADING: LONDON TO NEWCASTLE

Mr WATKINS:
NEWCASTLE, NEW SOUTH WALES

asked the Assistant Minister representing the Minister of Defence, upon notice -

  1. Whether the Defence Department has yet made representations to the British Admiralty asking them to withdraw the embargo on issue of through bills of lading from London to Newcastle?
  2. Is he aware that at present all goods for Newcastle have to be transhipped at Sydney, to the serious loss of Newcastle people?
Mr JENSEN:
ALP

– The Department has no information that the Admiralty has placed an embargo on the issue of through bills of lading from London to Newcastle. The Admiralty is being asked to advise whether any such instructions have been issued in the matter.

page 711

QUESTION

DEFENCE DEPARTMENT

Liverpool Camp: Supply of Bread - Refitting of Transport Ships - Tenders for Great Coats, Western Australia - Bushmen’s Contingent: Offer of Queensland Pastoralists - New Works and Additional Hands

Mr PIGOTT:

asked the Assistant Minister representing the Minister of Defence, upon notice -

  1. Whether tenders were called for the supply of bread at the military camp at Liverpool?
  2. How many tenders were received; what tenderer was successful; what was the price?
Mr JENSEN:
ALP

– The answers to the honorable members questions are -

  1. Tenders were called.
  2. Four; State Bakery;11s. per 100 lbs.
Mr FINLAYSON:

asked the Assistant Minister representing the Minister of Defence, upon notice -

  1. Where, and by whom, were the ships for the transport of the First Expeditionary Force refitted?
  2. What was the cost of refitting in each case?
  3. Were the specifications and conditions as to quality of timber, &c, similar in each case ?
  4. What was the proportion of cost (a) for wages, (b) for material in each case?
Mr JENSEN:

– The answers to the honorable member’s questions are as follow: -

  1. At Sydney, Melbourne, and Brisbane, by Government dockyards and private firms.
  2. This is not yet known, as final accounts for refitting have not yet been paid.
  3. Owing to the urgency of the work any suitable timber available was allowed to be used. There were no specifications.
  4. See reply to No. 2.
Mr FOWLER:

asked the Assistant Minister representing the Minister of Defence, upon notice -

  1. Is it a fact that tenders were recently called for in Western Australia for the supply of some 10,000 great coats, tenders to close at 3 p.m. on the date of publication?
  2. Is this not an unreasonably short time to give to possible tenderers to make up and send in their tenders? 3. (a) Is it the practice to demand payment from a successful tenderer for the materials supplied to be made up?

    1. Does not this condition prevent many tenders from being made, and would not a satisfactory guarantee suffice?
Mr JENSEN:

– The answers to the honorable member’s questions are as follow : -

  1. The Senior Ordnance Officer was instructed by wire on 26th October to invite quotations for 10,810 great coats, and to advertise in local press, also to communicate with all firms likely to quote. Quotations closed at 3 p.m. on 29th October.
  2. As 8,400 great coats were urgently required by 20th and 25th November, it was not possible to give more time. 3. (a) Yes. (b) Possibly it does in some cases; but past experience has proved the necessity for such procedure to prevent the Department suffering loss.
Mr SINCLAIR:
MORETON, QUEENSLAND

asked the Assistant Minister representing the Minister of Defence, upon notice -

  1. Whether an offer has been received from the pastoralists of Queensland to raise and equip a regiment of Queensland bushmen for active service in the present war?
  2. If so, has the offer been accepted?
Mr JENSEN:

– The answers to the honorable member’s questions are as follow : - ‘

  1. Yes.
  2. No. The conditions of the offer were not considered suitable; but units have been raised in which bushmen from the same district could enlist together.
Mr J H CATTS:

asked the Assistant Minister representing the Minister of Defence, upon notice -

  1. Have any works been put in hand in the Defence Department additional to those in hand when the Minister took office?
  2. If so, what additional men have been employed, and where?
Mr JENSEN:

– The answers to the honorable member’s questions are as follow : -

  1. Yes; but the works so put in hand are, with the exception of some naval works, carried out by the Home Affairs Department.
  2. Ninety-eight at Flinders Naval Base, and sixty-one at Henderson Naval Base.

page 712

QUESTION

CHECK ROLLS

Mr SINCLAIR:

asked the Minister of Home Affairs, upon notice -

  1. On what date was the order issued to withhold check rolls from candidates at the recent Federal elections?
  2. For what reason were these rolls withheld?
  3. Were check rolls supplied to any candidate?
  4. As the appeal period has now lapsed, will he make the rolls available?
Mr ARCHIBALD:
Minister for Home Affairs · HINDMARSH, SOUTH AUSTRALIA · ALP

– The answers to the honorable member’s questions are -

  1. In the absence of any provision in the law requiring a special check of the certified list of voters used at the recent elections a direction to suspend action was issued on the 1st October, 1914.
  2. See answer to No. 1.
  3. No authority was given to issue a check roll to any candidate.
  4. The issue of check rolls to the candidates who contested the elections is not proposed. Any action which might be taken under Regulation 24a in regard to the certified list of voters will be purely administrative.

page 712

QUESTION

TELEGRAPH RATES : CANADA AND UNITED STATES

Mr KELLY:

asked the PostmasterGeneral, upon notice -

Will he give the schedules of rates for the transmission of telegraphic messages in Canada and in the United States of America?

Mr SPENCE:
Postmaster-General · DARLING, NEW SOUTH WALES · ALP

– The information desired by the honorable member is as follows: -

In the United States of America the charges for telegrams are calculated on a zone system, and vary according to distance.

The following are typical instances of charges from New York to other States. The figures show the day and night rates for messages of ten. words or less, exclusive of date, address, and signature, and also the day and night rates for each additional work: -

For night and day letters special rates and conditions are in force, particulars of which can be furnished if desired.

In Canada approximately the same rates apply as in United States of America.

The foregoing is according to the latest information in the hands of the Department, but it has been reported in the daily press that, by reason of the war, it was recently proposed to increase these charges.

page 712

QUESTION

PUBLIC WORKS

Mr J H CATTS:

asked the PostmasterGeneral, upon notice -

  1. Have any works been put in hand in the Postmaster-General’s Department additional to those in hand when the Minister took office?
  2. If so, what additional men have been employed and where?
Mr SPENCE:
ALP

– The answer to the honorable member’s first question is “Yes.” In regard to his second question, I cannot give the information without getting reports from all over the Commonwealth, which would take a considerable amount of time and involve additional work on staffs already fully occupied.

Mr J H CATTS:

asked the Minister of Home Affairs, upon notice -

  1. Haveany works been put in hand in the Home Affairs Department additional to those in hand when the Minister took office?
  2. If so where are these works located, and how many additional men are employed in each case?
  3. What was the total number of men employed by the Home Affairs Department on 30th September, and what is the total number at present employed?
Mr ARCHIBALD:
ALP

– To afford the information in regard to all the works being carried out throughout the Commonwealth would be a large undertaking, but I will obtain the particulars in regard to the principal works in each State and lay them on the table of the House.

page 713

QUESTION

UNEMPLOYMENT

Mr J H CATTS:

asked the Prime

Minister, upon notice -

  1. Is it a fact that the Prime Minister, as Commonwealth Treasurer, has offered to provide his Ministers with funds to proceed with works in their Departments, in order to provide work for the unemployed?
  2. Have any Ministers availed themselves of this offer?
  3. If so, will he state the names of such Ministers and the amount of money requisitioned and provided in each case?
Mr FISHER:
ALP

– I can answer the first part of the honorable member’s question. Money has been found for Ministers for works that can. be profitably proceeded with in order to relieve unemployment as far as is consistent with the interests of the Commonwealth. The particulars are not available at the present time.

page 713

CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION BILL (No. 2)

Second Reading

Debate resumed from 13th November (vide page 661), on motion by Mr. Hughes -

That this Bill be read a second time.

Mr GLYNN:
Angas

.- The adjournment since Friday has afforded me an opportunity to look more closely into the Bill, and it contains a principle of some importance. This seems to be another of those amendments of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act which have been made to overcome some of the inconveniences felt by Ministers and others in connexion with the judicial interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution. The chief provision, to which one might, in a general discussion, confine attention, is in clause 5, and in effect makes the decision of a single Judge in Chambers final as to constitutional powers as well as to the merits in the case of an industrial dispute. This clause is as follows: -

  1. The principal Act is amended by inserting after section 21 the following section : - “ 21 AA. When an alleged industrial dispute is submitted to the Court -

    1. in the case of a dispute submitted to the . Court by plaint - the complainant organization or association; and
    2. in any other case - any party to the proceeding or the Registrar, may apply to the High Court, for a decision on the question whether the dispute or any part thereof exists, or is ‘threatened or impending or probable, as an industrial dispute extending beyond the limits of any one State.

The amending Act, which was introduced in 1912 by, I think, the present AttorneyGeneral, provides - and I suppose this must have been deliberately done - that in deciding a question as to the constitutional powers of the Commonwealth, the Court must be composed of all the Judges, unless a majority of all the Judges concur. Further, it was provided that, when an application was made for a certificate under section 74 of the Constitution, permitting an appeal on the question of the powers of the Commonwealth and States, inter se, and of the powers of the States inter se, the application must be heard by three Judges. The latter provision was not, I think, introduced at the instance of the members of the present Government; but, while in deciding questions other than those touching constitutional matters, the Court must be composed of at least two Judges, we now have a measure introduced to enable a single Justice in Chambers to determine the question of constitutional powers. Such a provision presents some anomalies; and the Attorney-General, I think, as becoming a lawyer, spoke with some doubt as to what the effect of the proposed amendment might be. I think, however, that it is fairly clear that the decision of the Judge in Chambers - if he is to constitute the High Court, as the Bill says he may - will only decide the question of the power in the particular case. It will be seen, therefore, that we may have on similar, though not identical, facts, quite a different view taken by another Judge as to the principle of the division of power between the Commonwealth and the States. The Bill is an attempt to make the decision of one Judge in Court or in Chambers equivalent to that of the High Court in the matter of constitutional powers relating to arbitration. We may have two Judges taking diametrically apposite views as. to whether a constitutional dispute under certain circumstances is one of which the Court can take cognisance as extending beyond the limits of one State. It may be said that, as the Bill constitutes the single Judge the High Court, the decision of the High Court will be final - in other words, that the disinclination of the High Court, except in very rare cases, to reverse its previous decision on a question of interpretation, will affect even the decision of a single Judge. This I doubt, because I find that in the Tramways case, as reported in the Commonwealth Law lieports, Vol. 18, page 58, Chief Justice Griffith said - la ray opinion it is impossible to maintain as an abstract proposition that the Court is either legally or technically bound by previous decisions. Indeed, it may in a proper, case be its duty to disregard them. But the rule should be applied with great caution, and only when the previous decision is manifestly wrong, as, for instance, if it proceeded upon the mistaken assumption of the continuance of a repeal or expired Statute, or is contrary to a decision of another Court which this Court is bound to follow; not, I think, upon a mere suggestion that some or all of the members of the latter Court might arrive at a different conclusion if the matter were res integraOtherwise there would be grave danger of a want of continuity in the interpretation of the law.

The Court may, therefore, disregard its own decision, but it will only do so in rare cases. I doubt very much, however, if there will be much disinclination on the part of a Court of three or four Judges to reverse the decision of one Judge in Chambers on a question of jurisdiction, and which, as a matter of substance, has no obligation as a declaration of principle on any other Judge who may subsequently give a decision. That seems to be an anomaly; but I confess that I speak with a certain amount of doubt as to the effect of some of these provisions. This provision in clause 5 does not take away the power of getting prohibition; at all events, it does not take away the power of ascertaining whether the clause is valid or not. You cannot take away the power of the High Court to decide whether this particular clause is valid or not

Mr Hughes:

– Oh, no.

Mr GLYNN:

– Nor does it take away the right of appeal in those cases in which it exists from a Justice of the High Court to the Privy Council, viz., on a question as to the limits inter se of the respective powers 01 the States and Commonwealth referred to in section 74. Then comes this further anomaly that, whether an appeal is to be given or not, will be decided, not by the Court whose decision is final - that is the Court consisting of a single Judge, if it should so consist - but by three Judges, because, as I have mentioned, the question of the issue of a certificate permitting an appeal to the Privy Council under section 74 has, according to the Judiciary Act, to be brought before three Judges. Therefore, an application may be made for liberty to appeal to the Privy Council notwithstanding clause 5.

Mr Hughes:

– Do you say there can be an appeal only by leave?

Mr GLYNN:

– I do not say that. 1 have merely enumerated some cases that struck me. It is clear, however, that you do not take away the right of appeal by permission of the High Court.

Mr Hughes:

– Oh, no.

Mr GLYNN:

– But what you do attempt to do is to prevent the High Court hearing an appeal from the decision of a Justice in Chambers. As to the provisions of the Constitution which led to that possible power, I will say a word later, because I dealt with that matter at the Convention; and it seems to me to indicate a weakness in drafting.

Mr Hughes:

– Would that not apply in any case? Suppose the case went to the High Court, and not to a single Judge ?

Mr GLYNN:

– No doubt; but I am testing the Bill by its application to extreme cases, because it is an extreme action to declare that the validity of an award is to be decided, not by the highest Court in the land - which was the principle declared by the Government to which the present Attorney-General belonged previously - not by a large Court, but by a Court of one Judge only. What I may call the objections to the provisions on the merits from the point of view of expediency become more pronounced when dealing with the power of a single

Judge. It may be that the award based on the decision of the High Court or of a single Judge will be challenged by a litigant before another Federal Court. I understand that in America questions of appeal to test the validity of a judgment are generally taken when the judgment conies before the Court in the ordinary course. The fact that you have not an appeal from the award, during these proceedings, to the High Court may not prevent the question of the validity of that award being tested in other judicial proceedings, if the award is made the basis of a claim. I do not say that is so, but I merely bring the question up for consideration. Whatever view we take of judicial decisions, we ought not to make confusion worse confounded, from the point of view of the Government, and it seems to me that this Bill goes some way in the direction of doing that. Then you may have a case stated, or a prohibition of the. High Court, on similar facts in another dispute. The case may be stated by another Judge and a different Full Court will determine the application of certain facts to the Constitution, and completely reverse the decision of this Judge, in principle, leaving, by the way, the award, which, according to the decision of the Full Court, ought never to have been made,, absolutely valid, as a necessary result of this clause. I do not know of any other anomalies, but I would just support, by quotation from English cases, what I said about the appeal to the Privy Council. You may have an appeal, not -only on certificate, which is an appeal by permission of the High Court, to the Privy Council, but by special permission of the Privy Council itself. In other words, the Constitution does not take away the right in certain cases of getting leave to appeal to the Privy Council from the Privy Council itself, but the real Court of Appeal at Home, which, for our purposes,, is the Privy Council, doe? not grant leave in such cases where the litigant has chosen to go first to the final Court of Appeal in the State or Commonwealth. That is to say, if the litigant goes first to the High Court, and then asks the Privy Council to decide the question, the Privy Council will not, except in rare cases, grant leave to appeal. That Court will say “No, you have chosen your tribunal, and you must abide by its decision.”

Mr Mathews:

– In other words, the Privy Council recognises the High Court to be as high as the Privy Council itself.

Mr GLYNN:

– Yes, in some cases. In this Bill we are compelling a man to accept the decision- of a single Judge, and are declaring that Judge equal to the Court of Appeal. A man has to go to a Court on a question of merits, and you may have that very Judge constituted a High Court for the purpose of interpreting his own power in that particular case. At all events, he or some other Justice may be the High Court of Appeal. There may be a decision given, and the party who did not bring the matter for interpretation before the Court appeals to the Privy Council. The Privy Council would grant the right of appeal, because they will say that if a man has been compelled to go to the other Court, the principle is different. As a rule, they will not obstruct his right of appeal to them. We, therefore, find it decided, in the case of Clergue v. Murray, that where a person has elected to go to the Supreme Court it is not the practice to allow him to come to the Board, except in a very strong case, but that it is different when a man is taken before the Supreme Court and cannot help it. That practically is the effect of these provisions. I always take the view that if the principle of a Bill is sound, and there is an opening for a difference of opinion as to the powers of the Parliament, we ought to risk matters, it being the function of the High Court to determine the constitutional limits of our powers. Still, we can discuss whether there is prima facie evidence of power, which is what I am attempting to do now. As regards prohibition, it will be conceded that in the one case I put as to whether the section is valid, that is not taken away. In ex parte Whybrow, the bootmakers’ case, Griffith, Chief Justice, put the view, which was the decision of the High Court in two cases, in these words -

Then the point is put another way, thus : - Under the Constitution (section 73) an appeal lies to the High Court from every Federal Court unless otherwise enacted by Parliament. . . But it does not follow that enforcement of a judgment may not be prohibited by a Court having jurisdiction to make such order, although no appeal lies to the prohibiting Court.

Under the Bill no appeal is to lie to the prohibiting Court ; but that does not take away the power of the Court in cases in which at present it has the power by prohibition to decide as to the validity of a provision. As to the question of expediency, I shall devote only a few words to that matter; it seems to me that it would deepen confusion so far as it really does exist. There will be conflicting views of power. I think that the provision is inconsistent with the Federal system. In the American, as in other Federal systems of jurisprudence, it is not intended that the final word on law is to be that of a single Judge.

Mr Hughes:

– Is not the existence of a dispute a question of fact?

Mr GLYNN:

– The decision of the question of fact is not final as to the existence of a dispute within the meaning of the Constitution. We are unconsciously deceived by the misuse of words.

Mr Hughes:

– The High Court has declined to say what is a dispute - to lay down the legal limits of a dispute.

Mr GLYNN:

– What the High Court has decided - I think last of all in the Felt Hatters’ case - is that it will not, in general, answer merely hypothetical questions. The Court is not going to take the risk of saying what would be the meaning of a particular part of the Constitution if certain assumed facts existed. When a question arises, it must be sure of the facts. In the Felt Hatters’ case, the Court refused to answer some questions, on the ground that they were hypothetical; but it went a long way to help - as I think a Court ought to do if the way is fairly open to it-to give an interpretation that would go beyond the limits of the case itself, by answering one particular question, I think question No. la. The provision we are considering seems to me to run counter to the spirit of the Judiciary provisions of the Constitution in another respect. Although we think certain judicial decisions inconvenient, if we find that the High Court has been protected by all sorts of provisions in the Constitution against any attempt to. undermine its independence and discretion - provisions relating to the tenure of office of the Justices, the fixing of their salaries, and other provisions, pointing to a desire on the part of the people of the Commonwealth, who adopted the Constitution, to place beyond possibility political interference with the Court-we must acknowledge these facts. I do not say that there is an attempt here to interfere, but when certain decisions are found to be inconvenient, it is proposed to jump from the decision of a majority of seven Justices interpreting the Constitution to the decision of one Justice sitting in chambers.

Mr Hughes:

– One Justice will be called on to interpret a Statute; that is all.

Mr GLYNN:

– I am drawing attention to the constitutional provisions relating to the High Court and to the temper of the Constitution with respect to it. In dealing with questions of policy we should consider the spirit of the measure to a far greater extent than the Justices are capable of doing on the Bench, because the law which they are called on to interpret may contain provisions which prevent them from applying their sense of what ought to be. We are not obliged, if we find that the Constitution is against it in spirit, to make one Judge the final arbiter on any constitutional question.

Mr Hughes:

– What did the people mean by an industrial dispute?

Mr GLYNN:

– The Minister asks me to give a definition across the chamber of the meaning of a much discussed provision in the Constitution. I have not the temerity to do that.

Mr Hughes:

– Every one knows perfectly well what is meant.

Mr GLYNN:

– I hope that I have a keener sense of the limitations of the human intellect than to attempt to offer a definition now. Let us see what the Justices have said on this point. According to Bacon - I shall not quote the exact text, because it is in Latin - the province of a Judge is not to make or give, but to interpret the law. Let us remember that dictum when we are tempted to criticise rather severely under a sense of inconvenience caused by an interpretation of the law that a Court may have been compelled to find as. the correct one. As to the meaning of an industrial dispute, there is a consensus among the Justices, although they may differ as to the evidence required to establish a certain position. I am thoroughly sympathetic with every attempt to promote expedition and to prevent double hearing. I have not the remotest sympathy with the attempts which have been made - successfully in some cases - to wear out litigants by the consistent pressing of technicalities which ultimately would prove futile.

Mr Mathews:

– That is the lawyer’s way of slowing down.

Mr GLYNN:

– Not necessarily ; sometimes it is the litigants’ way-. In the Broken Hill case, nine out of ten or elevencompanies arrived at agreements which were subsequently made the basis of Mr. Justice Higgins’ award, but others persisted in what seemed technical objections, and secured a pyrrhic victory, which was neutralized by a retrospective amendment of the law. But in legislating we should try to feel the pulse of the Constitution, and should not go in a direction opposite to the flow. Mr. Justice Higgins has stated, in more than one award, that a dispute must embody a real claim, fairly definite, and of real substance. He took those words from Conway and Wade, an English case, as to what constitutes a trade dispute, and used them in his judgment in the case of the Merchant Service Guild of Australia v. the Commonwealth Steam-ship Owners. There must be a real claim, fairly definite, and of real substance. I do not think that any Justice holds the opinion suggested by the AttorneyGeneral, that there is no mean between recognising -a mere paper demand and refusal as constituting a dispute and a strike.

Mr Hughes:

– I did not say that.

Mr GLYNN:

– I have not read the Hansard report of the honorable and learned gentleman’s speech, but the comprehension of his hearers was that, if a mere demand and refusal were not to constitute a dispute, there was nothing for it but to manifest the feeling which existed by a strike.

Mr Hughes:

– I quoted from Mr. Justice Isaacs’ judgment.

Mr GLYNN:

– I shall emote from that judgment, too. Mr. Justice Higgins, in the case of the Engine-drivers and Firemen v. the Broken Hill Company and others, said, on the 12th May, 1911 -

It is true that last year I dismissed a plaint filed by this very association, on the ground that there was no genuine dispute outside New South Wales. I found that certain employes in other States, had joined in the proceedings, not under thepressure of grievances of their own, but in order to help their comrades in New South Wales collieries; treating a New South Wales dispute as a dispute extending beyond New South Wales, so as to gain access to this Court. But this case is very different.

In that case Mr. Justice Higgins refused to acknowledge the existence of a dispute, notwithstanding that the claim was made, and that there was an implied refusal; but it would not do to rush forward an amendment of the law because of the sense of inconvenience that might be caused by such a decision. In the Felt Hatters’ case -18 Commonwealth Law Reports, p.109 - Mr. Justice Higgins said -

Primâ facie the request made is that the log sent on the 2nd August is to be treated as real, genuine, and intended to be pressed by any appropriate means. But it was open to the respondents to prove to the contrary, as respondents proved it in the case of the Federated Engine-drivers, &c, Association versus Caledonian Coal Company.

Mr. Justice Higgins will accept the demand and refusal as primâ facie evidence throwing on the respondent the onus of showing that there was not a real and genuine dispute. Let me now give the views of the Chief Justice. I happen to have been in one or two of these cases. In the Jumbunna case, he gave a general definition of what constitutes an industrial dispute -

An industrial dispute exists where a considerable number of employes engaged in same branch industry make common cause in demanding from or refusing to their employers (whether one or more) some change in the condition of their employment, which is denied to them or asked of them.

Mr. Justice Barton says what Mr. Justice Higgins, in effect, does in the quotations I have given -

Surely disputants in different States may make common cause to defend a common interest when it is attacked or threatened, provided that mere sympathy is notconfounded with material interest.

Now, let us get on to the case of the Federated Sawmillers and others James Moore. Here we have one of the constituents of an industrial dispute as declared by the Chief Justice-

The term “ industrial dispute “ connotes a real and substantial difference, having some element of persistency, and likely, if not adjusted, to endanger the industrial peace of the community. It must be a real and genuine dispute, not fictitious or illusory. Such a dispute is not created bya mere formal demand and refusal without more. … In considering industrial disputes we are concerned with real facts, not words or word spinning.

He says there must be real discontent existing, and he mentions that there must be large bodies of men, Such large bodies of men in two or more States acting, in fact, with one accord.

Mr Hughes:

– Does the honorable member say that large numbers are a vital element in the matter ?

Mr GLYNN:

– No, nor, without qualification, does the Chief Justice. He says that mere sporadic discontent here and there does not indicate a dispute of the magnitude that would make it fall within the industrial power given by the Constitution.

Mr Hughes:

– Does he say that a further demand after a refusal is evidence of the existence of a dispute?

Mr GLYNN:

– I am not giving my view; I am simply saying what the Justices say. The other day the AttorneyGeneral did not altogether make an attack on the Judiciary, but he used fairly strong language as to the effect of their recent decisions. With all due respect, after reading the interpretations of the Justices, I do not think that the honorable gentleman was justified in so severely criticising the Court.

Mr Hughes:

– I did not do so; I simply attacked the system which made the position possible, and I said that the Judiciary would be very glad if there were some means by which the matter could be settled.

Mr Mathews:

– Surely, if men strike, it is evidence of the existence of a dispute?

Mr GLYNN:

– The Court says that it - a. demand and refusal alone - is not conclusive, and, on the question of substance and material interest, the same view is taken in England, as I could show from the Imperial report on trade disputes for 1894. Mr. Justice Isaacs says -

It must; of course, be a real dispute. A demand and refusal may bc made in terms and in circumstances which indicate that they are merely tentative or that they are an ultimatum. In the one case they would probably not constitute a dispute: in the second the President might think they did.

Right through all the decisions of the Judges we may find differences as to the amount of evidence necessary to support a demand, but we shall find that the Court does not regard the fact of a demand having been made as conclusive evidence of the existence of such discontent as will constitute a dispute, or as to the question of whether the dispute extends beyond the limits of a particular State. I could refer to Conway and Wade to show that the same opinion is held by the English Justices.

Mr Brennan:

– Are not the definitions of all the Justices of what constitutes a dispute nearly all the same, while the views of the Justices as to the facts differ?

Mr GLYNN:

– The definitions are nearly all the same ; it is simply a question of evidence as to facts, and therefore it is not right for this Parliament to attack the majority of the Court, on the ground that they have produced an inconvenience which could have been avoided.

Mr Hughes:

– Is not the position now that an award fairly given may be upset by technicalities?

Mr GLYNN:

– Certainly not in all cases. I have seen only the newspaper report of the Tramways case. The Chief Justice held that “every one of the four fundamental rules as to disputes was entirely disregarded in the institution and promotion of the alleged dispute,” and he further held that “ a Federal character was not given to the association according to the rules.”

Mr Riley:

– Who made the rules?

Mr GLYNN:

– The Association. The Bill before us is dealing with each of these points. There are many provisions in the measure with which I agree; but I maintain that the High Court took the view that they were compelled to take. At any rate, I hold that a reasonable difference of opinion could be taken on the point as to whether the dispute was a genuine one, or whether, in the institution and conduct of it, the rules had been violated. The Chief Justice also held that “ the attempts to validate what had been invalid” were futile, and were in themselves invalid. He held that the resolution passed by the organization was, at its best, a resolution attempting to validate what had been done, and which the organization probably found was invalid - that “ it was an attempt at the rectification by unappointed agents of their own unauthorized acts.” Mr. Justice Isaacs differed from tlie Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Barton on the question’ of the existence of a dispute, but the question with us is not which Justice was right or which Justice was wrong. I hold that there was room for a difference of opinion among the members of the Court, and that we should not say that the Judiciary were not acting within a reasonable sense of their duty in not exercising their constitutional powers coincident with the views of some Minister of the Crown. I hope that we shall not use language which conveys an unfair imputation upon the common sense of the Judiciary. Mr. Justice Isaacs points out some lines on which, perhaps, it is desirable that our legislation should be amended. I think that he mentions the inconvenience of having the question of fact as to the existence of a dispute settled by two different tribunals. We all agree with him there. It is most harassing for an organization, after a hearing of, perhaps, twenty or thirty days, to have to go to another Court and have the matter threshed out again; but it is one of the inconveniences of the power given in the Federal Constitution. I do not think the Bill before us will alter the matter in that regard, because the power given in the Constitution must, from time to time, be interpreted by the High Court, and that interpretation will involve inquiry into the facts as to whether a dispute exists. Therefore, I do not see how we can avoid going to the High Court on the point. Also, there is provision in the Arbitration Act by which the President may reserve a point for the High Court. Mr. Justice Higgins has said that he found it very difficult to decide on the question of jurisdiction until he had really heard all the facts. I do not think he decides many questions of jurisdiction now,, but he used to postpone his final decision on the question of jurisdiction until he’ had heard all the facts, those affecting the merits of the case as well as those affecting the existence of an Inter-State dispute. Therefore, it will not be so easy, in some cases, at least, to get the High Court to shorten the procedure without there being a liability to error. The Bill proposes that the whole question of the existence of a dispute should be referred to the High Court first of all. In that case the question of hearing evidence as to the facts must be cut out. All these matters touch ‘ upon the usefulness of the provision in the Constitution, and raise the question of whether the apportionment of the industrial power is a proper one; whether Ave could not find some better means of expediting these disputes, and attaining the end less expensively, and with less harassment to the organizations through the waste of time. In regard to the matter of insistence on rules, Schloesser, in a recent work on trade unionism, points out that trade unions are the most insistent on the strict ob servance of their rules by officers and others. He says -

In all trade unions the power and authority are vested in numbers. The governing body cannot act without their sanction, either as expressed in the certified rules, or as determined by a specific vote. In a properly constituted trade union there is no such thing as anarchy. The unions recognise the fact that order is the law of progress, and they act upon the principle with Conservative tenacity in all they do. *

That is dealing with the fact that no men are more jealous as to the observance of their own rules than are the trade unions of the United Kingdom. What was done by some Justices of the High Court in the Tramways case was to say that the action of some officers of the organization was in disregard of the rules which were framed by and accepted by the organization itself. As I waa saying, a good deal of this trouble has arisen from the apportionment of the industrial power, and from the way in which that power was amended in the Federal Convention. As originally introduced by Mr. Higgins, the power waa “ to make laws in regard to industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of any one State,” and had the power been left at that, the limitation to Commonwealth arbitration would not exist; but Mr. Kingston did not believe in the States surrendering all the industrial powers, nor did Mr. Wise. Both spoke strongly against the current view that the industrial powers should be’ given over to the Commonwealth.

Mr Fenton:

– Would they say the same thing now1?

Mr GLYNN:

– I do not know. I am merely mentioning what occurred at the Convention. Mr. Kingston proposed that the power should be “ conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes.” Mr. Higgins moved an amendment to this, which waa subsequently accepted at the Melbourne Convention, and inserted in the Constitution, adding the words “ extending beyond the limits of any one State.” I do not think that the Arbitration Court should be abolished. It has done good work in raising and maintaining a reasonable standard in the conditions of employment, but I notice that in 1912 we had in Australia 14,500 manufacturing industries employing 312,000 hands, and paying £32,000,000 a year in wages, and notwithstanding that we have had a very energetic Arbitration Court, there have been only twenty-eight awards - I do not know how many persons were affected by them - forty-eight compulsory conferences, and, I think, 359 industrial agreements. The volume of work done since 1904 does not indicate that arbitration is the best method of settling the question of what are fair rates and conditions of employment.

Mr Hughes:

– Does it not rather show that access to the Court is somewhat difficult?

Mr GLYNN:

– It is hard to avoid a lengthy hearing regarding the merits of a dispute. We may avoid technicalities, and I hope we shall ; but I do not know whether it is possible to avoid a double hearing. The Bill provides, as a matter of fact, for double hearings. It provides for a hearing by a Justice before the question of the merits is gone into, and unless we make the President of the Court the Justice who isto determine that question, I do not know how we can overcome the difficulty of a double hearing, in some cases, where the question of jurisdiction is raised.

Mr Hughes:

– Does the honorable member say that the Conciliation and Arbitration Court takes longer to hear a case than a Wages Board would take?

Mr GLYNN:

– No; but I say that a Wages Board award applies to the whole industry affected, whereas an award of the Conciliation and Arbitration Court does not.

Mr Hughes:

– That is the fault of the Constitution

Mr GLYNN:

– That is the point. The Conciliation and Arbitration Court is doing good work, but cannot cover the whole field. There were, I think, over 170 respondents in the Engine-drivers’ case, and the award was applicable only to the respondents.

Mr Hughes:

-Therewere more in the Bricklayers’ case.

Mr GLYNN:

– In the Federated Sawmillers’ case there were 173 respondents, and more in the case to which the AttorneyGeneral has referred. But the award in each case applies only to the litigants.

Mr Mathews:

– We cannot have a common rule

Mr GLYNN:

-As the honorable member for Melbourne Ports says, there is no power in the Court to frame a common rule, which is the logical corollary of arbi- tration. It seems to me that we shall have to consider the best method of framing a general law in relation to industry - a law directed towards the establishment of fair and reasonable conditions of employment. The President of the Conciliation and Arbitration Court has done exceedingly good work, and I say deliberately that the view which he took as to what ought to be the basis of an award is one that has been held at Home, as may be found by reference to the reports of Royal Commissions. In the final report of the Imperial Commission of 1894, for instance, the question of the usefulness of arbitration in dealing with a matter of this kind is discussed at page 144, and the very point I am now alluding to is touched on. The report states -

The points at issue are not such as admit of decision upon principles which both sides accept. . . .

It goes on to say -

If arbitration is resorted to at all with regard to this class of questions, we think it should only take place on references which (omitting all mention of fluctuations of prices, or profits, or of any abnormal year) are especially based upon an inquiry whether the existing conditions are or are not consistent with efficient citizenship.

That is practically the principle applied by Mr. Justice Higgins.

Mr Hughes:

– That report was issued a long while ago. Remember how we have advanced since then.

Mr GLYNN:

– The Attorney-General ought not to talk about the advances we have made in this matter until he realizes the import of this report. It has been cited again and again in the Court in order to sustain a view which the honorable gentleman himself seems to take.

Mr Hughes:

– It serves, no doubt, a very useful purpose.

Mr GLYNN:

– The view taken by Mr. Justice Higgins as to what ought to be the basis of an award as to rates of wages, namely, that it should be that of an efficient standard of living, is the very view taken in this report. I am not saying that the administration of the Act has not come fairly well up to popular expectations, nor am I impugning in the least the soundness generally of the awards made by the Court. What I do contend is that it is a difficult power to have to deal with such a matter as Australian industries. I am not going to discuss at present what amendments or modifications of this power ought to be made, but I think every member of tlie Opposition is prepared, as far as possible, to assist in trying to solve this very difficult and important problem of industrial conditions by some provision auxiliary to, if not in substitution of, the somewhat imperfect arbitration provisions that exist to-day.

Mr Hughes:

– The honorable member has not directed his remarks to the proposition made by Mr. Justice Isaacs that there should be a separate Court, or that the Conciliation and Arbitration Court should be clothed with the necessary jurisdiction to decide what is a dispute.

Mr GLYNN:

– I mentioned that Mr. Justice Isaacs expressed tlie opinion that we ought, if possible, to avoid two hearings in the same matter. An appeal, at the present time, means threshing out the merits of the case a second time before the High Court. I do not know how that is to be overcome. An attempt is being made to overcome it by this Bill, but, if Mr. Justice Higgins’ opinion, expressed as the result of great experience, is right - that you cannot always come to a correct decision on the question of jurisdiction without a knowledge of the facts that affect the merits! - then I do not see, unless you appoint the President himself to be a Court of Appeal from himself, how you can avoid the two hearings. Even if another Judge were appointed to settle a question of constitutional power upon a preliminary application, he could not avoid going into the merits of the case. To a great extent he would have to do so in order to enable him to arrive at a decision. I agree with Mr. Justice Isaacs as to the expediency of avoiding double hearings if possible.

Mr Hughes:

– Does the honorable member adopt Mr. Justice Higgins’ suggestion that the Arbitration Court should be clothed with the necessary jurisdiction to hear the facts and determine the question?

Mr GLYNN:

– I do not see how it would be possible to hand over to the Conciliation and Arbitration Court the decision of the extent of its own powers. The Constitution does not contemplate the decision of constitutional questions by one Justice. We all become more or less affected by the sense of authority. Even Judges on the Bench do so. Every man pushes his power to the fullest extent that his dignity will permit, and the principle that the extent of a Judge’s power, every time tlie question is raised, should be left to himself to determine, is a dangerous one.

Mr Joseph Cook:

– Do I understand the honorable member to say that the President of the Court, sitting in Chambers, might himself be the Judge of his own powers?

Mr GLYNN:

– I do not say it should be so, but the Attorney-General does think that a Judge in Chambers might so act, and it has been argued that the Justice to decide the question of jurisdiction might be the President of the Conciliation arid Arbitration Court himself.

Mr Brennan:

– Why not?

Mr GLYNN:

– Surely the honorable member does not think that a Justice who decides a question on the merits should also finally decide the extent of his constitutional power?

Mr Brennan:

– I should think it is very proper that he should do so.

Mr GLYNN:

– I can only refer my honorable friend to the Act passed in 1912, ill which it was declared that a Bench of seven Justices was necessary to decide constitutional questions unless a majority of four, of course, agreed. I do not know why there has been this extraordinary change of opinion as to the expediency of allowing the High Court to determine questions of constitutional power. It seems to me that we may legitimately infer from what has been done that there has been a change of opinion, but in any event I hope .we shall find some means of overcoming, at least, some of the acknowledged difficulties of the administration of the Act.

Mr RILEY:
South Sydney

.- I am one of those who view almost with despair tlie present Conciliation and Arbitration Act so far as the speedy settlement of any dispute brought before the Court is concerned. I strongly favoured the principle of arbitration, with a view of causing the whole of our industrial machinery to work smoothly in the production and development of the wealth of the Commonwealth; but recent decisions of the High Court have led me to think that we should be far better off if the present Act were removed from the statute-book. No one, whether he be an employer’ or employe, knows exactly how he is going to get to the Court, and, when he does get there, how long the hearing of his case will take, or what is going’ to be the result of the inquiry.

Under most of our Acts of Parliament, the penalties for breaches of them are clearly set forth. We in the industrial movement do not want strikes, and the Act provides that if we do strike we shall not be allowed to go into Court. In order to come before the Court, however, we have to take such steps as will bring usvery near to a strike. When we do so, the question of jurisdiction is raised, as it was in the Tramways case, and members of the High Court Bench sit for twenty-three days, and finally come to the conclusion that there is no dispute. The Justices of the High Court draw from £3,000 to £3,500 per year. The Court does not sit on Saturday, so that in the Tramways case it was occupied for practically one calendar month in hearing the question of jurisdiction. It finally came to the conclusion that there was no dispute, and that the President of the Court had no jurisdiction, therefore, to try the case at all, or to make an award. But the High Court did not lay down the lines upon which a union might go to the Court.It did not say what constituted a dispute. I am not a legal man, but I claim to be one of the common-sense members of the community. I have listened with pleasure to the legal argument of the honorable member for Angas, but it does not get over what seems to me to be the common-sense view. What are the facts in regard to the Tramways case ? The Brisbane tramways employés decided to have a union, and their employers determined if possible to prevent it. The employés resolved to have a union badge, and the employers decided that if they wore such a badge they should be dismissed. The men wore the badge, and they were dismissed. A lock-out took place, and was followed by what was almost a riot. Yet we have the High Court of Australia, after a hearing extending over twenty-three days, deciding that in that case there was no dispute. The common-sense people of the community must feel some misgiving as to the ability of the High Court in such circumstances to decide an industrial question of the kind. If two or three business men were asked to decide what was an industrial dispute, they would quickly determine that where we had employés demanding a certain concession and employers refusing it, there was a dispute - that there were two parties in disagreement - but the High Court, as at present constituted, says that in such circumstances there is no dispute. Is arbitration worth fighting about if this is to be the position ? The employers and workers of this country, who have spent thousands of pounds in bringing their cases before the Court, are not at all satisfied with the way in which they have been decided.

Sir John Forrest:

– The employés are satisfied if the award is given in their favour.

Mr RILEY:

– That is not the question. In this case the President of the Court decided that there was a dispute, with the result that five other employers came in and made industrial agreements, under which they worked. Those industrial agreements were brought about by the dispute, and yet the High Court now decides that there was no dispute, and these five industrial agreements no longer prevail. This House will have to consider its duty to the people and to say whether the time has not arrived when the Act should be repealed, and the High Court given some other useful work to do, rather than have cast upon it the duty of sitting for twentythree days to consider whether there is not a dispute in a case where a lock-out took place, which was followed by what was nearly a riot.

Sir John Forrest:

– Disputes should not be manufactured.

Mr Finlayson:

– Why did the Liberals manufacture a double dissolution?

Mr RILEY:

– The double dissolution is a fact that Liberals now very much regret. For two years the parties interested in the disputes to which I refer took evidence in nearly every State, and when, after vast expenditure, they obtained an award, certain interested parties raised the question whether the Arbitration Court had any jurisdiction. The whole crux of the question discussed during the twenty-three days was whether there was a dispute; and now, after this great expense and loss of time, there is no basis on which an appeal can be made to the Arbitration Court. The whole Arbitration Act is a sham, and so is the system of the High Court appeals ; and I hope that the time will come when the workers and the people generally will cease to pay high salaries for such a return. Had working men taken up so much time over work relatively simple, the whole of the newspapers of the country would have been talking about “ the man on the job.” The position is ridiculous; and the common sense of the country will repudiate this loafing in the High Court. I confess that I have no faith in the Bill, because the only effective course is to appeal to the country for an amendment of the Constitution. After men have spent their money in the adoption of a peaceful method of remedying their grievance, they are defeated on flimsy technicalities and musty, fusty law. There is no real doubt as to the existence of a dispute ; but because the facts do not comply with some particular law or technicality, the High Court, as now constituted, takes full time to consider all the points raised, and to find all the objections that can possibly be found ; indeed, I say openly that I have read many of the High Court decisions, and I believe that the Judges read words into the Act to prevent awards standing. One clause in the Bill will prevent five Judges sitting in such cases, and taking up the time of the country, where one Judge is sufficient ; we do not desire to employ five men to do the work of one. The Bill, I believe, will he passed, but, as I say, I have no faith in it, because, doubtless, the High Court will find a way to render it useless. We have passed five or six amending Acts, and each has been quashed by the interpretation of the law by the High Court. Those who appeal to the Arbitration Court do not seem to be able to get any judgment that will stand ; and, if I could, by my vote to-morrow, I should wipe the Arbitration Act off the statutebook, knowing that we really can do nothing without an alteration of the Constitution. I support the Bill for what it is worth, but enter my protest against the waste of time in the High Court over trifling technicalities.

Mr GROOM:
Darling Downs

– So far as the Attorney-General seeks to remove technicalities from the path of those who are trying to obtain substantial justice in the Arbitration Court, he will find he has the entire sympathy of honorable members on this side. There is no desire on the part of any one that cases should be unduly prolonged or unduly costly, c-y that the real aims and intentions of the parties in a case of real and substantial dispute should be in any way frustrated; and any proposal with the object of providing cheap, effective, and direct settlement and industrial peace will be supported to the full. But constant attacks are made on the High Court, because, as it is said, it bases its judgments on technicalities. Do honorable members really think that the High Court has no object in view but to raise technical points in order to prevent justice being done? Such a suggestion is absolutely without foundation. When we examine the cases we find that so-called technical points are really points of justice and of substance, involving the interpretation of the Constitution and the distribution of powers between the Commonwealth and the States. Honorable members, of course, may, in this connexion, take different views, but the High Court has undoubtedly been most unjustly and unfairly attacked. Parliament owes to the High Courts the duty of approaching its judgments with respect - of paying some respect to the personnel of the Court whether its judgments are for or against any particular views. Of course we have the undoubted right to criticise the judgments, or otherwise our functions would be very much curtailed. But here is what the Attorney-General said in his speech upon this Bill -

I do not hesitate, indeed, to say that no citizen who desires industrial peace oan view the latest decision without alarm. It ia la decision absolutely incompatible with industrial peace - nay, more, it is nothing short of a direct provocation to industrial war. The Arbitration Court was established for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes. But if we can gather, from the hideous entanglement of technicalities and long-drawn-out litigation in the Tramways case, any substantial principle - no man knoweth what a “ dispute1” is ! Could anything be at once more grotesque and more incompatible with the maintenance of industrial peace than such a position?

That, I say, is absolutely unfair criticism.

Mr Brennan:

– Does the honorable member say that that constitutes an attack on the personnel of the Court?

Mr GROOM:

– Not for one moment; but it is a piece of unjust criticism.

Mr Brennan:

– I thought the honorable member read the quotation in proof of what he had just said.

Mr GROOM:

– I deprecate personalities, and I also deprecate this kind of criticism. The so-called technicalities are really questions involving the interpretation of the Constitution. There are, df course, two views that may be taken > but simply because some honorable members . find that the view taken by the Court does not sustain their own opinions, they immediately jump to the conclusion; that the judgment rests on technicalities. My own opinion is that the difficulty has been created outside ratherthan within the Court. The intention of the Constitution is perfectly clear . The section is -

The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to - ….. Conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of any one State.

Those words show the general purport, and the intention behind, when the Constitution was drawn up, was that the Arbitration Court should deal with great national disputes, those of local significance being left to the States concerned. Verysoon after the Arbitration Act was passed,an agitation arose outside for an extension of the powers, and the method of extending them would have amounted to an attempt of perversion of the whole purpose of the Constitution. The disputes contemplated when the Constitution was settled were such as those that had been experienced in connexion with the shearing and maritime industries, and the intention was that the judicial power of the Commonwealth should be invoked to settle actual disputes extending beyond the limits of a State with a view to industrial peace. In the meantime, how ever, Wages Boards had. been growing lip in the various States, and it had become the practice to prepare comprehensive logs regulating all the details ofan industry; and difficulties arose because the leaders of the workers attempted to convert the Arbitration Court from its original intention, as a Court for the settlement of disputes, into one the object of which was really to legislate in every detail for the whole of an industry.

Mr Brennan:

– The High Court has taken a very much wider view than that of the honorable member, narrow as the viewof the High Court may be.

Mr GROOM:

– I am now dealing with the intention behind the section in the Constitution. I am not contending for one moment that the Court has not the powers or ought not to entertain all the substantial points at issue; but what do we find even before a case is lodged ? An attempt is, made by means of a log to settle the whole details of an industry, from A to Z, as, for instance, in the. case of, the shearers, whose rations were even regulated in all details. In the Felt Hatters’ case, there were 308 specific points raised for regulation. When there is an attempt to make this Court something that it was never intended to be under the Constitution, and the Court finds itself unable to grant some of the requests made, there is immediately the accusation of resorting to technicalities. On this point I should like to read the following from the judgment of Mr. Justice Higgins in the Tramways case: -

There are eleven respondents; and the claim really involves a study of the working conditions of eleven distinct tramway systems (or twelve when Ballarat and Bendigo are separated), with the consideration of. the wages of seventy-two classes of workers, and the examination of forty-six other complex claims, involving about eighty distinct claims in all, for each system. This case illustrates the tendency, to which I have referred in previous cases, to treat this Court as if it were it Legislature, with power to make a complete code for the employment of labour in any kind of industry, instead of a tribunal which has merely power to prevent or settle disputes.

Mr. Justice Higgins there emphasizes the very point I am making. Most of the troubles arise from the fact that the leaders of the movement outside, in seeking to extend the powers of the Court beyond the intention of the Constitution, find themselves in hopeless difficulties; and when the men are disappointed on account of the expense and delay, those leaders, instead of taking the responsibility, accuse the High Court of technicalities.

Mr LAIRD SMITH:
DENISON, TASMANIA · ALP; NAT from 1917

– The High Court was not unanimous, though the honorable member was assuming that it was.

Mr GROOM:

– That is another question altogether. Mr. Justice Higgins, speaking generally on the methods and tendencies of the industrial leaders outside, said -

This case illustrates the tendency, to which I have referred in previous cases, to treat this Court as if it were a Legislature with power to make a complete code for the employment of, labour in any kind of industry, instead of a tribunal which has merely power to prevent or settle disputes.

That is the basic cause of the whole trouble.

Mr Brennan:

– He gave a satisfactory award, at any rate!

Mr GROOM:

– That may be so; but we have, for instance, the honorable member for South Sydney blaming the Presiding Judge or Judges for the slow way in which the work is carried on. Let us hear what Mr. Justice Higgins has to say on that point - .

Tha result of inattention to this obvious fact has been a great waste of time in eliminating matters not really in dispute between the partics, and in confining the award to matters which arc in dispute.

The fault is not that of the Judges, but that of the industrial leaders outside, who are confusing the issues, and instead of confining themselves to the points in dispute before the Court, introduce other various matters. Honorable members cannot make any complaint about the legal profession in this matter, because the profession is excluded, from the Court.

Mr HANNAN:
FAWKNER, VICTORIA · ALP

– The complaint of the honorable member for South Sydney was against tlie appeal.

Mr GROOM:

– I understood that the honorable member was speaking of arbitration proceedings generally.

Mr Riley:

– No.

Mr GROOM:

– I ask the honorable member if he did not refer to the lengthy time these cases took before the Court?

Mr Riley:

– T was speaking of one specific case.

Mr GROOM:

– The honorable member’s language was general. Mr. Justice Higgins said-

The result of inattention to this obvious fact lias been a great waste of time in eliminating matters not really in dispute between the parties, and in confining the award to matters which arc in dispute.

That is so. In a great many cases matter was. incorporated in the log that ought never to have been there. His Honour continued -

I have had to examine 291 exhibits put in by the claimant, and 397 exhibits put in by the respondents, and many of the exhibits contain several and lengthy documents. There are more than S,300 pages of transcript from the shorthand notes. Tlie case has occupied ninety-three days - more than any case with which I have yet had to deal. The time taken in the investigation has been enormous, owing not only to the intrinsic difficulties of the subject) and to the attempt to get a labour code for so many elaborate systems, but owing, in particular, to the want of power in this Court to proceed by way of common rule, and to the want of power to deal with any disputes which do not extend beyond one State.

Mr Spence:

– That was the fault of the Constitution.

Mr GROOM:

– That is only one fault he mentions; but the fault also lies with the responsible leaders, who framed the statement of the case. His Honour went on to say -

For at each stage of the case, and on each question, all the representatives of the different tramways were entitled to be heard.

Mr. Justice Higgins is not alone in that opinion. Other Judges have held the same views about the attempted perversion of this tribunal. The Chief Justice pointed that out in his remarks in the Felt Hatters’ case, at page 93 -

To this I only desire to add that, in my opinion, the power conferred on the Parliament by section 51 (xxxv) is not a power to constitute a Board or tribunal, consisting of one or more persons, with authority to regulate, by its decisions or awards, the conduct of industrial enterprise. Nor is the power to transfer the control of industrial enterprises to such a Board or tribunal, by empowering it to accede to any demands made by the employes. The authority which may be conferred upon the tribunal is authority to settle industrial disputes properly so called. I am not, for the present purpose, concerned with the distinction between actual and threatened or probable disputes. I repeat that the dispute must bc something more than a claim to have the conduct of an industry regulated. It must be a real dispute of such a nature as to indicate a real danger of dislocation of industry if it is not settled.

Mr Hannan:

– What, in your opinion, constitutes a real dispute?

Mr GROOM:

– I will give you the Chief Justice’s opinion ) that is more important. His Honour continued -

Unfortunately, attempts have sometimes been made to take advantage of this provision of the Constitution for the purpose of creating so-called disputes, not for the real purpose of preserving industrial peace, but for the purpose of taking the control of industry out of the hands of employers. In my opinion, such attempts are a fraud upon the Constitution, and ought to be so treated. Such machinemade disputes are not, in my opinion, industrial disputes at all within the meaning of the Constitution, and cannot be said to be disputes extending beyond tlie limits of any one State merely because of the identity of the language in which the claims are made, or because a claim relating to the operations of the same industry carried on in two or more States is comprised in a single document.

Mr. Justice Barton also pointed out, just as Mr. Justice Higgins and the Chief Justice had done, the attempt to pervert this tribunal and make it a. Board to regulate wages. At page 104 of the 18th Commonwealth Law Reports, in the Felt Hatters’ case, Mr. Justice Barton said -

The setting up of some tribunal to regulate the conditions of industry, irrespective of questions of dispute, but with a jurisdiction coextensive with any series of claims that can bc made by employes on employers, may, or may not, be an entirely desirable thing. It is not for this Court to pronounce upon any Such question. But it is as clear as can be that the Constitution does not enable the establishment of any such tribunal. The Parliament may legislate for conciliation and arbitration, not for the prevention and settlement of such claims, but of industrial disputes of Inter-State extension.

Then on the same page he added -

However morally justifiable it may be to invoke the action of the Court for the entire regulation of an industry, apart from any dispute, that is not the office which, under the Constitution, can be imposed upon the Court. The adoption of such a process may be called, in a sense by no means opprobrious, an attempt to create a dispute. But it is an attempt which cannot succeed, because the intention of the Constitution is that the Court should operate upon the pre-existing state of facts amounting to a dispute or impending dispute, and not upon some position which follows, instead of preceding, a demand which is put forward merely to open the door of the Court.

Those three Judges clearly drew attention to the perversion that has been taking place all through these cases, and every time the aim- has been frustrated, an attack has been made on the High Court, and it has been accused of technicalities. The High Court is not responsible. The responsibility is with those who formulated claims distinctly and avowedly against the intentions of the Act.

Mr West:

– That is the effect of the Constitution not giving power to deal with these matters.

Mr GROOM:

– The honorable member may be right in asking for wider constitutional powers. I think that a wider power should be given to the Court ; that is reasonable criticism, and is very different indeed from attacking the Court, and saying that it is because of the technicalities of arbitration that the whole of this difficulty has been created. I say that so far as this section is concerned, there has not been a really substantial dispute, extending beyond the limits of any one State, and brought before the tribunal, that has not been sustained and properly sustained. Honorable members will admit that, so far as concerns the twenty-nine awards that have been given, this Court has done a great deal in the settlement of industrial disputes.

Mr Hughes:

– The Court said that the Tramways case was a dispute, and heard the facts for ninety-three days.

Mr GROOM:

– The Attorney-General gave only the minority Judge’s opinion. Four other Judges took a very different . view indeed. Members ou neither side have had an opportunity of studying the whole of the records, amounting, as one of the Judges remarked, to 5,300 pages of transcript alone. Has any member on either side of the House read the whole of the evidence?

Mr Brennan:

– Only one Judge had the opportunity of hearing the whole of the evidence, and he decided that there was a dispute.

Mr GROOM:

– It is not only a question of hearing the evidence, but of reading the transcript of the notes. I would like to know whether the AttorneyGeneral, before, making such a strong pronouncement as he gave us the other afternoon, went through the whole of the evidence that was before the High Court?

Mr Hughes:

– Certainly not; and, what is more, neither did the Court. It was physically .impossible for the Justices to do it.

Mr GROOM:

– We can now speak with authority of what the Attorney-General did not do ; but we cannot speak with authority of what the High Court did or did not do.

Mr Hughes:

– Read what Mr. Justice Isaacs said.

Mr GROOM:

– The Attorney-General read to the House the opinion of one Judge only - Mr. Justice Isaacs.

Mr Hughes:

– I also read the opinion of Mr. Justice Powers.

Mr GROOM:

– The honorable member gave us the opinions of the two minority Judges; but I venture to put before the House the other side of the case. I frankly say that, as I have not had an opportunity of studying the whole of the facts completely, I am npt in a position to say whether the minority or the majority of the Court was right.

Mr Hughes:

– I expressed no opinion about that. What I say is that, whether the Court was right or wrong, the position is intolerable.

Mr GROOM:

– We have constituted a tribunal to be the judge of these matters, and Parliament is bound by tlie decisions of that tribunal. We believe that the whole of the Judges constituting that Court are men of strict integrity and impartiality, and do their duty as they see it.

Mr Hughes:

– Hear, hear!

Mr GROOM:

– The honorable member for Angas gave the House the opinion of the Chief Justice, in whose judgment Mr. Justice Barton concurred. I am now about to give the House the opinion of two other Justices - Mr. Justice Rich and Mr. Justice Gavan Duffy. I am quoting from a newspaper report, which, I suppose, is substantially correct. I have not the official reports.

Mr Hughes:

– No one has access to them. I have tried to get them, but have been unable to do so.

Mr GROOM:

– This is the position, according to Mr. Justice Rich and Mr. Justice Duffy -

It is now well established that the language of section 51 (xxxv.) of the Constitution does permit the creation of a dispute for the special purpose of having it settled by that Court. If the dispute exists, it is nothing to the purpose to inquire how or where it originated, or whether the claims of any of the disputants are reasonable or unreasonable; but the dispute, whether spontaneous or fabricated, does exist. Did such a dispute exist in Queensland ot South Australia?

That was the question the Judges had to put to themselves -

This depends on the facts, and the evidence furnished to us is vague, fragmentary, and illarranged, and some of it is quite untrustworthy. Dealing with it as best we arc able, . wc have come to the conclusion that the employes, in both States believed that the trouble and expense of an appeal to the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration would be amply repaid if they could obtain an award, and that the chances of obtaining an award justified the necessary expenditure of time and money. They were also willing, and oven anxious, that all conditions should he fulfilled, in order to enable the Court to adjudicate on their claim. They, and those to whom they intrusted the conduct of the proceedings, probably thought that the submission of the log and the refusal by the employers constituted a sufficient dispute to give jurisdiction to the Court, and had they not thought so, they, no doubt, would have taken any further step that was considered necessary to give such jurisdiction; but they were so engrossed in the production of a satisfactory claim, and its carriage through the Court,’ that they overlooked the necessity for a substantial dispute, or pretermitted the function of creating one. The service of the log on the employers was no more than a formal step on the road to arbitration, and was not effected with the expectation, or even with the desire of obtaining. any concession from, or conference with, the employers, except in so far as they might be obtained as incidents in the arbitration proceedings. The log, as a whole, did not represent the real grievances of any body of employes - what they were determined to get, or even what they thought they were entitled to get, as a matter of fair play between themselves and their employers. It was merely the claim which those who had the carriage of the business considered would be likely to obtain the most favorable award from the Court. No doubt it contained some items which employes in all the States considered they were fairly entitled to claim, and many items which the employes in some two or more States thought reasonable. But we do not think that it contained any item about which there could be said to. exist in either Queensland or South Australia, a “ dispute “ extending beyond the limits of any one State in circumstances referred to from the Builders Labourers’ case. That being so, the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration had no jurisdiction to make an award in respect to the applicants in either case.

The Justices stated clearly that there was before them no dispute extending beyond the limits of any one State.

Mr Hughes:

– They said that there was a substantial dispute.

Mr GROOM:

– But the Constitution does not give the Parliament power to make laws for the prevention and settlement of merely substantial disputes.

Mr Hughes:

– There was a substantial dispute extending beyond the limits of one State.

Mr GROOM:

– Pour Justices held that there was not, two taking the contrary view.

Mr Hughes:

– The honorable member is alluding to two cases only; I alluded to the ten cases.

Mr GROOM:

– I am completing the Attorney-General’s quotations from the judgment by giving the opinions of Justices other than Mr. Justice Isaacs. The Court decided that in South Australia and in Queensland there was not a dispute extending beyond one State. .That was not a technicality.

Mr Hughes:

– What about the eight cases in which there was admittedly a dispute extending beyond a State 1

Mr GROOM:

– It is not just to say that the Court decided this case on a mere technicality; it dealt with a substantial issue raising the interpretation of one of the terms of the Constitution itself. If a dispute does not extend beyond the limits of any one State, it is not a matter for Federal action. Honorable members have asked for some opinions as to what constitutes a dispute. Mr. Justice-

Isaacs, Mr. Justice Rich, Mr. Justice Gavan Duffy, and Mr. Justice Powers, in Holyman’s case - XVIII. Commonwealth Law Reports, 285 - gave this wide and extended view of what constitutes a dispute. I quote from a judgment delivered by Mr. Justice Isaacs -

In order to prevent any misapprehension in that respect I state, with the concurrence of my learned brothers, Gavan Duffy, Powers, and Rich, in. a succinct form, five propositions of law which are now to be taken as expressly or by necessary implication to be definitely settled. They are : -

The phrase “ industrial disputes extend ing beyond the limits of any one State “ in sub-section xxxv. of section 51 of the Constitution is to be construed according to the natural and ordinary meaning of the words as understood at the time of the passing of the Constitution Act.

There may be an industrial dispute “ ex tending beyond the limits of any one State “ although there is no interState competition in the products or services of the industry, and although the operations and conditions of the industry in one State have no direct action or reaction with respect to the operations or conditions in another State.

The word “ dispute “ means a real dis pute in fact, and is not limited by any artificial criteria.

The words “extending beyond the limits of any one State “ as applied to a dispute mean that the dispute is one “existing in two or more States” or, in other words, “ covering Australian territory comprised within two or more States.”

The existence or non-existence of such a dispute within the meaning of subsection xxxv. is to be ascertained by this Court by the ordinary rules of evidence applicable to questions of fact.

Those rules show that a very extensive power is possessed by the Court of Arbitration.

Mr Hughes:

– The Court of Arbitration cannot ascertain the facts.

Mr GROOM:

– It is the duty of that Court to ascertain in the first instance if it has jurisdiction.

Mr Hughes:

– It can only guess at that.

Mr GROOM:

– It can take evidence, and give a decision upon the facts.

Mr Hughes:

– It is not legally competent to do that.

Mr GROOM:

– It is the. duty of the Arbitration Court to satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction to hear any case. If the President of the Court came to the conclusion that the dispute in question did not extend beyond one State, he would not go on with the case. The Attorney-General has stated that a dispute which was a real dispute could not be entertained in the Tramways case. That was because the High Court held that the President of the Arbitration Court had not jurisdiction.

Mr Finlayson:

– Only two of the Justices held that.

Mr GROOM:

– That was held by the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Barton, Mr. Justice Gavan Duffy, and Mr. Justice Rich against the two other Justices. This Bill has been brought forward to get rid of that judgment. There was an exercise of the original jurisdiction of the High Court by way of prohibition, it being held that the President of the Arbitration Court had not jurisdiction in the case under review. Under section 71 of the Constitution the judicial power of the Commonwealth is vested in the High Court’, consisting of the Chief Justice and two or more Justices. By virtue of section 75, sub-section 5, the High Court, independent of any power that we can give it, has jurisdiction to deal with writs of mandamus and prohibition against an officer of the Commonwealth. It was under that section that the High Court declared that the Arbitration Court had no jurisdiction in the case that has been referred to. Section 76 empowers the Parliament to confer original jurisdiction upon a Judge in any matter arising under the Constitution, or involving its interpretation, or arising under any law made by Parliament. Section 73 - to which the Attorney-General did not refer - says that the High Court shall have jurisdiction with such exceptions and subject to such regulations as the Parliament may prescribe, to hear and determine appeals from all judgments, decrees, orders, and sentences of Justices exercising the original jurisdiction of the High Court. Under the Bill, before a case begins in the Arbitration Court, application may be made to a J ustice of the High Court, who is to have jurisdiction to hear it, and to decide on the evidence whether, within the meaning of the Constitution, there is a dispute extending beyond one State. The Bill also provides that the decision of this Justice on the question shall be final and conclusive, and shall not be subject to any appeal to the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction, and shall not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed, quashed, or called in question, or be subject to prohibition or mandamus iu any Court on any account whatsoever. The Attorney-General asks Parliament to exercise its power to except appeals from the decision of one Justice, and so to make final an interpretation of the Constitution given by one Justice alone. The honorable and learned gentleman says that he has satisfied himself as to the constitutionality of this proposal. I ask him to give to the House the authorities upon which he claims that the High Court, notwithstanding this legislation, will be unable to exercise its powers under subsection 5 ‘of section 75 to keep a Justice of the High Court within its jurisdiction by means of a writ of prohibition. When a similar proposal to prevent the use of the writ of prohibition by the High Court was made on a previous occasion, attention was drawn in this House to the unconstitutionality of the proposal, and since then the High Court has unanimously declared that the power of prohibition cannot be taken away from it, that power being vested in it as original jurisdiction by the Constitution. Is not the Attorney-General trying to evade the Constitution ? What Court ought to be the final interpreter of the Constitution ? Ought the interpretation of the Constitution to be left to one Justice, or should it be the work of the Pull Court ? As these interpretations seriously affect the rights, not only of tlie Commonwealth, but of the States also, and of private individuals, they should be given by the highest and fullest tribunal we can get.

Mr Webster:

– What about the rights of the States ? *

Mr GROOM:

– State rights are not only affected; but rights of individuals may be. Every Statute passed by the Commonwealth or by the States affects private individuals. These constitutional cases are often raised by individuals whose rights are affected. The Commonwealth and the States are entitled to the full services of the High Court in interpreting the Constitution. Honorable members opposite very properly supported a Bill, assented to on the 24th September, 1912, which required that the Full Court consisting of less than all the Justices should not give a decision on a question affecting the constitutional powers of the Commonwealth, unless a majority of all the Justices agreed in the decision, but in the case of an industrial dispute, honorable members .do not require this majority. Why is this exception made ? Is there any difference between an industrial matter and an ordinary civil matter? There is none so far as the rights of individuals are concerned. Had all the decisions of the Arbitration Court gone against the workers, had one Justice persistently given judgments against the workers, and had the suggestion of technicalities been raised, would it be claimed, that it would not be right for the workers to appeal to the highest tribunal in the Commonwealth? What may suit one party to-day may suit the other to-morrow. The sweeping aside of present conditions in regard to essentials is not the right step to take. To- prevent even the humblest subject in the land, from appealing to the highest tribunal is wrong. One of our greatest claims has been that the judgment of one Justice should not be absolutely final, and that a man who is imprisoned on the conviction of one Justice should have the right of appeal to the highest tribunal; yet, when we are dealing with a decision affecting’ the rights of thousands of citizens, honorable members seek to restrict the right of appeal, and say that important questions affecting the interpretation of the Constitution shall not be submitted to all the Justices of the High Court, but be finally determined by one. A simple procedure was followed in the Felt Hatters’ case. After considerable- evidence had been taken, the question arose as to whether the President of the Arbitration Court had jurisdiction to go on with the case, and he immediately stated a case for the High Court, submitting four or five hypothetical cases, and at the end adding the following -

On the facts stated in the case is this Court justified in finding that there is an actual, threatened, impending or probable dispute, and in proceeding to investigate the merits under section 23 f

That case occupied the High Court three days, and the Justices decided by four to two that there was sufficient evidence, and that the President of the Arbitration Court had jurisdiction. What is to prevent that course still being followed? Why has the Attorney-General provided, iu clause 5, that the right of getting a case submitted to the High Court is to be given to the complainant association only? Why have not both parties that right ?

Mr Hughes:

– That is an error. We can amend the clause hy striking out the word “complainant” and making “an organization “ have the right.

Mr GROOM:

– At present, by section 60, if it appears to the Arbitration Court that certain conditions are not fulfilled, the Court has to order the cancellation of the registration of an organization ; but it is now proposed to omit the words “ shall order,” and leave it optional for the Court to order the cancellation. The proposal is to give this power if it appears to the Court -

  1. That the rules of a registered organization or their administration do not provide reasonable facilities for the admission of new members or impose unreasonable conditions upon the continuance of their membership or are in any way tyrannical or oppressive.

As a matter of policy Parliament, which is entitled to lay down certain conditions as absolute, decided that when such conditions existed in an organization it ought to be cancelled. There was no question of “may” or “may not” be cancelled. I ask the Attorney- General to explain why, instead of laying down the policy of absolute conditions being fulfilled, the matter has been converted to a purely optional case. Another serious principle is involved in section 55. Persons who are not employes in any industry are now to be allowed to become members of an organization in an industry. The object of the Act was to enable disputes between employers and employes to be dealt with, and awards binding on the employers or employes to be given; but now it is sought to bring in as members of an organization persons who are not employed in any industry concerned, and have no connexion with it, but are merely officers of the organization. A solicitor may join the Waterside Workers Union, and become its secretary, and thus get his audience in the tribunal. Honorable members may hold that such a procedure is correct, but I think it will be found inadvisable. I would like the Attorney-General to explain this point : Is the person who is not really a member of an organization to be made liable to any penalties for the non-observance of awards? What is to be the legal position of such an individual in connexion with an award and its enforcement? I also wish to know why it is necessary in clause 13 to have a de claration about organizations being deemed to be duly registered. I notice that this, provision is to apply retrospectively only, and that in future organizations who may register are not to have the benefit of this provision. It would appear that there are some existing difficulties which it is desired to remedy. Finally, the Attorney-General might tell us why there is such urgency for pressing forward with this Bill.

Mr Riley:

– We want to get it out of the way before the Tariff is brought down.

Mr GROOM:

– Is that the onlyreason ?

Mr Riley:

– It is one reason.

Mr GROOM:

– I did hope that during the present crisis contentious party strife might cease, and industrial peace be obtained by laying aside for the time being the industrial, as well as the political, weapons.

Mr Page:

– The High Court would not allow us.

Mr GROOM:

– Those responsible are the individuals who brought wrong cases and claims before the Arbitration Court. Honorable members of the Opposition have no sympathy with the maintenance of technical difficulties, and if the AttorneyGeneral can show that the Statute can be made even more effective in the direction of getting the cheap and expeditious settlement of industrial disputes he will find no opposition to a measure having that object.

Mr Hannan:

– What is the opinion of the honorable member as to what constitutes an industrial dispute?

Mr GROOM:

– I have given the opinion of the Justices of the High Court.

Mr Hannan:

– We want your opinion as a legislator.

Mr GROOM:

– A barrister or solicitor when asked to give his opinion as to what would constitute an industrial dispute would be guided first of all by the opinion of the Justices who had adjudicated on the point. That is just what I have given to the House for its guidance. That the existing power in the Constitution is not altogether satisfactory is admitted on both sides, but the present attempt of the Attorney-General to patch up and evade the decisions of the High Court will not make the position any more satisfactory. Good work can be done under the power already in the Constitution as long as the parties will not seek to pervert itfrom its original domain of dealing with real disputes that extend beyond one State.

Mr CHARLTON:
Hunter

.- We have heard a good deal of discussion in regard to this measure, and the whole of it has been of a legal character. Not one member of the Opposition who has addressed himself to the question has ventured to state what, in his opinion, should be done to meet the situation. As a result of the majority decision given by the High Court in the Tramways case - a decision from which we have had extensive quotations to-day - no one in the industrial world knows where he stands, and no one can say what is an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Act. That is a very serious position, and it seems to me that what we have to do is to take a common-sense view of it. We must not surround our arguments with legal technicalities ; we should rather endeavour to devise some means of overcoming the legislative difficulty with which we are faced. The principle of industrial arbitration was indorsed and placed upon our statute-book, not only to assist the actual parties to industrial disputes, but to protect the general public, who suffer in connexion with such troubles, but have no voice whatever in their settlement. The States, and, later on, the Commonwealth, introduced legislation to protect the third party - the public - and, in addition, to provide for the settlement of any industrial disputes that might arise from time to time. It is our duty, therefore, to make the path as easy as possible for the parties whom we compel to come underthis law. Recent decisions under the Commonwealth Act have done very little in that direction. What is the use of telling a body of industrial workers that they may go to the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Court because their dispute extends beyond the boundaries of one State if when they get there they are to be told by the Court that the dispute is a fictitious or manufactured one? Not one honorable member has been able to say what is a dispute within the meaning of the Act. I take the view that an industrial dispute is a difference between two parties in regard to working conditions. If one party serves a notice on the other demanding certain emoluments or hours of labour, and the other party refuses to recognise that notice, there must, in my opinion, be a dispute. In the opinion of the High Court, however, in such circumstances no dispute exists.

Mr Joseph Cook:

– That is not what the Court says:

Mr CHARLTON:

– Then what does the High Court say ?

Mr Joseph Cook:

– It said in the Tramways case that the dispute did not genuinely extend to more than one State.

Mr CHARLTON:

– Will the right honorable member say what is a genuine dispute? If two organized bodies in different States have a dispute with their employers, surely that dispute must be regarded as genuine. This legislation is supposed to be based on equity and good conscience, and not upon mere legal technicalities; but what is there of equity and good conscience when it is said that a dispute which really exists between employers and employes in different States is not genuine ? If such a dispute is not genuine, will the Leader of the Opposition say what is? It would seem that to make such a dispute a genuine one. it would be necessary for the employés whose claim has been rejected to cease work. Under the Act, however, the workers are told, “ You must not cease work. If you do you will be liable to certain penalties, and if you continue after the Court has dealt with your case you are liable to imprisonment. ‘ ‘ The day has arrived when the imprisonment of working men for disobeying measures of this kind must be brought to an end. No man who is fighting for his daily bread should be regarded as a criminal. I realize that compulsory industrial arbitration without some penalty is impossible; but a monetary penalty should suffice. I have heard some honorable members say that working men are never satisfied; but these working men of whom they complain are the very men who are fighting for the Empire today; and the same dogged determination which characterizes their action on the battlefield is characteristic of their industrial fight against employers. We are not justified in imprisoning a man because of a breach of an Act of Parliament of this kind. We should be satisfied to provide for a monetary penalty, and there should not even be a monetary penalty, or compulsory arbitration at all, if there is no means of deciding what is a dispute. Believing that a dispute exists within the meaning of the Act, men go to the Court, and are finally told by the High Court that that dispute is an artificial one, and that they can obtain no redress under the Act. Industrial unionism is extending from one State to another. Occupations are being linked up, and those that follow them expect to secure the advantages of this law. Surely it is not fair for a tribunal to say that there is no real dispute, although a dispute between employers and employés extends, in fact, beyond the boundaries of one State. If that is the position, let us be honest, and say to the workers, “ This legislation is of no avail.” Let us wipe it out. Do not let us tie up the workers by providing penalties if we cannot give them redress for their actual grievances. It is idle to read what this Judge or that Judge said; let us apply a little common sense to this matter, and let us decide for ourselves what, in the circumstances, is necessary. Until the Constitution is amended, we shall have great difficulty in this direction. Since I have been a member of this Parliament there have been three or four amendments of the principal Act, yet we do not know even to-day how we stand in regard to it. This state of things cannot continue. Every honorable member should be prepared to urge the people, if they believe in industrial arbitration, to give us sufficient power under the Constitution to set up a Court which can deal with industrial disputes.

Mr Webster:

– Does the honorable member mean that power should be given to enforce awards?

Mr CHARLTON:

– Power to impose monetary penalties, but not imprisonment.

Mr.Webster. - In the event of nonpayment of the monetary penalty, what would happen?

Mr CHARLTON:

-The offenders would not secure the advantages of the Act. This Bill is to remove as far as possible the difficulty in which we find ourselves, but it will not give satisfaction. It may to an extent alleviate the situation until the people can be appealed to and asked to grant to this Parliament larger powers. Under this Bill either party to a dispute will have the right to appeal to a Justice to decide whether it is a dispute within the meaning of the law. But compulsory arbitration was brought into force to grant the redress of grievances within a reasonable time. How can grievances be speedily remedied if there be this cir cumlocution in approaching the Court? Even under this Bill it would be necessary to have a preliminary hearing to decide whether a dispute actually existed, entitling the persons concerned to go to the Court and seek relief. That preliminary hearing would take a considerable time, and delay, we know, is killing the spirit of arbitration. Neither the workers nor the employers are satisfied to have their cases hung up month after month, and, as they are, in some instances, year after year without redress. Under this very Bill we shall have delay, but I must support it, because it provides the only means by which we can, at present, secure the determination of the question of what is a dispute. At the present time, the parties to what is believed to be a dispute within the meaning of the Act go before the Conciliation and Arbitration Court, and their case is presented and heard at considerable cost. After the award has been made, there is an appeal by the unsuccessful party to the High Court. There, again, considerable expense is incurred, and finally the workers are told that the decision of the Conciliation and Arbitration Court is invalid. We must do something to meet the position, and, therefore, I shall support this amending Bill. At the same time, I am coming to the conclusion that, unless largerpowers be granted to us under the Constitution, we shall not be right in tying down industrial bodies in Australia. We should permit them to act as they did before, and to make the best terms they possibly can for themselves. If we do that, the public will quickly realize the injury they have done to themselves by refusing so to amend the Constitution as to enable industrial disputes to be dealt with in a fair and reasonable way. In reply to the honorable member who preceded me, I would point out that this measure bears on its face the impress of its urgency. A recent decision of the High Court makes this amending legislation urgently necessary. Without it the different claims before the Court could not be dealt with. No union would feel justified in spending money in presenting its case to the Court, only to find, later on, perhaps, that its action had been of no avail. It is useless to quote the judgments of the different learned Justices. They, like ourselves, have their own opinions. The majority thought that the Tramways’ dispute was a ficti- tious one, while others considered it genuine. What we require is to secure sufficient power to enable us to pass a law- based upon common sense and permitting disputants, wherever they may be in the Commonwealth, to bring their case before the Court and have it dealt with without delay.

Mr SAMPSON:
Wimmera

.- We have listened to some very exhaustive and illuminating speeches on this question. This is a further attempt to legislate for arbitration under section 51 of the Constitution; but, so far, our attempts have not been very satisfactory, and I do not know whether the Bill will improve matters very materially. Section 51 is as. follows -

The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth, with respect to -

Conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of any one State…..

I suppose that, if we were to search the pages of Mansard, we should find that there is scarcely a subject that has been so exhaustively discussed as this,; indeed, it would probably surprise most of us if we could only tally proportionately the time occupied. At the same time, as I say, we do not seem, up. to the present, to be any nearer a solution of the great arbitration difficulty than we were at the beginning of Federation. We are all agreed, I suppose, that we should aim at industrial peace. I do not undervalue the importance of the agitation in favour of passing laws and creating a tribunal that will give the working men and the unions of Australia an opportunity to have their grievances settled by peaceful means, and prevent, not that discontent which is necessary to progress, but that discontent which every now and again throws the whole community into turmoil. The desire of the workers, to better their conditions is to be commended. I am not one who- believes that, high wages necessarily mean dear labour, but, rather, that cheapness of production and of manufacture is consistent with the best pay. But, slackening down an the part of the workmen,’ and their failure to realize their obligations to employers after they have secured better wages and conditions, must necessarily mean increased cost of production and* of living. A com munity that pays high wages is a better community than one that pays low wages; and, as I have said, high wages are not inconsistent with reasonable cost of production and manufacture. The fault lies in the fact that there is a disposition on the part of the organized unions to absorb individual effort, and to preach to their members a kind of gospel that means a slackening down and a loss in efficiency. We know there is a tendency to instil into members of unions the idea that there is only a certain amount of work to be done, and there is not felt that individual obligation to give increased efficiency and better service in return for increased wages and improved conditions. Evil arises when there is developed in the community a system of class warfare born of a feeling that the employers are, as it were, in illegal possession of their particular industries. This gives rise to all sorts of undesirable results, which ought not to be experienced iu a country like this with so many and such splendid opportunities. Reaching out for better wages and conditions is, in my opinion, a sign of virility - an indication that the workers are showing signs ‘of a latent ambition to improve their position until, it may be, they themselves become employers.

Mr Webster:

– Does the honorable member mean that if a workman has his position^ improved monetarily he should increase his labour I

Mr SAMPSON:

– There are obligations on both sides - on the part of the employer to. pay good wages, and on the part of the worker, in return, to give more efficient service, not only in the interests of. himself, but in the- interests of the community as a whole. Every increase in production re-acts, not only on the workers, but on the country generally. The Bill, so far as I understand it, aims at tightening up the law in respect to dismissals, relaxing the conditions of registration, widening the opportunities for conference between employers and employed in impending or probable disputes, and reducing the High Court jurisdiction, on constitutional matters in regard to arbitration, to a single Judge. These proposals go far to destroy the present” safeguards of the Constitution and the rights of the States. From a layman’s stand-point, section ‘51 seems to indicate that tie word “prevention” should be sufficient’ to enable conferences to be called in order to avoid even the necessity, in many instances, of going to the Court. The word “ prevention “ should give the Arbitration Court sufficiently wide powers to that end, but it seems to me that the word is governed to a large extent by “dispute.” The interpretation of the High Court has shown that it really is difficult to define “dispute” under the section as it stands; and no one can regard the repeated failures in connexion with appeals to the Arbitration Court without a certain amount of regret and misgiving as to the future. “We all agree that there has been a certain straining of the law and of the Constitution in the endeavour to give effect to legislation of this character; and this has placed both unions and employers, and also the High Court in a very awkward, unfair, and invidious position.

Mr Brennan:

– Does not the straining of the law show need for an amendment of the Constitution?

Mr SAMPSON:

– It seems to me that the limitation in the Constitution at the present time compels unions, in some instances, to strain the law, and to what- we term “manufacture” disputes^ in order to gain access to the Court. Section 51 of the Constitution has, in my opinion, been used by this Parliament in an endeavour to pass arbitration laws which were never contemplated by the Convention. My reading of the Convention debates indicates that this section was inserted as a kind of reserve power, to be used for the settlement of disputes, such as that in the maritime industry in 1890, and was never intended as a wide power to enable an Arbitration Act to be passed to deal with all classes of disputes in the Commonwealth. There is no doubt that the unions of Australia to-day are looking beyond the State industrial tribunals to the Federal Court ; and the reason is very obvious. None of us can dispute the fact that in an Arbitration Court, with a sympathetic Judge, better conditions have been laid down and wages awarded at higher rates than unions have been able to obtain before the various State tribunals. Even for the unions themselves this is a very false and unsatisfactory view in respect to the operations of the Court

Mr Fenton:

– The awards of tha Federal Arbitration Court tend to harmony and uniformity all over Australia.

Mr SAMPSON:

– That uniformity is one of the strongest objections when we have regard to the great variety in climatic and other conditions over Australia. One central Court is never likely to satisfactorily lay down conditions in a great country like this, where the climate and other circumstances so widely differ.

Mr Brennan:

– Does the honorable member really think that that is what was meant by the honorable member for Maribyrnong ?

Mr Fenton:

– The honorable member for .Wimmera ought to read Mr. Justice Higgins on that point.

Mr SAMPSON:

– I have read Mr. Justice Higgins on that and other points. Is it possible for a Federal Arbitration Court to do anything but insure uniformity in its decisions in regard to particular industries? It is impossible for one Judge to be able to discriminate between local conditions.

Mr Fenton:

– What about the shearing industry?

Mr SAMPSON:

– Shearing I regard as a special industry, presenting none of the intricacies which are associated with those manufacturing industries most likely to come before the Court. I admitthat the constant appeals from the Arbitration Court to the High Court must be rather heartbreaking to the unions, and the annulment of different awards is more likely to provoke industrial war than promote industrial peace.

Mr Brennan:

– Still it is said that the unions “ manufacture “ disputes.

Mr SAMPSON:

– The evidence is, I think, that disputes are manufactured; and, as I have already said, it seems to me that,, on account of the limitations in section 51, it is necessary for unions to resort to means that they would not otherwise resort to if the Court were freely open to them. There is no doubt that we are trying to do the impossible when we try to pass an arbitration law that would allow the unions, without restriction or technicalities, to have access to the Arbitration Court. The section in the Constitution is not wide enough to allow an Act of such a simple character, and there is no doubt that we shall have to recast the whole position. In my opinion, the unions throughout Australia have forgotten altogether the existence of the State tribunals, and have as their object and aim the Federal Arbitration Court; indeed, they have combined as a kind of federated union over the whole of the country with that end in view. The figures show that, in twelve months, the membership of the unions increased from about 300,000 to 433,000, and this, no doubt, is on account of the desire to gain access to the Federal Court. The strain of the present position cannot last for all time, and there are two very decided courses open to the Parliament, one of which will, in my opinion, have to be taken before long. One course is to amend the Constitution in regard to industrial matters, while the alternative is for us, as a Federal Parliament, to abandon any attempt at arbitration legislation of an initial character. We shall either have to broaden the Constitution so as to have conferred on us full industrial powers, or we shall have to limit the constitutional power to appeals from the various State tribunals. My own view, which I hope to have an opportunity of expressing when the Bills for the amendment of the Constitution are before us, inclines to the plan of leaving the whole initiation of, or original jurisdiction in, industrial legislation to the various State Parliaments. I believe that they are eminently fitted to deal with industrial matters. Wages Boards, by their simplicity, inexpensiveness, and the expedition with which they can bring about awards, together with the fact that very few of their awards have been broken, have proved eminently successful in the fixing of reasonable wages and conditions of labour, and the prevention of serious disputes. I do not see why we should not have an extension of that system. To my mind, there are two courses open to us - either to amend the Constitution so as to give this Parliament full industrial power, or, alternatively, to limit the jurisdiction of this Parliament to the hearing of appeals from wages tribunals throughout the length and breadth of Australia.

Mr Joseph Cook:

– Precisely what the Bill is trying to kill is the appeal.

Mr SAMPSON:

– The reduction of the High Court to a single Judge in regard to industrial matters means the taking away of the rights of the people; it is a complete reversal of the policy of the Government, and must reduce the status of the High Court materially in regard to some of the most important matters that can be brought before it.

Mr Joseph Cook:

– Do I understand you to say that taking away the rights of the people is a departure from the Government’s policy? That has been their policy for a long time.

Mr SAMPSON:

– What I have in mind is that, in 1911, the present Government introduced a Bill to increase the number of High Court Judges, and they said that there must be an absolute majority of the total number of Judges before a constitutional question could be decided. That was in order to havea greater display of wisdom by the High Court in the interpretation of the Constitution. Perhaps the Government had in mind at the time a more liberal interpretation of the Constitution. If that was the desire, why arewe to have all the important powers of the High Court relegated to a single Judge?

Mr Brennan:

– That is an extravagant statement.

Mr SAMPSON:

– I mean all the powers of the Court in respect to the important subject of arbitration.I do not intend to discuss this matter at any greater length. I believe that, no matter how much legislation we have, under the limited powers of the present Constitution the Court is bound to prove unsatisfactory.

Mr Webster:

– Then why did you oppose an amendment of the Constitution?

Mr SAMPSON:

– I am putting forward a suggestion for a constitutional amendment, whichI doubt if the honorable member would agree to. I have already said that there are two ways in which the industrial question can be dealt with. The first is by giving complete and unlimited powerto the Federal Parliament, and the other is for the Federal Parliament to abandon its attempt to deal with industrial legislation under its present constitutional limitations. To my mind, there is a great deal to be said in favour of leaving the original jurisdiction in industrial matters to the States, conserving to the Federal Parliament only the appeal power. If we had not had so many favorable decisions by the Federal Court there would never have been all these attempts by the unions to climb over the heads of the State Courts in order to approach the Federal one.

Mr Burns:

– Perhaps the honorable member would like to go back to the days of strikes.

Mr SAMPSON:

– I have already said that the various unions are to be commended for having endeavoured to have their industrial disputes settled by arbitration and peaceful means, and it is the duty of this House, knowing the value of industrial peace and progress to all sections of the community, to endeavour to frame legislation which will give an opportunity to great bodies of men, bound togetherin unions, to have speedy, simple, and inexpensive access to some sort of industrial tribunal.

Mr.Finlayson. - Do you not think that the treatment of the men by the Wages Boards was sufficient justification for their desire to go to the Federal Court?

Mr SAMPSON:

– We have not had any concrete statement put forward in this House which would justify us in casting a serious reflection on the 120 or 130 Wages Boards which have fixed the wages and conditions of the men in various industries in Victoria.

Mr Hughes:

– If we do not act we cast a reflection on the minority Justices who hold a certain opinion. We are not casting reflections on anybody, but we are doing what we believe tobe right.

Mr SAMPSON:

– I am putting forward two alternative propositions, either the abandonment of any attempt to legislate in regard to industrial matters, or else an amendment of the Constitution. I believe this legislation will prove abortive. I do not think it is going to improve matters materially, and I think the time has come when the Government should reconsider its decision.

Mr Brennan:

– Would you give any power to the Federal Parliament under your scheme?

Mr SAMPSON:

– I should give a reserve power to the Federal Parliament to intervene in case of any industrial upheaval, such as the maritime strike of 1890, which, extending beyond the limits of any one State, calls for the intervention of the Commonwealth Parliament. So far as the general settlement of industrial disputes is concerned, there is a good deal to be said in favour of leaving the States in charge of original jurisdiction in these matters, the Federal Parliament dealing only with appeals from the decisions of the various Wages Boards.

Mr BRENNAN:
Batman

.- At this stage I do not intend to say very much in regard to the Bill, but I propose to say a word or two on the question of what constitutes a dispute. Not that I hope for one moment to be able to throw any light upon what constitutes a dispute of a kind that is likely to give jurisdiction to a Judge of the Arbitration Court to deal with it. In regard to an important case which has been recently heard by the High Court, I should like to say that I have read the judgments of the various Judges, and they do not effect any revolution in regard to what constitutes a dispute. It is true that it shocked the understanding of a good many of us to be told that in those special circumstances there was no dispute within the meaning of the Constitution; nevertheless, the judgments of the learned Justices do not lay down any new theory as to how we are to ascertain what does constitute an industrial dispute. It is worth remarking; however, that we have progressed some distance from what honorable members of the Opposition say was the view of the framers of the Constitution in regard to the jurisdiction of this Arbitration Court. They would have us believe that the intention of the framers of the Constitution was that the Court should deal merely with industrial disputes similar to that of the shearers and the big maritime strike, or other such disputes in which there are interests involved of a clearly Inter-State and connected character, so clearly related between the States that there could be no doubt that the dispute was of an InterState character.

Mr Webster:

– What case are you referring to?

Mr BRENNAN:

– I am not referring to any particular case, but I am directing attention to the fact that honorable members opposite are prone to tell us what the framers of the Constitution had in mind in regard to disputes extending beyond the limits of any one State, and they point to simple and obvious kinds of Inter-State disputes as those which the framers had in view.

Sir William Irvine:

– What they had in view doesnot matter so much as what they said in the Constitution.

Mr BRENNAN:

– That is true, but they have said something which, in view of the majority of the High Court, is different from what honorable members opposite would have us believe the framers of the Constitution intended. The majority of the High Court now hold a much wider view in regard to a dispute extending than that referred to by Opposition members today, when they instanced the maritime and shearers’ disputes, which were obviously Inter-State in character. The Court has held that, in such enterprises as the felt-hat industry, different masters and different sets of men, all unrelated, and with no connexion through their capital or otherwise, may still have their federal organizations and an industrial dispute extending. The same thing was held, or at least stated and not denied, in regard to the Tramways case. I think it was the honorable member for Darling Downs who said that these tramway systems are quite disconnected in management and capital in the different States, but the High Court has decided that there might easily be an Inter-State dispute in enterprises of that kind. Therefore, I say that the view which the High Court now takes of an industrial dispute extending is a much wider view than was said to have been held by the framers of the Constitution. What is the view of all the Justices on the question of a dispute extending within the meaning of the Constitution to-day? The Chief Justice may be taken as the representative of a Conservative view - not to use the word offensively - of our constitutional powers, and Mr. Justice Higgins and Mr. Justice Isaacs as the representatives of a Radical view ; but their opinons of what constitutes an industrial dispute are almost identical in terms. They say that the dispute must embody a demand and a refusal, and must have substance. The demand must be a demand made with a determination to back it up, and there must be a determination to stand by the refusal. The dispute mast have substantial reality. It is not a matter of words, but facts.

Mr Joseph Cook:

– That is to say, it must be a dispute, and not a case which can be made up and called a dispute.

Mr BRENNAN:

– It must not be a pure fiction. So far as an explanation in terms or a definition of dispute has been attempted, there is no wide difference between the Justices of the High Court.

Mr Glynn:

– The difference is as to the extent of evidence required to substantiate the dispute.

Mr BRENNAN:

– The Justices are agreed in terms as to what constitutes a dispute. But there is the widest chasm of divergence as to the conclusions to be drawn from facts evidencing a dispute. One Justice, having certain facts before him, will say that there is evidence of a substantial dispute; and another will say that the dispute is fictitious and unreal,’ and does not come within that definition. Our difficulty is due to the difference of opinion among their Honours as to facts which bring a dispute within the definition on which they are all agreed. Parties come to the Arbitration Court, and, after fighting an issue for ninety days, are told that there is no dispute. One Justice holds that there was a dispute, and another that there was only an engineered or manufactured difference, which did not constitute a dispute within the meaning of the Constitution. It is a good principle at law that it does not lie with those who have submitted to the jurisdiction of a tribunal to say, after it has given judgment against them, that it had no jurisdiction. Objections to jurisdiction are usually raised before, not after, a hearing. But in arbitration proceedings a party may go to the Court, and say to himself, “ I shall fight first upon the issue, and, if I lose on that, I shall raise the question of jurisdiction.” Thus he tosses with a double-headed penny. Mr. Justice Isaacs stated with regard to this matter -

It seems to me that it ought to be judicially determined at the threshold whether the entry of the Arbitration Court upon an arbitration inquiry is justified or not. If it is, let it proceed, and the result, whatever it may be, depend on the merits alone. If not justified, then let it be prevented at the outset. Such a shocking waste of public and private time, money, and energy as has occurred in the present instance ought not even to be possible. As the law at present stands, the Arbitration Court is only permitted to guess whether there is a dispute or not. It is bound to ask itself whether a dispute exists, and whether it is properly submitted, and it is bound to answer these questions for its own guidance only, and not by way of decision binding the party. If, in fact, its answer is right, it has jurisdiction. If wrong, there is no jurisdiction….. It is not only inimical to general welfare, but quite unfair, that one party alone should have the choice of lying by, taking the chance of a favorable judgment, and, if not then satisfied, of upsetting the whole proceeding, very possibly on some merely technical point. Thus the whole structure, laboriously and patiently built up by the Arbitration Court as an equitable settlement necessary to secure industrial peace, disappears as ah unreality in the eye of the law, but one which certainly leaves very real and very lasting evil effects behind.

Thus, in letters of fire, Mr. Justice Isaacs brands the present constitutional position in regard to the jurisdiction of the Arbitration Court.

Sitting suspended from 6.29 to 7.45 p.m.

Mr BRENNAN:

– Prior to the adjournment for dinner I was engaged in the painful, difficult, and I might almost say impossible, task of ascertaining what is, or might be, an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Federal Constitution.

SirWilliamIrvine. - The hopeless task.

Mr BRENNAN:

– No; hope springs as eternal in my breast as in that of the average human. All that we have established so far is the fact that no one knows what are the essential facts which constitute an industrial dispute. It does not lie on me to say what, they are, because our contention is that we should get at the root of this trouble by means of an amendment of the Constitution. We should give up this useless quest, and invest ourselves with the necessary powers to do some real good, irrespective of this subtle inquiry as to what constitutes an industrial dispute within the Constitution as it stands. If I cannot say what constitutes an industrial dispute within the meaning of the Constitution, I can at least suggest what ought to be considered an industrial dispute. I say that when an organization registers under the Federal Arbitration Act, and deliberately makes a claim representative of all, or nearly all, the persons engaged in a particular industry; when it is representative, in one sense or another, of more than one State; when it is concerned with an industry which extends, or is carried on, or operates beyond, the boundaries of one State ; when it makes that claim through its recognised officers in the form of a “ log “ or some other form which cannot be misunderstood, and when the employer, upon whom the claim is made, either declines to entertain it, or refuses, or ignores it, there is established an industrial position which, in my view, should properly be determined by the only industrial tribunal we have established to determine it. We have heard a good deal in this Chamber about manufactured disputes, disputes which are engineered, and. laboriously brought about by so-called agitators for the purpose of securing an award of the Federal Arbitration Court. What is the meaning of this manufactured dispute? Let us consider for a moment who it is that manufactures these disputes. What is an organization ? An organization is a body ofmen who, before they can be registered as such under the Federal Arbitration Act, have to abandon their right to strike. They have to give up every weapon which they previously possessed to enable themto enforce their rights before they can come under the Arbitration Act. They have to divest themselves of the only arms which were previously available to working men as a means or asserting their rights. When they register under the Act they burntheir boats behind them, and I put it to the House that, in so doing, they give an earnest of their sincere desire to settle their troubles by the peaceful method of arbitration. They commence in that way. It would be quite easy for them to stand outside of arbitration, and if it was fight they were looking for, and the pleasure of battle, they could get it outside in much greater degree than they can get it within the operation of the Arbitration Act. In coming under the Act, then, they give an earnest of their desire for a peaceful settlement of their disputes. They must come under the Act in certain numbers; they must formulate their claim. They do so in an orderly, peaceful way. They make their demands in a respectful way. Their claim may be granted or refused. I am assuming that it is refused, and, because of the very orderly course they adopt, because their means are peaceful and not militant, their actions deliberate and not thoughtless or impulsive, it is for all these reasons they are regarded as having engineered a dispute. Had they entered the contest bullheaded, had they acted wildly and impulsively, and, had they struck, there would be a dispute sure enough. But if they have done none of these things, but have merely responded to the invitation which the law has extended to them, it is strange that they should be accused of having engineered a dispute. I am often reminded of the irony of the words of promise contained in this measure - the Arbitration Act. It was to be an Act free from legal technicalities, rapid in operation, and divested of the harassing processes which some think disfigure so many of our measures of legislation. These were the words in which organizations were invited to come under the Act, and, because they have done so peacefully and with a sincere desire to have their disputes settled in the way in which it was promised they would be settled, they are told on the floor of this House, and in other places, that they have engineered a paper dispute, which has no real substance. What could give it substance?

Mr Hughes:

– They take the only way legally open to them. The strike - the other way - is closed to them by the law.

Mr BRENNAN:

– That is so, but apparently they must go as near to striking as they possibly can without actually doing so before they can prove the existence of a dispute. I say that this is a gross travesty of what was proposed to be given to the working men and women of the Commonwealth by this measure for industrial arbitration. The truth is that this alleged manufacture of a dispute represents nothing less than a meticulously careful method observed by unions in their endeavours to evade the numerous pitfalls by which they are surrounded in order to approach a Court for the settlement, not of an imaginary, but of a real, grievance.

Sir John Forrest:

– Why do they not go to their State Courts?

Mr BRENNAN:

– My answer to the honorable gentleman is to ask him why they should not go to the Court provided for them if they wish to do so?

Sir John Forrest:

– It is not provided specially for them, and they have their State Courts.

Mr BRENNAN:

– Does not the right honorable gentleman know perfectly well that no State Court has jurisdiction to deal with disputes of this character? He knows, or he ought to know, that no State tribunal can deal with industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of a State.

Sir John Forrest:

– They rarely ever do.

Mr BRENNAN:

– I am afraid that that is not an answer to the point that I have raised, because, where disputes do not extend beyond the boundary of a State, we do not claim at present that they should be heard in the Federal Arbitration Court. What is the great charm that induces working men combined in organizations to spend their time, energy, and money also, in an effort to obtain an award of the Federal Arbitration Court? Does any one seriously believe that it is a pleasure to them ?

Sir John Forrest:

– They like it better than the State Courts, any way.

Mr BRENNAN:

– Does any one pretend that there is in these long drawnout arbitration proceedings something so soothing to the sensibilities of the working man that he must get into the Arbitration Court, or does he go there impelled by a feeling that there is something which he ought to have and cannot obtain elsewhere ?

Sir John Forrest:

– He thinks he can do better there than in a State Court.

Mr BRENNAN:

– Of course he thinks he can do better there. There is the Court, there is the invitation to him to go to it, and why should he not get a fair hearing of his claim ?

Sir John Forrest:

– He should use the tribunals of his own State.

Mr BRENNAN:

– Does the right honorable gentleman mean to repeat what has been too often said on the other side of the House - that the sole reason why the working men of Australia in such large numbers seek the arbitrament of the Federal Arbitration Court is that they hope to get more than they deserve from a certain Judge.

Sir John Forrest:

– They hope to get more than they would get from a State

Court.

Mr BRENNAN:

– Is such a contention worthy ofany honorable member on the other side?

Mr.Rodgers. - It is unworthy of the honorable member to put up an argument that has not been advanced.

Mr BRENNAN:

– I understood that it was, and that that was what was in the honorable gentleman’s mind. I do not now know what is in his mind.

Mr RODGERS:
WANNON, VICTORIA · LP; NAT from 1917

– I thought the honorable member was putting in a plea for the legal fraternity.

Mr BRENNAN:

– I am not, and that is certainly an unworthy argument to advance. If the objection of honorable members opposite is an objection to a certain Judge, and I must say that their objection in that regard has been stated with indecency on more than one occasion, they can possess their souls in patience. There will be other Judges. If this principle is right, surely they should not oppose amendments of this law because a certain Judge presides over the Federal Arbitration Court for the time being.

Mr RODGERS:
WANNON, VICTORIA · LP; NAT from 1917

– I do not think any one has made that suggestion, andI certainly dissociate myself from it.

Mr BRENNAN:

– It has been made, and more than once. It appears to me, as one who is genuinely anxious to see these industrial troubles settled as speedily and simply as possible, that we are wasting our energies, and the Courts are wasting their energies in torturing their minds to find out whether, technically, persons who have got into this Court have arrived there by a strictly correct route, or whether there is precisely that momentum behind their demands which raises it to the doubtful dignity of a dispute. If there are merits in a claim, why not let it be heard and determined ? Why not redeem the promise in this regard made generally to the people of Australia? There are one or two matters which arise under the Bill that can perhaps be more fitly discussed in Committee. I am very pleased to see that the Attorney-General has embodied in this Bill a provision permitting officers who are not employes in an industry to become members of the organization connected with that industry. The honorable member for Darling Downs raised that question. The reason for the provision is perfectly obvious. With the greater and better organization of industrial workers, experience has shown that this is absolutely necessary - that the men who have to do the administrative work of the organizations cannot possibly be employed in the ordinary work of the industry. I am sorry to say that this fact has more than once been made the basis of groundless and cruel charges against persons, such as secretaries and others, who have borne the brunt of industrial organization. They have been accused of being agitators and of using particular organizations for their own ends, and for the salaries attaching to the positions. The answer to the point raised by the honorable member for Darling Downs is most obvious. Any organization seeking to have its affairs properly and judiciously managed naturally requires some capable person who can give his whole time to the work. When I use the word “ capable “ I do not necessarily mean a man who is not a worker in the industry.

Mr Hughes:

– He may have been a person who was employed in the industry.

Mr BRENNAN:

– Probably ; but at present he must be a person no longer employed in the industry; he must be employed by the organization.

Mr Groom:

– Should not the same concession be given to organizations on both sides ? The clause, apparently, applies to one side only.

Mr BRENNAN:

– I do not think that that is so. For the moment I am defending the particular aspect to which the honorable member referred, and which is very easily defended. The honorable member also referred to the short amendment which seeks to remove an obligation that hitherto rested on the President of the Arbitration Court to cancel the registration of an organization because of some technical failure to comply with some preliminary in regard to registration. The necessity for this amendment has been shown by the grotesque miscarriage of justice in the Miners’ case. The miners’ organization had to be deregistered. The Judge had no discretion - by reason of the technical circumstance, as my memory serves me, that its rules made noprovision for the investment of its funds. The irony would have been more striking if the organization had not had any funds for investment, but the effectwould still have been the same. That a technicality should be the means of breaking down the whole elaborate system of an organization, and everything done for and by it, is contrary to all British law, and the Bill contemplates leaving to the wise discretion of the Judge the decision as to whether in all the circumstances there is occasion for cancelling the registration of an organization because of some failure to comply with some preliminary requirements, which are, for the most part, and as a rule, merely formal matters, matters of convenience and order rather than of substance. I was somewhat entertained this morning by reading some observations on the part of the Employers’ Federation in regard to clause 2 amending section 9 of the Act dealing with the injury of an employé because of his membership of an organization, or of an association applying for registration as an organization, or because of his having given evidence. The Employers Federation is represented as saying that the Bill assumed that if an employer dismissed such a man it was because of the latter ‘s unionism, and that the penalty for doing so was £50. The Bill does not assume such a thing. The employer may still dismiss the unionist for any one of a million reasons that he may select; he may select his own reasons; there is no limit on the absolute discretion of the employer to dismiss his employe imposedby this Bill other than the solitary circumstance of membership or association with a union.

Sir William Irvine:

– The employé has the equal right to dismiss the employer. Each can sever the relation with the other.

Mr BRENNAN:

– That is perfectly true.

Sir William Irvine:

– Would you apply to the one party a rule which you would not apply to the other ?

Mr BRENNAN:

– No. The section applies to both employer and employé, and reads as follows -

  1. An employer shall not dismiss an employé, or injure him in his employment, or alter his position to his prejudice, by reason of the circumstance that the employé-

    1. is an officer or member of an organi zation,or of an association that has applied to be registered as an organization; or
    2. is entitled to the benefit of an industrial agreement or an award; or (c)has appeared as a witness, or has given any evidence, in a proceeding under this Act.

Penalty: Fifty pounds.

  1. An employé shall not cease work in the service of his employer by reason of the circumstance that the employer -

    1. is an officer or member of an organization, or of an association that has applied to be registered as an organization ; or
    2. is entitled to the benefit of an industrial agreement or an award; or
    3. has appealed as a witness, or has given any evidence, in a proceeding underthis Act.

Penalty: Twenty-five pounds.

Mr RODGERS:
WANNON, VICTORIA · LP; NAT from 1917

– That is balm for the employer.

Mr BRENNAN:

– We know from our every-day experience - that is why the honorable member for Wannon jeeringly says that it is balm for the employer - that it is not a question of dismissing the employer. There are men looking for work; the employe, and not the employer, can be victimized. In the past it has been the employe, and not the employer, who has been victimized.

Mr Kelly:

– Then why have the subclause inserted in the Bill?

Mr BRENNAN:

– I am not very hopeful of the effect of this very mild provision that has been inserted, because the astute employer has only to state some reason, if he is ingenious enough to keep that reason well advertised, and the law cannot possibly touch him, though the real operating reason for the dismissal of an employe is that he is a member of an organization, or takes some active part in connexion with a union. However, the provision is some improvement on the Act, and seeks to meet glaring cases of what are called victimization. There have been a few convictions under the section as it stands. . On one day in Melbourne not long since, there were three cases in which employers were convicted of having dismissed employes because of the fact that the latter were members of organizations. Though convictions are not easy to secure, they may be secured in glaring cases, and there have been some cases where convictions have been recorded - under the new provision there may be a few more - but the difficulties are so great that, wordthe provision as we may, we are not likely to make it a complete security for the employe. The AttorneyGeneral appears to have done his best in drafting the new section in order that equal-handed justice may be dealt out to both employer and employé. If it operates more for the protection of the employé the answer is the history of the industrial movement in Australia has shown that the employer does not need protection as the employe does in this regard. I do not propose to detain the House much longer on the second reading.I agree with the AttorneyGeneral that we are merely patching up a measure which will be ineffective, at all events in its entirety, until we have secured an amendment of the Constitution. To-day we have heard the honorable member for Wimmera urging, as he has urged before, the amendment of the Constitution in regard to industrial matters. (Needless to say, the honorable member gives us no help when we try to get the amendment of the Constitution for that purpose. My mind goes back to the splendid, stirring, and conclusivelyreasoned passages of the honorable member for Flinders, in which he pointed out the absolute need for an alteration to the Constitution in order to give the Commonwealth Parliament the power to deal with industrial questions, and in order to prevent the gross waste of time and energy that results from our present constitutional limitation; but the honorable and lea’rned member has allowed three successive golden opportunities to go by ; he has also failed to give us any assistance towards bringing about those amendments which he has said were so imperatively necessary. In the richer experience of futile cases before our Court, and of the industrial troubles we have had since last the matter was submitted to the electors, and with his wider appreciation of the necessities of the case, I can only hope that, in the country; the honorable and learned member will not again resist our next appeal to the people to obtain the amendment of the Constitution which he has shown to be so necessary. To make stirring addresses upon this matter is idle ; to invoke great names - like that of Chief Justice Marshall, of the United States of America - is equally idle if; when the golden opportunity comes to crystallize into fact our preconceived view on these questions, we turn aside and say, as do the exAttorneyGeneral and the honorable member for Wimmera, and, I am sorry to have to say it, even the honorable and learned member for Angas, with his judicial mind, “the time is not yet ripe.”

Sir WILLIAM IRVINE:
Flinders

– I am afraid that I shall be obliged to resist the almost pathetic appeal of the honorable member for Batman to enter into the discussion of the constitutional question at present. When the proper time comes I shall be only too glad to discuss the matter with him. Before dealing with the only portion of this Bill which I propose to touch at present, I would like to say a few words with regard to the attitude of the honorable member to a judgment recently delivered by the highest tribunal of the country. The High Court does not claim to be, and I for one, would not claim on its behalf, that it is in any sense immune from that criticism which Parliament is entitled to pass on every public matter in this country. But that criticism ought always, especially when applied to the highest judicial tribunal under the Constitution, to be scrupulously fair. In a somewhat lengthy disquisition on what is an industrial dispute, though no one can complain of his tone, the honorable member for Batman has certainly endeavoured to make it appear that the minority of the Court in the recent decision was right, and the majority was wrong. I do not complain of that, but when we find the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth in nearly every public utterance he makes inside or outside of this House, taking a similar position, it raises questions of a somewhat higher nature. As I have always said, the position, the authority, and the dignity of the High Court is peculiarly within the guardianship of the chief* law officer of the Commonwealth. When we find him on this occasion - it is not the first of .many occasions - using for political purposes in this House, and out oS it, a judgment which it should be his first care to fully, clearly, and correctly explain to the people of Australia; when we find him citing long passages from the judgment of one of the minority, however able he may be - and we all acknowledge him to be a very able Judge - and not in any way presenting the public or this House with the countervailing arguments which ultimately obtained the sanction of the majority of the Court-

Mr Archibald:

– Do you not cite a judgment for a political purpose, too ?

Sir WILLIAM IRVINE:

– No. And I sincerely hope that I never may do so, not merely as a Minister, but as a private member. It is peculiarly in the duty of the honorable gentleman who introduced this Bill that if he refers to judgments of the High Court at all he should give them fully and fairly. And it is just as much his duty to place before the House and the country the reasons which actually prevailed with the majority of the Court as to cite those in which the minority of the Court gave expression to their views. The High Court is not immune from criticism. It is entitled to be criticised. Its Chief Justice has pointed out that it is subject to fair criticism, and cannot complain of it. But we must recognise that it is the final arbiter of con- stitutional questions under the Constitution under which we all live. We must also recognise what I should have thought the honorable member for Batman and the Attorney-General would have been the first to recognise, and that is that in the High Court, as in this House, the views and the opinions of the majority prevail. I only intend to address myself to one clause of the Sill, and that is the remarkable clause which has been analyzed fully - I was not able to be present to hear the speeches - by my learned friends, the honorable member for Angas and the honorable member for Darling Downs. Clause 5 is a very remarkable one, and, in some respects, I think it is a useful one. One of the purposes with which it is conceived, I think, is probably to effect an improvement in the extremely cumbrous machinery of the Arbitration Act. So far as it gives an opportunity for those who are engaged in the very costly, lengthy, and cumbrous litigation which this Court has given rise to - so far as it will enable them to have one important and fundamental question determined first, as far as it can be determined finally, before incurring all the expenditure of going into evidence at great length with regard to the conditions of employment; so far as it is intended to enable the fundamental question of the existence of a dispute to be determined “before the parties are to be put to the huge expense and delay dependent on that question, I, for one, cordially approve of the provision. But, so far as it is intended to convey, either to this House, or to those outside of the House, that the decision of the Judge of the High Court is a final decision on that point, it is simply one illusion added to many other illusions which have already found a place on the statute-book. With regard to this, the Attorney-General is like a man with a lantern leading the unions that accord him support through devious paths, and through great dangers and difficulties, with the hope of ultimately finding finality; and they come out just about where they went in. Clause 5, to divest it of the technical language in which it is necessarily framed, provides that where you have an industrial dispute before the Court, either party - in one case it is only the complainant ; I do not know why that is so, and I suppose it will be explained

Mr Hughes:

– I said I would amend that.

Sir WILLIAM IRVINE:

– I do not complain of that, as it is a small matter. It is intended that either party should, at an early stage of the case, have the right to ask for a decision of the High Court, or of a Judge of the Court, as to whether there is a dispute or not. So far as that will enable the parties to avoid the waste and cost of going into litigation which may be ultimately set aside on the determination that there is no dispute at all, and, therefore, the foundation of the whole proceeding is gone, I cordially approve of that provision. But, where the clause goes on to say, by subclause 4 -

The decision of the Justice on the question shall be final and conclusive, and shall not be subject to any appeal to the High Court in its appellate jurisdiction, and shall not be challenged, appealed against, reviewed,, quashed, or, called in question, or be subject to prohibition or mandamus, in any Court on any account whatever. so far as that is concerned, it is a mere empty farce, a delusion, and a deception. It will convey to the people who depend upon it the idea that they will get finality when they go before this Judge; but it will not give them finality. It would be better that the clause were left out; it would be better that people should not be induced to expend the enormous sums of money which they have expended in so many useless and fruitless “inquiries under the Act, with a kind of assurance that ultimately they will, if they follow this course, arrive at actual finality; because they will not by this means arrive at finality. This, of course, is a technical question, and one which has to be dealt with in more or less technical terms. Where this clause purports to say that the High Court shall not grant a prohibition against a decision of the Justice, what does that mean ? Can the AttorneyGeneral explain what it means? What is the decision of the Justice? It is merely an answer to the question, “Is there a dispute?” How can any Court grant a prohibition against such a decision ? What does the prevention of a prohibition mean ? A prohibition only lies to prevent the Court from going on to take the steps to give effect to a decree which it has already made. A prohibition to a Judge of the High Court who has no further steps to take is perfectly meaningless. While the clause says that the High

Court cannot issue a prohibition to the Judge who has determined the question that there is a dispute, it leaves wholly untouched the weapon which is always there, that you can issue a prohibition against the carrying out of any steps to interfere with judgment by the only Court which can carry them out, and that is the Arbitration Court. So that the actual phrase is meaningless.

Mr Hughes:

– Is the honorable gentleman’s argument directed against the whole of that provision, or only against the part which deals with prohibition ?

Sir WILLIAM IRVINE:

– I am dealing now with prohibition, because that is the one weapon which has been used so far for attacking the fundamental want of jurisdiction in the Court. It is a prohibition in the Tramways case, it ‘is a prohibition in the Boot case, it is a prohibition practically in all the cases. That is the method of getting the decision of the High Court as to whether the Constitution has been exceeded. I ask any honorable member who has read this clause, Was it not intended to convey, and does it not convey, to the House and to persons outside the impression that if -they can get before a Judge of the High Court in Chambers, and he gives his decision, there is an end to the matter? Is it not plain-

Mr Webster:

– Ought there not to be some finality ?

Sir WILLIAM IRVINE:

– That has nothing to do with the question I am arguing. The question is, Does this subclause obtain finality, or is it not a blind ? Is it not holding out the hope of finality when there is no finality? That is the question on which I am now engaged. I ask the Attorney-General to answer this question. There is no use in enveloping it in a cloud of words, and saying that there is no appeal. By a previous Act an appeal from the Arbitration Court to the High Court has already been taken away on questions of fact, and the only thing which is left is the weapon of prohibition. This is merely an attempt, by involving a difficult question with a mass of legal phraseology, to do the impossible. The Constitution says that if there is not, in fact, an industrial dispute, there is no power in the Commonwealth Parliament to deal with it, directly or indirectly. I pause here to say, as I have said before, that paragraph xxxv. of section 51 of the Constitution is,- of all constitutional pro visions which have ever been inserted in a Constitution, one of the worst. It contains nearly every fault which a constitutional provision, as such, could contain. If there is one thing in framing a constitution or a constitutional amendment to which honorable members ought to have close regard, they ought, in choosing their words of constitutional limitation, to’ choose them by direct reference to the subject-matter, and not to make it dependent upon the existence of particular facts in a particular case. For instance, if we look at all the other subjects of our legislative powers, in section 51 we find such subjects as divorce, marriage, bills of exchange, and bankruptcy.. These are all subjects which define themselves; but when- we come to paragraph xxxv., we find that it says, “Your constitutional power shall depend, not upon the subject-matter, but upon whether in a particular case the facts show that there is a dispute.” By adopting that particular kind of constitutional demarcation you invite all manner of constitutional trouble - constitutional paralysis in the Parliament; confusion, and, in short, every evil which arises from misshapen constitutional provisions. Tn passing, I may point out that on a former occasion when certain proposed amendments of the Constitution were under consideration I showed that, bv the use of the word “ monopoly “ the Government were breaking practically the same rule - that they were making the constitutional line of demarcation depend, not upon the subject-matter, but upon a particular set of facts existing at a particular time. That is the inherent defect of the constitutional provision with regard to industrial disputes, and no matter what remedy the Government may propose, it is utterly useless, as long as it remains, to try to go round about it, or to creep under it, or to fly over it. There it stands, and although the Government may say, by means of an ingenious ‘ arrangement, ‘ ‘ This question of whether or not there is a dispute may be heard in Chambers, and there shall be no appeal to the High Court,” it is impossible to ‘get rid of the fundamental difficulty.

Mr Webster:

– Without an amendment of the Constitution ?

Sir WILLIAM IRVINE:

– As long as the Constitution remains as it is, the Government must face the difficulty that if there is not in fact a- dispute we cannot directly or indirectly prevent the High Court from ultimately determin-‘ ing that there was not a dispute, and that there was no jurisdiction. That is the result of the recent decision in the Tramways case, in. which all the members of the High Court concurred.

Mr Hughes:

– Does the honorable member say that the question of what paragraph xxxv. of section 51 of the Constitution means is not within the judicial power of the Commonwealth?

Sir WILLIAM IRVINE:

– Of course, it is a function of the Court-

Mr Hughes:

– And is it within the judicial power of the Court to decide the meaning of any Statute under it?

Sir WILLIAM IRVINE:

– It is within the judicial power of the High Court to determine.

Mr Hughes:

– Can we not create a special Court to determine that - not the High Court, but a Federal Court.

Sir WILLIAM IRVINE:

– Not to finally determine it. We can create as many tribunals as we please to determine it prima facie, but to say that we can create a Court that can finally determine it, and-

Mr Hughes:

– I was speaking about a separate Court. I come now to a High Court Justice. Why can we not say that one Justice shall do this, and that his decision shall not be subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court?

Sir WILLIAM IRVINE:

– We can limit the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court, and we have done so under a former Act, but we cannot do as the Government are attempting to do. We cannot limit, by a certain form of words, the ultimate power of the High Court to say to any tribunal - even to an officer of the High Court, “ You must not proceed with this matter, because the foundation of your jurisdiction does not exist.”

Mr Hughes:

– Not when we have taken away the right of appeal ?

Sir WILLIAM IRVINE:

– No.

Mr Hughes:

– Not when we deliberately take away, under the Judicature Chapter, that right of appeal?

Sir WILLIAM IRVINE:

– No. This conversation, I am afraid, is developing into something in the nature of legal question and answer. But I may be allowed to point out to .the AttorneyGeneral that, while it is true that Mr. Justice Isaacs, in the Boot case, as well as in another, I think, differed from the other members of the Court on this very point, holding that the right to. grant a writ of prohibition was in the nature of an appeal from the Lower Court to the High Court, and that the Constitution says that this Parliament may impose whatever restrictions it pleases upon the appellate jurisdiction of the Court-

Mr Glynn:

– But Mr. Justice Isaacs accepted the view of the -other members of the Court in the second case - he changed his opinion.

Sir WILLIAM IRVINE:

– I was coming to that. In the earlier case His Honour took the view that what I may call the overriding power usually exercised by means of a writ of prohibition was in the nature of an appellate power, and, therefore, under the Constitution, was subject to whatever conditions this Parliament might impose. But the majority of the Court were opposed to that view, and ultimately, in the Tramways case, Mr. Justice Isaacs receded from his position, and the Court now unanimously holds that nothing that this Parliament may do under the Constitution as it ‘ exists can deprive the High Court of the ultimate right of preventing proceedings being taken against the subject,, in any form, without the constitutional foundation for those proceedings, namely, tlie actual existence of what is known as a dispute.

Mr Riley:

– Then what is a dispute?

Sir WILLIAM IRVINE:

– The honorable member must ask me something very easy. I am not dealing with that aspect of the matter. There are, I admit, infinite difficulties. The particular form of constitutional drafting followed in paragraph xxxv. is faulty. It imposes upon the Court, as a fundamental question of jurisdiction, and of constitutional power, the duty of determining in every case a matter of fact. In every case it is a question of fact about which the evidence may differ from time to time. But I am not now dealing with that. I am taking the Constitution as it is, and my contention is that the Government, in pretending,, by this Bill, to give finality to a decision of the Court as to whether there is a dispute or not, are keeping the promise to the ear and breaking it to the hope. They are holding out hope of relief to employés and employers, who have been scattering their money like water in trying to secure a settlement of their difficulties. Some of this money has produced fruit, but most of it has been sunk in the ground and has borne none. The parties on both sides have been expending money on a kind of judicial warfare which has produced fruits totally incommensurate with the amount of energy and money devoted to it. The Government, by making them believe that they will be able to secure some kind of finality, are now inviting them to go on, whereas they are leading them into the same impasse as before.

Mr Hughes:

– I do not think the honorable member heard what I said when I was introducing this Bill. I said that I had very little hope of it; but I should be glad if the honorable member, after refreshing his memory by looking at sections 73 and 76 of the Constitution, would tell me whether he still holds to the same opinion.

Sir WILLIAM IRVINE:

– Those are the ordinary sections giving original and appellate jurisdiction.

Mr Hughes:

– Section 73 of the Constitution provides that -

The High Court shall have jurisdiction, with such exceptions, and subject to such regulations as the Parliament prescribes, to hear and determine appeals from all judgments…… of any Justice or Justices…..

Sir WILLIAM IRVINE:

– The defect in the Attorney-General’s argument comes back to the point I mentioned a moment or two ago. It would be a perfectly good answer to me if Mr. Justice Isaacs’ original position were correct : that this power of issuing a prohibition or controlling the exercise of judicial functions by other Courts was an appellate power. In such circumstances, we could say that this was an appellate power subject to any conditions or restrictions that we chose to impose. We might limit the power, or even prohibit it. But the High Court has now unanimously decided that it is not an appellate power, but an original inherent power, which this Parliament cannot take away from it. It is only in regard to the appellate power that the Parliament may impose limitations. The inherent jurisdiction under section 75, which provides that -

In all matters … in which a writ of mandamus or prohibition, or an injunction is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth, the High Court shall have original jurisdiction - has been held to include every judicial officer of the Commonwealth.

Mr Hughes:

– Does it include a Justice of the High Court ?

Sir WILLIAM IRVINE:

– Certainly. The Constitution declares that in all these matters the High Court shall have original jurisdiction,so that we cannot take it away from the Court. I am not going to occupy more time in discussing this question. I feel that I am dealing with a highly technical matter difficult to explain, except in technical language. I rose to point out that it is all moonshine to say in the very drastic, almost conclusive words of the sub-clause, “ The decision of the Court shall be final. You members of unions must get your dispute before a Judge in Chambers, and his decision shall be final. You can then go on indefinitely ; bring your witnesses from all parts of Australia, and spend your funds in keeping them here, while employers, on the other hand, can spend their money in producing countervailing evidence. You can go on with the assurance that you have already the final decision of the High Court on this point.” All this is absolute moonshine ! The position is just as open as it was before. It may be approached in the same way, and upon the same class of evidence, by an application to the High Court in its original jurisdiction.

Mr Webster:

– What is the remedy?

Sir WILLIAM IRVINE:

– If the hon orable member would only listen for a moment he would know.

Mr Webster:

– I have.

Sir WILLIAM IRVINE:

– Then I cannot complain. I thought I had made it fairly clear that under the Constitution there is no remedy. It is useless, therefore, to attempt to persuade the thousands who are depending upon this Parliament to give them machinery that will work well for their safety, that under this measure they will be provided with what I may describe as final machinery when they will have nothing of the kind.

Mr Fisher:

– We were charged, oh’ a previous occasion, with having failed to exhaust our powers.

Sir WILLIAM IRVINE:

– Not on this point. The charge, I think, was often made with regard to certain proposed amendments of the Constitution - those, for instance, relating to trusts and combines.

Mr Fisher:

– I am not opposing the honorable member. All that I say is that we must exhaust our powers.

Sir WILLIAM IRVINE:

– I must admit that seme of us took up the position that the Labour party were asking for certain amendments of the Constitution before the Parliament had exhausted the powers which it already possessed in that regard. But that does not apply to this matter. In it we ,cannot go further under the Constitution, and, when the matter of the necessary additional power that will have to be given comes to be debated in this House, if we can debate it in anything but a party -spirit, all sides of the House will concur that the present power is insufficient. The only question then to determine is in what particular shape this Parliament may wisely ask the people to enlarge or alter the power. But, in the meantime, what is the good of holding up before the people as an amendment that will do them good and enable them to go on and spend their money with some assurance of finality, a provision that will really give them nothing of the kind ?

Mr FINLAYSON:
Brisbane

.- The honorable member for Flinders has once more illustrated the fact that all this argument amongst the lawyers with regard to arbitration may be very interesting, but does not help us forward at all in regard to the settlement of industrial disputes. His speech only emphasizes the fact that we are in a difficulty, and that, apparently, there is no way out except the way the Labour party have proposed, and the Opposition have so unanimously refused to indorse.

Mr Kelly:

– You have always bound it up with a lot of other amendments.

Mr FINLAYSON:

– That is. not correct. That was the argument advanced in 1911, when we submitted the Constitution amendment proposals all lumped together, but when we re-submitted them separately in 1913, the honorable member’s party were just as strongly opposed to them. I have a vivid recollection of the honorable member for Flinders, in 1911, telling us that each of the words in paragraph xxxv. of section 51 of the Constitution had been a happy hunting ground for the lawyers; that they had argued what “ conciliation “ meant, what “ arbitration “ meant, what was meant by preventing a dispute or “ settling “ a dispute, what a “ dispute “ was, andwhat an “ industrial dispute “ was. The ordinary working man is getting very impatient with all this legal and technical argument, and the feeling that some very drastic step will have to be taken to remedy the existing state of affairs is growing in intensity. The honorable member for Flinders says there is no remedy. We on this side may be simple-minded, but we approach this question from the stand-point of justice and fair play. The Act of 1904, under which the Conciliation and Arbitration Court was established, distinctly states that the Court shall be guided, not by the ordinary rules of law, but by equity and good conscience. That is the point overlooked by the honorable member for Darling Downs. He said all these questions were to be dealt with according to the ordinary rules of evidence. The Act specifically lays down that that rule shall not apply to the Arbitration Court, but that justice, reason, and equity shall be the guiding principles. If the ordinary rules of legal evidence and technicality are going to be applied to these questions, we are in a morass. If the Court is in difficulties at the present time, it is simply because the Court has applied legal, instead of equity, standards. We have had ten years’ experience of conciliation and arbitration. It was introduced in 1904 as an experiment. Mr. Deakin, then Leader of the Opposition, has said that that Act was an experiment pure and simple. We have had four amendments since then, each of them an additional experiment. The Bill before us is another. It does not pretend to represent finality, and the AttorneyGeneral, in introducing it, said it was merely patchwork, and in no way pretended to be a final solution of this perplexing trouble. The fact remains that, in spite of all our machinery and efforts, the’ Arbitration Court is impotent to prevent or settle a dispute.- At any rate, the High Court has confessed its impotence to define what a dispute is, and what is an industrial dispute that extends beyond the limits of one State. The honorable member for Darling Downs said something about what the High Court had decided would be the determining factors in an industrial dispute extending beyond the limits of one State - that they had laid down a guiding rule or standard principle on which to judge the question ; and yet we know that the High Court has confessed, in the Tramways case, that, although there was a dispute existing in Adelaide and in Brisbane, both connected with tramway matters, the fact that the same terms, exactly word for word, point for point, and argument for argument, did not occur in both cases, showed that there was not a dispute. The Tramways case presents some of the most extraordinary features to the ordinary layman. It would take more than a Philadelphia lawyer to arrange the parts of that puzzle. Two Judges said the tramway employes had no case; two others said their case was good but for the fact that they had not established that it was the same dispute in Adelaide as it was in Brisbane. The Melbourne dispute had disappeared then, owing to agreements having been arrived at. Probably, had the Melbourne men been still in, the argument would have been extended to show that the position in Melbourne was different from both Adelaide and Sydney. The remaining two Judges said that the tramway men had a good case, and ought to have succeeded. An attempt has been made here to-night to show that the High Court was unanimous on the question. As a matter of fact, it was divided into three sets of two Judges each.

Mr Fenton:

– Which Judges agreed with the tramway men ?

Mr FINLAYSON:

Mr. Justice Powers and Mr. Justice Isaacs. Mr. Justice Higgins was not available, owing to absence on holidays. I am not concerned with the legal argument as to whether or not there was or could be an industrial dispute extending beyond the limits of one State; but I know - and the fact is a sufficient reply to the arguments of some honorable members, especially the honorable member for Swan - that the State tribunals could not meet the difficulty, because an ever-increasing proportion of trade and commerce, and business generally, is becoming InterState related. The tendency in that direction is continual. It is almost impossible to say that any well-established industry is confined to one State, or that you can have an industrial dispute that is actually and genuinely confined to one State. The honorable member for Swan suggested that State tribunals could deal with the trouble. If any State tribunal gave an award, it would immediately produce a desire in the same industry in another State to get a similar award to bring the men there on to equal terms.

Mr BRUCE SMITH:
PARKES, NEW SOUTH WALES · FT; ANTI-SOC from 1906; LP from 1910; NAT from 1917

– If the tendency of the award is upwards; but if it is downwards, they are not anxious to come in.

Mr FINLAYSON:

– The tendency cf awards of late in Australia has been on the up-grade. The time may come when the awards will have to be reduced owing to changed circumstances; but the fact that the awards have always been in the direction of improving^ the conditions of the workers, shows either that the workers have been seriously and disgracefully underpaid in the past, or that their right to better conditions than they previously enjoyed in the industries of the Commonwealth is being recognized. State tribunals can. never meet the difficulty; and, in view of the national spirit that we are trying to create, in view of the combination of workers throughout Australia, engendered by that very national spirit and the increase of the Federal idea, it will be increasingly difficult in the future to limit industrial disputes or the operation of industrial awards to any one State.

Mr Sampson:

– What we are aiming at is the prevention of industrial disputes.

Mr FINLAYSON:

– I am not forgetting that point, but the system of State tribunals and awards has already created an Inter-State competition which is entirely opposed to our ideas of Inter-State Free Trade. It cuts right across the constitutional provision that there shall be a free flow of commerce and trade between the States, and it has been shown particularly on the borders of Victoria and New South Wales that two different State awards, operating on different sides of the River Murray, have led to a kind of State competition that is as bad as, if not worse than, the original competition caused through the Customs Tariff. State tribunals would be all right if each State was isolated and self-contained.

Mr Atkinson:

– That could be easily . got over with a Federal Court of Appeal.

Mr FINLAYSON:

– The honorable member only suggests as a remedy another circumlocutory idea. He suggests the creation of another tribunal which must be got over before the worker reaches the Federal Court. This means more delay and more expense. This House has deliberately and specifically invited the workers and employers to combine in Federal organizations to get their case before the Federal Court.

Mr.Rodgers. - The great majority could have used the State tribunals instead.

Mr FINLAYSON:

– The honorable member need not be in any doubt as to the present tendency towards Federal organization. It is as strong amongst the employers as amongst the industrial workers.

Mr Sampson:

– Has that not been chiefly brought about by the existence of the Federal Arbitration Court!

Mr FINLAYSON:

– I believe it has. At any rate, the Court may be held to be largely responsible for encouraging it; but I do not think it is a bad thing. The honorable member’s argument, judging by what he said this afternoon, is that it is rather a regrettable tendency, but I do not think it is. We ought to encourage the desire for a uniform standard of life here, and if, by means of the Arbitration Court, we can enable the workers in every part of Australia to feel that, after all, they are parts of one great industrial machine, we shall be doing a great service to the Commonwealth, and therefore the Federal Arbitration Court ought to be encouraged, instead of being hindered and obstructed.

Mr RODGERS:
WANNON, VICTORIA · LP; NAT from 1917

– If the Court were to be made general, would it not mean that ultimately demands would have to take the place of disputes?

Mr FINLAYSON:

– The proposals of this party include, not only a central Arbitration Court to deal with Inter-State matters, but we have also provided, in an amendment of the Act, as well as, to some extent, in the original Act of 1904, that the President of the Court shall have power to nominate deputies in any part of the States to deal with matters of purely local concern. There, immediately you have the opportunity for the retention of local State Courts, presided over by deputies of the President of the central Court.

Mr RODGERS:
WANNON, VICTORIA · LP; NAT from 1917

– You would take all industrial matters out of the hands of the States?

Mr FINLAYSON:

– Certainly. There is no doubt as to the ideas of the members of this party, because we believe that Inter-State trade is becoming so increasingly inter-related that we must provide machinery to deal with disputes, whether local or universal. Unless they are all parts of one scheme, we shall never be able to accomplish satisfactory results.

Mr Boyd:

– What about the sovereign powers of the States?

Mr FINLAYSON:

– The main thingto be secured is the industrial peace of the community - that is the first desideratum. To secure peace it may be necessary for, perhaps, both States and Commonwealth, to some extent, to give and take. The honorable member’s interjection reminds me of what Alexander Hamilton said of the thirteen original sovereign States of the United’ States. Those States, he said, were so jealous of what they called their sovereign rights that they would not spare a rag to cover the shivering form of the central Government. That history is being repeated in Australia. I admit the complete sovereignty of the States within their own sphere, but they are all so jealous of their State rights, of which my honorable friends opposite are the champion exponents, that they are not prepared, even when industrial peace may be secured thereby, to part with a shred of their sovereignty. What is the position to-day? Not only in Australia, but all the world over there is, I believe, a deep desire in the hearts of every member of every Parliament in the British dominions - and in other countries - to find some solution of the industrial problem. Arbitration is recognised to be a reasonable, honest, legitimate, and proper method; and we are advocating arbitration, not only in industrial disputes, but in international and other disputes.

Mr Atkinson:

– Does the honorable member think that arbitration is successful?

Mr FINLAYSON:

– Of course, it is. The industrial disputes of to-day bear no comparison to the disputes of ten. or twenty years ago; and I pray we may never see the scenes of those days repeated. Men are getting more intelligence, and resorting to better methods, though whether these methods are effective is, perhaps, open to dispute. The workers of the world, and particularly the workers of Australia, are, however impatient of the legal difficulties attending arbitration - of the delay, expense, and interminable appeals, prohibitions, man.damuses, and so forth - and they wish to know if there cannot be found a quicker and easier way. In 1904 two methods were adopted in the endeavour to prevent disputes. The first was that of a friendly conference to which the President of the Arbitration Court, on his own initiative could invite the two parties to talk matters over and endeavour to arrive at a mutually satisfactory decision. That method failed hopelessly, for the simple reason that an award made by a Judge in a friendly conference was binding only if both parties chose at the last moment to accept it. Then there was tried the method of compulsory conference; but when one party, accepting the summons, attended the conference, and sat back refusing to discuss matters, the Judge found himself hopelessly tied and unable to do anything. The compulsory conference failed; and there was nothing left but the Court. But what has been our experience of the Court during the past ten years ? Honorable members, I am sure, will be glad to recognise the value of the services the Court has rendered in many cases; and it is a tribute to its work, and to the wisdom of the gentlemen who have occupied the position of President, that in every case, without exception, the award nas settled matters in the particular industry affected. At any rate, there has been no disputes since in those industries, as shown in the cases of the shearers, the waterside, workers, and many other employes in other industries. Some twenty-nine awards have been given, and I claim that in every case they have made for industrial peace.

Mr Boyd:

– They have only paralyzed the speech of one party, and not settled matters

Mr FINLAYSON:

– They certainly have not paralyzed the speech of one party. I remember last year reading in the Melbourne newspapers a report of the proceedings at the annual meeting of the Victorian Chamber of Manufactures, the main speech at which was made by Mr. Brookes, though the honorable member for Darling Downs ventured a few rather interesting remarks on the occasion. Mr. Brookes went out of his way to insult and misrepresent and to quarrel with the President of the Arbitration Court, concluding with the remark that if the employers had to choose between an earth quake and the Arbitration Court, they would pray God to send the earthquake, because it would mean sudden death, and their exact position would be known. The awards of the Arbitration Court have certainly not paralyzed the speech or prevented criticism by honorable members opposite and their friends. We are told that we on this side have criticised the High Court, and it is true that we have done so. I am glad to hear this afternoon that criticism is not objected to.

Mr Groom:

– The Chief Justice has upheld the right of public criticism.

Mr FINLAYSON:

– 1 have criticised the Chief Justice very severely outside, and I am prepared to do so again here. When one remembers that Sir Samuel Griffith had a good deal to do with the framing of the Constitution, one naturally feels that he will be timid about admitting the ineffectiveness and feebleness of the work of his .own creation. Mr. Groom. - Sir Samuel Griffith had nothing to do with the insertion of the particular provision by virtue of which this Bill is introduced. I think the present President of the High Court had more to do with it.

Mr FINLAYSON:

– I give Sir Samuel Griffith a good deal of credit as a very able lawyer, who has had considerable experience of parliamentary work in Queensland; but, having- been associated with the Conservative school, he naturally inclines in most matters to maintain Conservative traditions and standards. At any rate, if honorable- members opposite have any remarks to make about Mr. Justice Higgins being favorable to the workers, our retort is very simple. We can point to the fact that the previous President, ‘Mr. Justice O’Connor, was just as much disposed to favour the workers, as his decisions show, and that Mr. Justice Powers, who is at present acting for Mr. Justice Higgins, has shown an equal readiness to recognise their claims. And we have the further retort that Chief Justice Griffith and Mr. Justice Barton have shown a corresponding desire to obstruct and harass the workers in their claim to recognition. What are we going to do? Do honorable members opposite propose to go on tinkering and paltering with the question, or are they going to make a decided and determined effort to settle it? One thing may be taken for granted, and that is that, df we do not settle the matter in one way, -there is another way in which it will be settled, and in regard to which we shall not be consulted. T am not prepared to follow the honorable member for South Sydney in his proposal to abandon the Arbitration Act altogether, because I thoroughly believe in the principle of arbitration, and am prepared to apply and support it, but I join with the honorable member in saying that unless Parliament or the people can find some means whereby the Court can act quickly and cheaply-

Mr Groom:

– The Court must take evidence, must it not? In one case there were 308 points raised.

Mr FINLAYSON:

– If we cannot do something to prevent disputes as well as try to settle them, let us recognise the fact, abolish the,,Court, tear up the Act, and get back to ‘the good old method of the strike.

Mr BRUCE SMITH:
PARKES, NEW SOUTH WALES · FT; ANTI-SOC from 1906; LP from 1910; NAT from 1917

– In 1903 I predicted that this would be said.

Mr FINLAYSON:

– I hope the honorable member for Parkes will live long enough to see either his prophecy realized or something better in its place; and I do not think he would be disappointed if his prophecy were falsified. After all, the industrial peace of the community is a thing to be devoutly desired. Here we are treading along this path, and now “ we falter where we firmly trod.” We do not know where we are going ; and as this Bill may help us, it is worth while trying it. Until the people are again asked to give Parliament and the Arbitration Court sufficient power to deal with the problem in its broadest aspect, we ought to adopt what methods lie to our hands in order to secure the industrial peace of the community.

Sir ROBERT BEST:
Kooyong

– There are few members who do not feel somewhat disappointed at the result of the efforts of this Parliament to secure industrial peace. The Conciliation and Arbitration Act was introduced with the highest and best objects in view, and every effort that could be made by this House towards the attainment of those objects was honestly made. Let honorable members ask their own conscience where is the root of the trouble that has arisen. The terms of the Act and of the Constitution itself are, on . the face of them, apparently clear and explicit. By reason, however, of what has taken place, and particu larly because of the action of the unions themselves, all the complication, confusion, and trouble now complained about have been created. I do not desire to speak with any degree of heat, but merely to call the attention of honorable members to the spirit and intention of the Constitution, and our experience in regard to industrial arbitration during the last ten years. There having been established in the several States tribunals for the settlement of industrial disputes to deal with local disputes, there remained to be provided for some tribunal to deal with disputes which naturally overflowed or extended beyond the “limits of any one State, and became of an Inter-State character. That was the line of demarcation; all local disputes were to be settled by the local tribunals, and splendid efforts were put forward in all the States to give those tribunals the most extended powers within State jurisdiction.

Mr Fenton:

– Especially in Tasmania !

Sir ROBERT BEST:

– It was ultimately done in Tasmania. The intention and spirit of the Constitution were that Inter-State matters should be dealt with by an Inter-State tribunal. Disputes in regard to great industries, such as’ shipping and shearing, would naturally come under such a tribunal, in addition to which it is inevitable that disputes in regard to other large industries, as the result of Inter-State Free Trade, would overflow from one State to another. But unions were not satisfied to resort to local tribunals for the settlement of their local disputes.

Mr Fowler:

– It was more the leaders than the , unions.

Sir ROBERT BEST:

– I am referring particularly to the leaders of the unions, who were not prepared to use the State tribunals, which prior to Federation were availed of, and regarded as of great value. What those leaders of the unions did was to distort the terms of the Constitution; and it is by reason of that distortion, and by a process of engineering, that they have managed to manufacture and create disputes for the Federal Court. That is the root of the whole trouble;, by a process of artificial and machine-made disputes the spirit of the Constitution has been violated, and the Commonwealth tribunal used for purposes never intended.

Mr Howe:

– Give us an illustration.

Sir ROBERT BEST:

– I will. Take the woodworkers’ dispute, which originated in Western Australia. It was a local dispute between the woodworkers of that State and their employers, and, under ordinary circumstances, and according to the spirit of the Constitution, it should have been settled by the State tribunal, which had been established for the purpose. But the Western Australian woodworkers were not content with the reference of their dispute to the local tribunal. At that time the woodworkers throughout the rest of Australia were all working contentedly. The relations between them and their employers were of the most harmonious character. But what took place ? Representatives of the woodworkers of Western Australia visited South Australia, . and disturbed the employés in the same trade there. Then they went to Tasmania, and afterwards to Victoria and New South Wales. Finally, they visited the softwood workers of Queensland. The result was that, though the dispute was originally centred in Western Australia, turmoil and trouble were deliberately spread throughout the length and breadth of the Commonwealth. My honorable friends asked me to cite an example. I have done so.

Mr Howe:

– I do not appreciate it.

Sir ROBERT BEST:

– My honorable friends never appreciate facts. The Arbitration tribunal thus became, not a means for the prevention and settlement of disputes, but an instrument for unsettling all the workers of Australia in that particular industry. As the result of this distortion of the terms of the Constitution and of the employment of these artificial methods, arbitration has become the confused, complicated, and expensive process of which we now complain. The example which I have quoted is a typical one. The majority of the disputes which have reached the Commonwealth Arbitration Court are the result of these same artificial methods of manufacture. In such circumstances, I ask, Can we expect anything but confusion and serious expense in regard to arbitration matters?

Mr Fenton:

– What did Judge Heydon say ?

Sir ROBERT BEST:

– If my honorable friend will remind me later on, I will gladly deal with that aspect of the matter. The Chief Justice of the High Court rebelled against this condition of affairs, and against this distortion of the terms of the Constitution. He said that the employment of these artificial methods was a fraud on the Constitution.

Mr Burns:

– Did not Mr. Justice Heydon, of New South Wales, say that he could not increase the wages of the boot operatives in that State because of the wages paid in Victoria?

Sir ROBERT BEST:

– If my honorable friend will permit me, I will refer to that matter later. I say that the leaders of the political unions are wholly responsible for this ocean of expense and for the confusion and trouble incidental to the working of the Arbitration Court.

Mr Mathews:

– The honorable member has not given an atom of proof.

Sir ROBERT BEST:

– I have given facts. I have cited the woodworkers’ case in support of my statement, and I repeat that that case is a typical example of the artificial means which have been resorted to by which the Constitution has been abused. I realize at once that the object of arbitration should be simplicity, expedition, and inexpensiveness. Our aim should be the peaceful settlement of industrial disputes, and that aim we should seek to attain by every possible means. I admit the difficulty which would be experienced if there were no Federal tribunal for the settlement of these disputes. I recognise the different conditions which exist in the various States. I acknowledge that the aim of our Constitution is complete freedom of intercourse throughout the length and breadth of Australia. I realize that Inter-State disputes must occur, and that we should strive to establish some Federal tribunal for dealing with them as they arise. With this end in view, let us retain the principle laid down in our Constitution for the settlement of local disputes by State tribunals. Our Constitution contemplates only the settlement of industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of one State. Section 51, paragraph xxxv., provides -

The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution,have power to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to: -

Conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of any one State.

The honorable member for Brisbane was Court should be empowered to sit under the impression that these words were inserted at the instance of the pre-' sent Chief Justice of the High Court.' As a matter of fact, the words " industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of any one State" were placed in our Constitution at the instance of **Mr. Justice** Higgins, who was then a member of the Convention, whilst the words " conciliation and arbitration " were inserted on the suggestion of the late **Mr. Kingston.** It will be seen, therefore, that if the trouble which has arisen is the result of the insertion of the words " industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of any one State," as has been _ suggested, the present Chief Justice is not responsible for it. If an alteration of the Constitution is essential to secure industrial peace by means of a Federal tribunal, then limited amendment embodying that object should be effected. I have always been in favour of such an alteration, and the two Governments of which I was a member advocated it. If my honorable friends opposite were content with an alteration of that character they would meet with no opposition from me. They have a right to expect more simplicity in regard to arbitration proceedings than at present obtains. In order to secure that result, our Constitution might fairly be altered. I am prepared to assist in that direction, but I am not prepared to tear up the whole of the provisions of the Constitution in regard to industrial matters. I feel that at present our arbitration laws are things of shreds and patches - as has been observed by certain honorable members - and I think that the amendments proposed in this Bill will not prove of an advantageous character, and that they will not make for simplicity. We are indebted to the honorable member for Flinders for having pointed out a grave defect in the terms of the Bill - a defect of such a nature that it will add to the existing confusion and complication instead of simplifying matters. I do not think that my honorable friends opposite are seized of the great work that has been achieved by the Wages Boards in Victoria. I am of opinion that the Federal Arbitration tribunal might, with advantage, take the form of Federal Wages Boards, or that a Justice of the High with the representatives of any particular industry in which a dispute has occurred, for the purpose of settling that dispute. {: .speaker-JTI} ##### Mr Burns: -- We cannot deal with that matter under the Constitution as it stands. {: .speaker-JPC} ##### Sir ROBERT BEST: -- I am quite aware of that, and I am prepared to assist in securing an alteration of the Constitution with a view to bringing about the result which I have outlined. In Victoria there are approximately 140 Wages Boards, and while it is true that delay has occurred in the making of awards, it cannot be denied that 50 or 60 of these Boards, or, indeed, the whole of them, may sit simultaneously. {: .speaker-JTI} ##### Mr Burns: -- Can the honorable member tell me the reason why the Victorian unions are so anxious to get their cases before the Commonwealth Arbitration Court? {: .speaker-JPC} ##### Sir ROBERT BEST: -- If that is so, I am not aware of it, and think the honorable gentleman is misinformed. I venture to say there would be very few unions anxious to get away from the local tribunal. The experience of these Wages Boards has been of an extremely satisfactory and beneficial character to all concerned. There may be a few exceptions. I am not pretending for one moment that they are absolutely perfect, but they represent the most perfect system of industrial legislation that we have on the statute-books in Australia, and I think that by perfecting them, and also by establishing a Federal tribunal on the same lines, we would at least make towards ending those serious disputes and complications which have been associated with the present Federal tribunal. My honorable friend has suggested that from time to time there have been delays. I admit that in some instances there have been delays, but the few cases in which they have occurred are comparatively small as against the enormous delays and the expenses which have been associated with the Federal Arbitration Court. Wages Boards are conducted, without any expense to the employers or employes. The amount they cost the State out of Consolidated Revenue is less than £10,000 per annum. Two or three times that amount has been expended on a few cases that have been taken before the Federal Arbitration Court, and the same results have not been achieved. {: .speaker-JTI} ##### Mr Burns: -- That is because of the appeals to the High Court. {: .speaker-JPC} ##### Sir ROBERT BEST: -- The honorable member must realize that those appeals to the High Court have been brought about by the artificial methods of creating disputes. The Court has had to deal with the question of whether a dispute was an artificial or a substantial one. The whole of the members of the Court agree that, if it can be established that a dispute is one of substance, they have power to deal with it, but when the Act has been evaded and distorted by the manufacture of disputes in the manner I have described, appeals have become necessary, enormous expense has had to be resorted to, and the High Court has met with certain reflections in this House and elsewhere because they were merely interpreting the law. {: .speaker-JTI} ##### Mr Burns: -- Do you contend' that we manufacture disputes for the purpose of throwing away money ? {: .speaker-JPC} ##### Sir ROBERT BEST: -- No; but the workers have unfortunately been misled into artificially creating disputes for the purpose of getting to the Federal Arbitration Court, and it is because they have failed in those instances that they have suffered loss of time and money. I would suggest to my honorable friends opposite that they have to look the matter squarely in the face from that stand-point. There the root of the evil lies. I, for one, would be willing to see created a means whereby the troubles of the past might be .ended, and whereby we could establish a tribunal of a character that would bring about industrial peace and lead to the speedy settlement of all disputes between employers and employes. {: .speaker-JTI} ##### Mr Burns: -- You have not dealt with the boot trade. {: .speaker-JPC} ##### Sir ROBERT BEST: -- It is quite true that different wages are paid in the boot trade in *New* South "Wales and Victoria respectively, and Judge Heydon drew attention to that fact. I contend that it is our duty to bring about an alteration nf the Constitution, so that we may create «n industrial tribunal which could coordinate these disputes and bring about an effective settlement. That is the manner in which I would seek to avoid a recurrence of troubles of that character. The Bill at present before us makes no advance in that direction. {: #subdebate-23-0-s10 .speaker-KNH} ##### Mr MATHEWS:
Melbourne Ports -- If the position were not so tragic, one might laugh at the paternal feeling honorable members on the Opposition side have for Wages Boards. The honorable member for Kooyong was one of those who actually assisted in bringing the Wages Board system into operation in Victoria ; but I do not think there is another honorable member on that- side of the House who gave assistance in that direction. One can well imagine how honorable members opposite, if they had been in the Victorian Parliament, would have dealt with the Wages Boards when they were first brought forward. Now they are prepared to take the Wages Boards to their arms as infants they have nurtured and suckled. ' We can well remember the attitude of the honorable member for Flinders and others at the time, and the " reputable employers' condition," and the " three-fifths majority " provision, which were associated with the Wages Boards at their first introduction. We were asked to-day why honorable members on this side of the House prefer the Federal Arbitration Court to the Wages Boards. First of all, the Wages Boards have such limitations that they cannot settle the question to suit the employes, at any rate. {: .speaker-KRD} ##### Mr McGrath: -- And they apply only to cities and towns. {: .speaker-KNH} ##### Mr MATHEWS: -- They are limited in their operations. Honorable- members opposite must be aware that a Wages Board is composed of an equal number of men from each side, with an independent chairman. {: .speaker-KEX} ##### Mr Finlayson: -- So-called. {: .speaker-KNH} ##### Mr MATHEWS: -- I must say that we . have' had some very good chairmen in Victoria, men who have tried to do their duty. In the hearing of a case, the men naturally endeavour to get as much as they can, and the employers to concede as little as possible; and the chairman has to decide between the two parties. The honorable member for Kooyong knows well that the Judges in the Victorian Appeal Court, when requested by the men to consider the fact that the worker has a wife and family to keep, and that his wages are not sufficient for that purpose, have said, " We cannot consider the question of whether the wage is sufficient for the maintenance of a wife and family. All we know is that it is all the industry can pay." {: .speaker-JPC} ##### Sir Robert Best: -- One Judge said that. {: .speaker-KNH} ##### Mr MATHEWS: -- Two Judges in Victoria gave that decision, and there is no possibility of upsetting it. The real reason why the worker prefers the Federal Arbitration Court to the State tribunals, is that every State has a system of its own, and the tribunal in each State will give a different decision. The honorable member for Kooyong has endeavoured to deal with the case of the bootmakers in New South Wales; but he cannot get over the difficulty by saying that he is willing to create a Court to deal with the position when he actually refuses to help us to get an amendment of the Constitution so that the Federal Court may have wider powers. Why are we desirous of altering the Act so that the Court may achieve what was intended ? There is no doubt in anybody's mind that the framers of the Constitution intended that, whenever there was a dispute extending beyond the boundaries of one State, the Federal Arbitration Court should have power to deal with it. Now we come to the question as to whether a dispute is real or manufactured. We are told that the workers manufacture disputes in order to get away from the Wages Boards and obtain access to the Federal Arbitration Court. Let us consider the case of the felt hatters. The felt hatters in Sydney may obtain, per medium of their Court - which is distinct from the Victorian Wages Boards, or the South Australian Court - an award which their Court thinks necessary in order that they may live and rear their families in decency in New South Wales. Those workers know, however, that if higher wages are paid in New South Wales, and that in consequence it costs more to produce an article, the manufacturer in Victoria, where the men are paid less, will be able to flood the New South Wales market and deprive a large number of men of their occupation. For that reason, the men themselves, when raising their own wages, are desirous of raising those of the men in other States at the same time, so that there shall not be any undercutting. {: .speaker-KFJ} ##### Sir John Forrest: -- Do you believe in uniform wages in every State? {: .speaker-KNH} ##### Mr MATHEWS: -- The workers of the world do not love one another so well that they are willing to see otherstake their work. They are desirous of improving their conditions if they possibly can; but they know that if they receive more pay than other men, the underpaid men can undercut them. The only reasonable method of overcoming this difficulty in a place like Australia, where we are all dependent one on the other, is to have a Federal Court that can assess the wages and conditions of each State, so that we can have a uniform system of wages - always taking into consideration the fact that there are portions of Australia where it costs more to live, and in consequence wages must necessarily be higher there than elsewhere. {: .speaker-KFJ} ##### Sir John Forrest: -- What about the value of the article? {: .speaker-KNH} ##### Mr MATHEWS: -- Of course, it follows that, if wages were lower here than in another State, unless the cost of carriage counterbalanced the difference, the manufacturers in that State would not be able to carry on their trade; they would be undercut. I know, as well as the right honorable member for Swan, that there are portions of Western Australia where it is necessary that a man shall receive higher wages than in other portions of that State, and other parts of Australia. But we also realize that, in those portions, the. particular industries we are referring to are not conducted. One would not manufacture wrought iron in portions of Western Australia where there is no ironstone and no coal. {: .speaker-JWG} ##### Mr Fowler: -- There is plenty of coal and iron in Western Australia. {: .speaker-KNH} ##### Mr MATHEWS: -- I refer to portions where there are no deposits of coal or iron. The workers are as desirous that one section of them shall not get the better of another section as they are that the employing classes shall deal fairly with them. To obtain those conditions, there must be a Federal Arbitration Court. When an application for higher wages goes before a Wages Board, the employers are often able to show that their industry is not sufficiently protected to enable higher wages to be paid. The Wages Boards have power to increase and to decrease wages, though their powers in this matter are too limited ; but they have no power to give any decision which will affect conditions operating prejudicially to an industry. A Wages Board may know that higher duties are necessaryfor the protection of an industry, but it has no power to alter the Tariff. The Federal Arbitration Court, however, could, where an industry was insufficiently protected to enable those employed in it to earn wages which would give them proper conditions, suggest to this Parliament an alteration of the Tariff, and the Parliament would have to take the suggestion into consideration. {: .speaker-L0P} ##### Mr Sampson: -- The Inter-State Commission has been appointed to make recommendations in regard to the Tariff. {: .speaker-KNH} ##### Mr MATHEWS: -- I do not wish to speak harshly of the Commission, but, in my opinion, it is composed of Free Traders, who have no desire that goods shall be manufactured in Australia. That is borne out by accounts that I have read of the manner in which they have dealt with manufacturers who have appeared before them. I admit that many manufacturers have gone before the Commission without being properly fortified with facts, and some, no doubt, have kept back information. But the manner in which the majority of the Commissioners have treated the manufacturers who have appeared before them shows that they have no real sympathy with them, and consider that the existing duties are quite high enough. It is complained that disputes are manufactured; but that must always be so in a sense. Suppose that employes feel that they are not receiving sufficiently high wages. {: .speaker-KFJ} ##### Sir John Forrest: -- They should go to the local tribunal. {: .speaker-KNH} ##### Mr MATHEWS: -- The Wages Boards of Victoria do not meet the case. {: .speaker-KFJ} ##### Sir John Forrest: -- The honorable member thinks of Victoria only. {: .speaker-KNH} ##### Mr MATHEWS: -- The Wages Boards of Victoria are unable to deal fairly with the working men of the State, who should be able to appeal to a tribunal which could give their complaints proper consideration. I desire to have regard to the interests of the whole of Australia; but as a Victorian representative I know best the local conditions, and I am aware of the need for some tribunal other than the Wages Boards. The Wages Boards cannot consider whether what a man receives is sufficient for the upkeep of a wife and family. {: .speaker-KFJ} ##### Sir John Forrest: -- Then why does not the Victorian Parliament alter the law? {: .speaker-KNH} ##### Mr MATHEWS: -- Because, like the honorable member, it is Conservative. {: .speaker-KFJ} ##### Sir John Forrest: -- **Sir Alexander** Peacock could do it. {: .speaker-KNH} ##### Mr MATHEWS: -- He has not the power. The LegislativeCouncil, which is elected on a franchise of bricks and mortar and broad acres instead of one of flesh and blood, takes good care that no legislation is passed which might exact a shilling from those who elect them - the employing section of Victoria. The franchise of the elective Legislative Councils of Australia is so limited that only Tories can be elected, except in some of the congested city constituencies. In Victoria, after fighting for years, we have succeeded in getting only four members into the Legislative Council. There is a howl from the Liberals because of their small representation in the Senate, and they propose that the system of election shall be altered to increase that representation, but it is not proposed to alter the Constitution of the Legislative Council of Victoria, in which there are only four Labour men. That Chamber stands for vested interests, and will hold on as long asit can. It can veto any legislation that might be of value to the workers. That is why we are desirous of going from the Wages Boards to the Federal Arbitration. Court. The Legislative Council will grant only what is dragged out of it.It takes a decade to pass a measure through that Chamber. {: .speaker-F4S} ##### Mr Joseph Cook: -- What guarantee is there that the Labour party would alter its Constitution if they had absolute power? The party has been in power in New South Wales for four years, and has only strengthened the Legislative Council there. {: .speaker-KNH} ##### Mr MATHEWS: -- During the three years that we were in power in the Commonwealth we carried into effect everything that we said we would do. {: .speaker-F4S} ##### Mr Joseph Cook: -- And went out of office. {: .speaker-KNH} ##### Mr MATHEWS: -- The result of the 1913 election was a fluke. After thirteen months the honorable member lost his majority of one. He had not the sense to hold on to it. The Justices of the High Court have ruled that the Federal Arbitration Court is not a Wages Board; that it exists, not to consider questions of wages, but to prevent disputes. If a recent decision means anything, it means that a question of wages cannot be made a dispute. The workers of any trade in Victoria, New South Wales, or South Australia who desire to have their wages increased, combine and register under the Federal Act, and thus make themselves subject to the penalties of that Act. They tie themselves hand and foot, and cannot strike without paying the penalty. When they go into the Arbitration Court because of a dispute arising out of the fact that they do not get sufficient wages, they are told, according to the judgment of the High Court, that that is not a dispute. There should be some way of finding out what is a dispute before the cose of going to the Arbitration Court is incurred. If a man .threatens to punch my nose there is a dispute, even though he may not carry out the threat. If I tell him that he will not do what he threatens because I will prevent him from doing it, there is a dispute. If I thought that I was good enough to give him a go, I would do so, though if I thought the contrary I would not. The present position puts me in mind of that of a man who, when in prison, was told by a friend who was visiting him, "They cannot put you in gaol for that." " But," he said. " I am in gaol." The Justices of the High Court have ruled that there is no dispute when men are clamouring for shorter hours, higher wages, and better conditions, because they have not struck. I desire that the law shall be so altered that it will be made easy to prove the existence of a dispute, and if that is not possible, I advocate the repeal of the penalty provisions, so that employes may be able to strike without being penalized to prove that there is a dispute. If a dispute cannot be proved without a strike, and if men are penalized for striking, we should remove these penalty provisions, so that it will be possible to show, in the oldfashioned way. that there is a dispute which the High Court will recognise. I suggest to the Attorney-General that if it be found impossible to amend the law so that the existence of a dispute may be proved without a strike, the penalty provisions should be repealed in order that striking may be resorted to to prove the existence of the dispute. That is necessary in the interests of those whom we represent - the people of Australia. They are maintained by the wage-earners whom the Act was passed to assist. {: #subdebate-23-0-s11 .speaker-KTT} ##### Mr BRUCE SMITH:
PARKES, NEW SOUTH WALES · FT; ANTI-SOC from 1906; LP from 1910; NAT from 1917 -- The vehemence of the honorable member who has just spoken should convince any impartial person that this is a highly contentious measure. That being so, the Government should be very well ashamed , of themselves for bringing it before the House, in view of the expressions we had from them immediately before the elections. . I am satisfied that this is a purely legal measure, and I have no intention of dealing with either the legal or constitutional aspect of it, because three ex-Attorneys-General, who have analyzed the Bill from every aspect, have shown conclusively that it utterly fails to effect the purpose which the present Attorney-General professes to believe, and asserted, it would effect. Th, honorable member for Brisbane showed very clearly that he altogether misconceives the position of the Arbitration Court. So did the honorable member for Melbourne Ports. They have converted a debate upon purely abstract and legal issues into one of an electioneering type, in which they have been endeavouring to show their constituents what they would' like to get for them if they could only surmount the legal difficulties which now, and must for ever, surround them. The honorable member for Brisbane harped upon two points. In the first place, he said that when an award is given in one State it should apply in every State. That shows that the honorable member has either forgotten the nature of this Federation, or that he really desires, by a side wind, to bring about a system of. unification in arbitration. It is quite clear that the framers of our Constitution, in providing for arbitration, intended that each State should be left to settle its local industrial disputes within its own boundaries. It was only intended by the Constitution, and by- all who understood it, that the Federal Court when it came into existence should be limited to the consideration of those disputes which are not confined to one State, but extend over all Australia. I know that in the view of honorable members of the Labour party t cannot in this matter appeal to a better authority than **Mr. Justice** Higgins, and for their edification I propose to quote what he said at the Federal Convention on this subject. He had moved the insertion of the words, " extending beyond the limits of any one State," and I direct the special attention of my honorable friends opposite to what he said on that occasion. Quoting the paragraph - >Conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of " industrial dis.putes," he said - 1 would prefer personally to have the words £nd there, but, in order to obviate the tear which some members entertain that this may enable the Federal Parliament to interfere in disputes purely local, 1 think it better to put in the words I had originally sat the end of my previous amendment: - -"extending beyond the limits of any one State." The whole thing would then read - " Conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement, of industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of any one State." This was at the Adelaide Convention, and, although that amendment was rejected there, it was subsequently adopted in Melbourne, and incorporated in the Constitution. To show, further, how very clear **Mr. Justice** Higgins' mind was at that time, he said - >All 1 ask for by this amendment is that just as Victoria can deal with Victorian trade disputes, just as Kew South Wales can deal with New South Wales disputes, and just as Great Britain and Ireland can deal with disputes in the United Kingdom, so the Federal Parliament shall be enabled to deal with disputes that are Australian. It is quite clear from these two extracts, from a source that has become an object of worship with the Labour party, that it was the intention to limit each State to the settlement of its own industrial disputes, and then give power to the Federal Court to deal with disputes of a purely Australian character. {: .speaker-KEX} ##### Mr Finlayson: -- What is the date of the quotations! {: .speaker-KTT} ##### Mr BRUCE SMITH:
PARKES, NEW SOUTH WALES · FT; ANTI-SOC from 1906; LP from 1910; NAT from 1917 -- The statements I have quoted were made at the Convention of 1897; when the Constitution was being framed! {: .speaker-KEX} ##### Mr Finlayson: -- Seventeen years ago ! {: .speaker-KTT} ##### Mr BRUCE SMITH:
PARKES, NEW SOUTH WALES · FT; ANTI-SOC from 1906; LP from 1910; NAT from 1917 -- I have heard the statement that a man once said something happened 1,800 years ago, and it was just as logical as the honorable member's remark. * {: .speaker-KEX} ##### Mr Finlayson: -- Conditions have changed since then. {: .speaker-KTT} ##### Mr BRUCE SMITH:
PARKES, NEW SOUTH WALES · FT; ANTI-SOC from 1906; LP from 1910; NAT from 1917 -- The Constitution has not changed. Does the honorable member think that the Constitution is made of india-rubber and can be tightened or slackened at will to meet his particular views? {: .speaker-KZA} ##### Mr West: -- If the people will it. {: .speaker-KTT} ##### Mr BRUCE SMITH:
PARKES, NEW SOUTH WALES · FT; ANTI-SOC from 1906; LP from 1910; NAT from 1917 -- The people are elastic, I admit, and the Labour party especially is elastic, but the Constitution is not elastic. I hope I shall be allowed to proceed on the assumption that the Constitution is in black and white and is not intended to be stretched in any way except by a Court or by an arbitration Judge. In 1903, when we were dealing in this House with the Conciliation and Arbitration Bill, which was introduced to carry out this purpose of the Constitution, I felt very clear as to what the introduction of the words " extending beyond the limits of any one State" would enable the trade unions to do. It will be found reported in *Hansard* that I said it would enable them to have " two tries for their money." I said then that they would attempt to get a decision that would suit them from a State Court ; and, if they found that the decision of the State Court would not suit them, they would attempt to go to 'the Federal Court and for that purpose would endeavour to link up the ramifications of their organizations, and then claim that the quarrel was a Federal dispute. That has come to pass. We know very well that the Labour party veer about from one Court to another in order to get a decision which will 'suit them. Only the other day the bakers in New South Wales went to the Arbitration Court; and, when that Court refused to afford them the satisfaction of doing away with night work, ' they went to the much despised Wages Board and got what they wanted. There is a case in point of action taken in the reverse way. They went first to the Arbitration Court of the Commonwealth, and when they could not get what they wanted there, went to one of these miserable Wages Boards of which they so frequently speak contemptuously. We have a union in New South Wales and another in Victoria; they are not amalgamated; they have nothing in common, their funds are quite separate, their rules are different; but they say, " We shall amalgamate with similar unions in all the States and we can then go into the Federal Court and claim that our dispute is a Federal dispute." I say that it was never intended that the Federal Court should deal with any organizations that were not broad enough to be considered Federal, that had not their funds in common, and were really not united so as to constitute one genuine organization. The honorable member for Brisbane has told us that whatever is settled in one State should apply to the others. What he wants to do is to bring about, as I have said, unification of arbitration without first securing unification under our Constitution. He wants really to bring about a condition of a common rule throughout the Commonwealth, always based upon the decision given by the State Court which carries the highest wages. I put it to the honorable member in the course of his speech whether if one State happened to give a lower wage he would not suggest that the other States should come down to that wage. No ; the decision must always go up. This goes to show what a farce the whole thing is. It shows that the object of these men is not to get arbitration in its just sense. I am reminded in this connexion of a picture of two workmen that appeared in the London *Punch..* One was represented as saying to the other, " Here, Bill, you call this arbitration? Why it's gone agin, us." That was an indication of his view, and it is an indication also of the view of arbitration which is held by the honorable member for Brisbane. If in all the States organizations refer their disputes to different tribunals and one happens to get a little higher award than the others, according to the honorable member for Brisbane they must all go up to that award. Surely the spirit of arbitration' should suggest that all should just as reasonably go down to the lower award. Outside of Parliament the honorable member for Brisbane is a very rational man. I have heard the honorable member talk very good, sound, common sense outside Parliament, but when he gets into Parliament I have noticed one cheek a little more swollen than the other. The honorable member has his tongue in it. He talks to suit his constituents and the members of his party. {: .speaker-KEX} ##### Mr Finlayson: -- As the honorable member for Parkes does. {: .speaker-KTT} ##### Mr BRUCE SMITH:
PARKES, NEW SOUTH WALES · FT; ANTI-SOC from 1906; LP from 1910; NAT from 1917 -- The honorable member for Parkes says what he thinks. He does not say one thing out of the House and another thing in the House.. He does not talk to his constituents in order to win votes. The whole difference in regard to arbitration is a misconception of Federation. Honorable members on the other side of the Chamber would like to sweep away all State distinctions. If they could they would, steal all the powers of the States, and have one central Government from this House. They happen to have been successful in this House, they happen to have been successful in the Federal arena, and they happen to have, been successful in the Federal Arbitration Court; but I undertake to say that if, in the whirligig of time, a man like myself should become President of the Federal Arbitration Court, that institution would become very unpopular, and- honorable members would say, " Let us now get back to the State Arbitration Courts; that man does not suit us." They know very well that if the State Courts are unpopular they rush back to Wages Boards. They blow hot and cold. First of all, they try the State Courts. The State Courts do not suit them, so, by linking up the unions, they endeavour to get to the Federal Court, and we know that if the State Courts do not suit them they sometimes go back to Wages Boards. They have the choice of three tribunals: at which to try their luck. The public are watching this sort of thing. People outside know very well that this disgust which has come about in regard to arbitration is the result of the actions of the Labour party. How can we expect men outside to respect a tribunal when members of a Labour Government and members of the Labour party deliberately encourage members of organizations to snap their fingers at Arbitration Courts, and ignore their decisions ? How can we have these Courts respected ? How can the Federal Court be respected ? If a decision is given contrary to the wishes of honorable members opposite they snap their fingers at it, and say, " This Judge is no good now." If the President of an Arbitration Court or the chairman of a Wages Board gives a decision favorable to those making a claim, the unions say, " He is a great man, a magnificent fellow ; he ought to be in a higher position." But if a decision which the unions do not like is given, they say, " He is not fit for his position." Did we not have, within the last few months, a Minister of the Crown in the Senate actually stating in public that the Justices of the High Court should be swept away, and that we should have men appointed to it " more in sympathy with trade unionism " ? Do honorable members require Judges, men who will hold the proverbial scales blindfold between the parties, or do they require men whom they can turn and twist, and from whom they can get judgments or awards that happen to suit their party? I am not going to speak at length on this Bill. The legal aspects of it have been dealt with. The honorable and learned members for Angas, Darling Downs, and Flinders, in their speeches upon the constitutional and legal aspects of the Bill, have shown conclusively that the measure is simply an attempt to burke the right of. appeal on questions of law. In one provision Ministers are attempting to twist the facts and the proof of facts in such a way as to deprive certain parties of an appeal ; but they can never deprive a citizen of the British Empire of his ultimate right to go to a higher Court on a question of law; and the sooner honorable members on the Government side, especially the honorable members for Brisbane and Melbourne Ports, recognise that the Federal Constitution is a deed of partnership between the different parts of Australia, by which the States are supposed to settle their own affairs, and leave only Australian affairs to the Commonwealth, the sooner they will understand the distinctions in our arbitration law which have led to the trouble of which they are now complaining. {: #subdebate-23-0-s12 .speaker-JWC} ##### Mr CARR:
Macquarie .- A good deal which commends itself to one has been said in opposition to the Bill, but I think that the Attorney-General, when he introduced it, anticipated the limitations of his effort. Seeing that the High Court is the sole interpreter of the Constitution, I think it is fairly clear that when it says that the Constitution will not allow it to do certain things, trying to give it the power to do certain things is of very little use. The High Court now has appellate jurisdiction on questions that come before it as to whether it has the right to adjudicate or not, and now we are proposing to give it the power of original jurisdiction, and also entitling it to delegate that power to any member of the Court. Technicalities seem to me unavoidable, largely because of that section of the Constitution which has been quoted by the honorable member for Parkes, and which has long been a tremendous obstruction to the effective working of the Constitution. I think that we are all agreed that greater facilities should be provided for the settlement of industrial trouble that the existing facilities are not adequate, because of the differences between the States, and that a central authority is necessary in order that the balance may be fairly held between the interests of the different parts of the Commonwealth. The section of the Constitution referred to provides that the Commonwealth shall have power to deal with conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of any one State. The honorable and learned member for Parkes dwelt upon the addendum to the original provision in the shape of the words, " extending beyond the limits of any one State." The section is self destructive. While it provides for conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes, the High Court now declines to take action, because in most . cases the Justices are never sure as to whether a dispute exists. To enact a provision for the prevention of a dispute which the High Court does not admit exists isof no use. If the Justices of the High Court have first to wait for the establishment of the fact that a dispute does exist, what is the utility of making provision for conciliation and the prevention of that dispute? It seems to me, in regard to the framing of this section of the Constitution, that while one lobe of the brain must have been working with a view of preventing trouble and adjusting difficulties which lead to open outbreaks extending all over Australia, the other lobe must have been busy in seeing that the Convention did not go too far in the direction of interfering with State rights, and, therefore, took precaution to see that no steps could be taken for preventing a dispute from occurring until it was in actual existence. I can quite understand the muddle we are all in in regard to this matter. The Constitution is defective, undoubtedly, when it contains a power which destroys itself, as this one does. There is no greater justification to be found for submitting it to amendment. What is the use of talking about conciliation and the prevention of disputes when the High Court says, in another breath, " You cannot do anything unless the dispute is an absolute fact." {: #subdebate-23-0-s13 .speaker-JMG} ##### Mr ATKINSON:
Wilmot -- When the Attorney-General introduced the Bill the other day, he showed the unfortunate state into which the industrial world is getting. He said that the condition now is simply chaotic, and from his remarks I came to the conclusion that he bad practically abandoned all hope of the Arbitration Court, as we know it to-day, ever doing much good for the workers, or the employers, or the community generally. I agree, and always have recognised, that the Court is altogether too cumbrous and too costly in proportion to the benefit which the workers, or the employers, or the community get from its operation. We ought to remember that there are really three parties to be considered, namely, the worker, the employer, and the public. Because, if any trouble arises in an industry, it not only affects those who are immediately engaged in the industry, but also a great number of persons who are dependent, more or less, on its being carried on successfully. Therefore, it behoves this Parliament to approach the consideration of this matter in as impartial and non-party a spirit as possible. We are all here to do our best for the welfare of the community, and that object is not promoted by unemployment and dislocation in our every-day affairs. We do not want unemployment brought about. We are here to try to provide employment, and, when people are employed, to keep the wheels of industry going, so that there shall be no unfortunate breaks, and nothing happen of the nature of which we have heard so much lately. It is admitted that the Arbitration Court does not do its work in the way which its promoters fondly anticipated, and which we all desired. Unfortunately, it would seem that the proposition in this Bill, though well-intentioned and ingenious in its effort, is not going to achieve the object at. which it is aimed. I recognise that it is a good idea on the part of the Attorney-General to try to get away, if possible, or as far as possible, from the interminable cases which arise in the High Court, and which very often are occupied with the discussion of the question of what is a dispute, or whether, as a fact, there is a dispute between the contending parties. Unfortunately for the Bill, it would appear that we cannot do as the Attorney-General would wish us to do, and that is, secure finality by allowing a matter to. be taken before a Judge in Chambers. {: .speaker-DQC} ##### Mr Hughes: -- I do not admit that. I say that it is arguable. {: .speaker-JMG} ##### Mr ATKINSON: -- I do not say that the Attorney-General made that admission, but when he was introducing the Bill it struck me that he had very grave doubts on the point. {: .speaker-DQC} ##### Mr Hughes: -- I admit that. {: .speaker-JMG} ##### Mr ATKINSON: -- The honorable and learned member has very grave doubts on the point, but to-day we have heard speeches from three legal members who hold high rank as constitutional authorities, and they seem to be very positive that the clause will fail - that we cannot prevent the High Court from exercising its right to issue a writ of prohibition when a matter is brought before it. {: .speaker-JM8} ##### Mr Archibald: -- It is no good without a strike - is that it? {: .speaker-JMG} ##### Mr ATKINSON: -- I did not say that. {: .speaker-JM8} ##### Mr Archibald: -- The Court has not the honesty to say it, either. {: .speaker-JMG} ##### Mr ATKINSON: -- I am dealing with the Bill as it is, and will come to the remedy later. This proposal to leave a matter in the hands of a single Judge sitting in Chambers does not appear to me to be very satisfactory. I think it is narrowing the position rather dangerously. It is not a democratic move, to say the least of it. Even if we were to enact the provision there is nothing to prevent a Judge before whom a similar matter is brought from giving an opposite decision, and the two would be final decisions. It seems to me that even if we could do what the Bill is framed to do, we should sooner or later land ourselves in rather a difficult position. {: .speaker-DQC} ##### Mr Hughes: -- As the honorable member for Angas stated to-night, five points have been settled, and the question is the application of those points to any particular set of facts. {: .speaker-JMG} ##### Mr ATKINSON: -- I admit that. I should be very pleased to help the AttorneyGeneral if he could propose a way of achieving that purpose. I consider this matter from a purely non-party point of view, because it is one which affects the community generally. I recognise that it will be to the advantage of the whole community if we can keep the wheels of industry going, and see that the workers receive the best wages which the industries can afford to bear, that the employers get a fair days's work from every worker, and that all those dependent upon the industries obtain the fruits which they aTe supposed to reap when things aTe in a normal condition. I do not propose to deal further with the constitutional aspect, because, as I said before, it has been dealt with very fully to-day by three lawyers who have the reputation of being high constitutional authorities. I quite agree with what has been said from that stand-point. When I recall their decided opinions, and remember the doubt which the Attorney-General has in this matter, I feel satisfied in my own mind that the clause will be of no benefit to those for whom it is intended. I believe that if they were to act upon the provision they would only meet with great disappointment, because, when they took a case before the High Court, it would soon show them that it was not within the power of this Parliament to enact the provision. What can we do to better the present situation? We have come to the conclusion that the Conciliation and Arbitration Court at present is not doing much for us, and we are anxious to bring about an improvement. I think that the honorable member for Wimmera was not far wrong when he said that we must either secure an amendment of the Constitution in regard to conciliation and arbitration, or provide for the establishment of Wages Boards with the right of appeal to the Federal Court. The lastnamed proposal seems to me to be the better one. The conditions of climate and of employment vary considerably throughout the States. In Western Australia, for instance, a gold miner may receive £4 per week, whereas I do not suppose that there is a mine in Bendigo which could afford to pay such a wage. There are, however, in this. State mines which could afford to pay, perhaps, *£3* a week, and men employed by them at that wage might be just as well off at the end of the year as were miners in Kalgoorlie receiving £4 per week. If that be so, why should not the Victorian mines be allowed to continue to pay the lower rate? {: .speaker-KEV} ##### Mr Fenton: -- To how many industries does that apply? {: .speaker-JMG} ##### Mr ATKINSON: -- I do not say that there is the same difference in respect of every industry. I referred to mining only by way of illustration. But let us look for a moment at the position of the woollen and boot industries, or, indeed, at that of any manufacturing industry in the States. In Tasmania men may be receiving 9s. per day, whereas men in New South Wales doin*- the same class of work receive 10s. 6d. per day. The Tasmanian industry with its smaller output, and other drawbacks, might not be able- to pay more than 9s. per day. There might be many men in that State willing to work for 9s. per day, and who, perhaps, would be just as well off there as men in Sydney receiving 10s. 6d. per day. In such circumstances, why should not the Tasmanian industry be allowed to exist, and to provide for these people? If we centralized the power, making the Federal Court supreme, with power to frame a common rule, the smaller States would run the risk of losing some of the industries that are now being carried on with advantage to themselves and the workers. The competition of the smaller States with the large States has practically been knocked out by Federation. We know by a reference to the Convention debates that **Mr. Justice** Higgins, in proposing the addition of the words " extending beyond the limits of a State " to the conciliation and arbitration provision of the Constitution Bill, really intended that all matters of local import should be dealt with by local' tribunals, and that disputes relating tomatters of an Inter-State character, such' as a dispute in the shearing industry, or a- maritime strike, which might affect, the whole of Australia, should be dealt, with by the Federal Court. That, indeed, was in the minds of the framers; of the Constitution, and I think we can. still give effect to it. Although communication between the States is improving, it has not been brought to sucha state of perfection that industrial conditions in all the States are alike, and' if we imposed on every industry in Australia the obligation of paying the samerate of wages in every State,, we should' interfere very seriously with many factories carried on in the smaller States,, and conducted .just as well as are thosein the larger States. In the smallerStates rents are cheaper, and there areother factors which, perhaps, enable theworkers there to do just as well as dothose working in the larger States and' receiving higher wages. {: .speaker-KXO} ##### Mr Page: -- They make more boots inone factory in Collingwood Whybrow's- than in all Tasmania. {: .speaker-JMG} ##### Mr ATKINSON: -- I am not confining my remarks to the boot-making industry. I am striving to show that the exercise of the power to make a common rule might injuriously affect industries in the smaller States. {: .speaker-JM8} ##### Mr Archibald: -- What about Tasmanian jams? {: .speaker-JMG} ##### Mr ATKINSON: -- Tasmania is able to compete with the larger States in some lines owing to the excellence of her nroducts. It is for this reason that Tasmanian flannels and blankets have secured the cream of the Australian market. {: .speaker-DQC} ##### Mr Hughes: -- Does the honorable member suggest that the rule should be, " The larger the State the higher the wage, and the smaller the State the lower the wage " ? {: .speaker-JMG} ##### Mr ATKINSON: -- No; but in some of the smaller States there are factories whose output is very much below that of more thriving and extensive factories in Sydney or Melbourne, and if all had to pay the same rate of wages these small factories might be knocked out. There is no reason why they should be. The factories in the' smaller States are paying the best wages they can afford, and there are many people willing to take what they offer, believing that the conditions of living are better and healthier there for themselves and their families than they are in some of the more congested States. {: .speaker-KXO} ##### Mr Page: -- How is it that so many Tasmanians go up to Queensland in the sugar season ' {: .speaker-JMG} ##### Mr ATKINSON: -- It is a good thing for Queensland that they do. They go there because they can make good money, and, what is more, they earn it. We do not hear of their leading strikes. They are glad of an opportunity to do an honest day's toil for a fair day's pay. {: .speaker-DQC} ##### Mr Hughes: -- Is not Tasmania's immunity from strikes due to the fact that the men have to work such long hours that they have no time to think of anything but bed when they knock off. {: .speaker-JMG} ##### Mr ATKINSON: -- We were talking about the employment of Tasmanians in the sugar industry in Queensland. We ought to seek to improve the present system.- If we are to have these tribunals, we should leave local matters to be settled as far as possible by local bodies, and have a Federal Court of Appeal from them, and that Federal body could harmonize and co-ordinate the industries in the different States. If an industry in one State was not paying a proper wage, a Wages Board in another State could appeal to the Federal body, which could order the matter to be remedied. {: .speaker-DQC} ##### Mr Hughes: -- That would involve an amendment of the Constitution. {: .speaker-JMG} ##### Mr ATKINSON: -- Yes, but what is an amendment of the Constitution if we are going to confer a benefit like this on the people? No one is afraid to amend the Constitution, but I do not say we are going to amend it in the way the AttorneyGeneral would wish. If an amendment is required to bring about a sane and sensible scheme such as I have outlined, all the members on this side will be only too willing to help. If the present arbitration system is not proving successful, and if Parliament comes to the conclusion that no artificial bodies like Arbitration Courts or Wages Boards will meet the case, we are thrown back on the device of getting so many of the employers to meet so many of the employes to try to come "to some arrangement between themselves. I do not want to belittle the work of the Arbitration Court, which has effected a lot of good in many of its awards, but it has been at a tremendous cost. In many of the industries where disputes have been finally settled by the Court, if a little good feeling had existed, and the employers had selected a few of their number to meet the employes, quite as good results could very likely have been achieved. {: .speaker-DQC} ##### Mr Hughes: -- But they would not meet them. {: .speaker-JMG} ##### Mr ATKINSON: -- The question is: How are we to promote a better feeling? The Arbitration Court does not seem to do it. The two sides in a case before the Court are each fighting for their own hand. They are at arms' length; they are not trying to find a common way to work together. We want to get both sides together, and to realize that it is to their mutual advantage to keep the industry going. So long as a worker is getting the best wage that an industry can pay, it should be put to him in this way : " What more do you want? You may be an employer to-morrow, and if you are I hope you will as freely give the best wage you can afford as you are anxious now to obtain it as a worker." If we do away with the Arbitration Court altogether, and institute better forms of co-operation and profitsharing, the community will gradually settle down into a far more contented frame of mind, and we shall get better results. There are many industries in which profit-sharing could be employed with advantage. With it there would be far more mutuality of interest. Every worker employed in an industry would feel more or less a shareholder. {: .speaker-DQC} ##### Mr Hughes: -- Do you suggest that the Court should determine what proportion of the profits should go to the employer and what to the men? {: .speaker-JMG} ##### Mr ATKINSON: -- I am hoping that we shall be able to do away with the Court altogether. We should get employers and employés to see that their interests lie in making the industry as profitable as possible by working it as well as it can be worked, so that every employé would get, not only his wage guaranteed, but also a bonus if there were any profits. He would then see that it was to his advantage to do his very best. Mutuality of interest would become so great in the end that we should never hear of a strike. {: .speaker-DQC} ##### Mr Hughes: -- A proposal tofeed tigers on raspberry tarts would be about on " all-fours " with yours. {: .speaker-JMG} ##### Mr ATKINSON: -- I know that the honorable member and a great many of his followers are against profit-sharing, but why are they? {: .speaker-DQC} ##### Mr Hughes: -- Because they are hungry, and want something to eat. You are giving them words. {: .speaker-JMG} ##### Mr ATKINSON: -- I am not, because the wage is granted before the profits are shared. The tobacco company in Melbourne recently distributed £30,000 as a bonus amongst certain employés. The Ford Motor Company, in America., have distributed over £1,000,000 in the same way. {: .speaker-F4S} ##### Mr Joseph Cook: -- Suppose we go home? {: .speaker-F4N} ##### Mr Fisher: -- The matter is urgent. {: .speaker-JMG} ##### Mr ATKINSON: -- Where does the urgency come in? {: .speaker-DQC} ##### Mr Hughes: -- The Registrar says it is urgent, and the Judges say that things should be done, and we are trying to do them. {: .speaker-JMG} ##### Mr ATKINSON: -- I am not aware that there is any case pending. {: .speaker-KJE} ##### Sir William Irvine: -- Surely they will not make the Bill affect a case pending? {: .speaker-JMG} ##### Mr ATKINSON: -- There is nothing in the Bill to show to the contrary. If the matter is urgent, I presume they will use the Bill as soon as possible; but, after what the Attorney-General has heard to-day, he cannot hope that it will have any effect. {: .speaker-DQC} ##### Mr Hughes: -- That only applies to one clause; there are thirteen others in the Bill. {: .speaker-JMG} ##### Mr ATKINSON: -- But some of the alterations are not very great. I should like the Attorney-General to mention one material amendment. {: .speaker-DQC} ##### Mr Hughes: -- There are several, and quite important. {: .speaker-JMG} ##### Mr ATKINSON: -- I have read the Bill through, and I do not there see any great departure from the original Act, except in the one clause. We are now passing through very strenuous times, threatened with a poor harvest, and consequent unemployment, while we have to take our share in the struggle going on in Europe. Under such circumstances, we ought to be brought to see more clearly things as they really are, and to realize that we are all very much dependent one upon the other, and should do our best to assist in relieving the position. If the Act has been such a failure as we are led to believe, Parliament ought to take seriously into consideration the creation of another tribunal on different lines, or devise some other means to produce harmonious relations throughout the industrial world. It might be advisable, perhaps, to appoint some body to inquire into the whole question, and report to Parliament. This Bill is admittedly only a patch, which will break away at the first pressure. No doubt, the idea underlying the measure is a good one; and, if it were possible to get the High Court to say that any given state of affairs constituted a dispute, it would save a lot of time, trouble, and money. The method suggested, however, will not have any effect, because it will be open to any party to appeal ; with the result that the decision arrived at may be quashed. Both sides should do their utmost to provide mesas by which the industries of Australia may be carried on peacefully and harmoniously. {: #subdebate-23-0-s14 .speaker-KEA} ##### Mr KELLY:
Wentworth **.- Mr. Speaker-** {: .speaker-JTI} ##### Mr Burns: -- Is this a" stone-wall " ? {: .speaker-F4S} ##### Mr Joseph Cook: -- I object to the insulting observation of the honorable member for Illawarra, and I ask you, **Mr. Speaker,** whether it is in order? {: #subdebate-23-0-s15 .speaker-10000} ##### Mr SPEAKER: -- I remind the honorable member for Parramatta that his proper course is to call my attention to any words to which he takes exception, and not to add any remarks such as that the words are insulting. I have to ask the honorable member for Illawarra to withdraw the observation complained of. The honorable member must know that it is not in order to accuse another honorable member of doing anything that is unworthy. {: .speaker-JTI} ##### Mr Burns: -- I withdraw the observation ; but I ask that the honorable member for Parramatta withdraw the remark that the wordsI used were insulting. {: .speaker-F4S} ##### Mr Joseph Cook: -- I withdraw the remark. Debate (on motion by **Mr. Kelly)** adjourned. {: .page-start } page 765 {:#debate-24} ### PATENTS, TRADE MARKS, AND DESIGNS BILL (No. 2) Motion (by **Mr. Hughes)** agreed to - That leave be given to bring in a Bill for an Act to amend the Patents, Trade Marks, and Designs Act 1914. Bill presented, and read a first time. {: #debate-24-s0 .speaker-DQC} ##### Mr HUGHES:
AttorneyGeneral · West Sydney · ALP .- I move - That this Bill be now read a second time. In submitting the former measure to the House, two lines from the Imperial Act were omitted. With that exception, the measure was taken literally from the Act in question. It is to restore those two lines giving power " to extend the time within which any act or thing may, or is required to be done, under any of the Acts referred to in this section," that the Bill is introduced. {: .speaker-KJE} ##### Sir William Irvine: -- Then, with these amendments, the Bill will be identical with the Imperial Act? {: .speaker-DQC} ##### Mr HUGHES: -- Yes. **Mr. JOSEPH** COOK (Parramatta) General's word that this Bill will add nothing to the Imperial Act. {: .speaker-DQC} ##### Mr Hughes: -- I am so informed by the draftsman. {: #debate-24-s1 .speaker-F4S} ##### Mr JOSEPH COOK: -- Then I shall offer no objection to it. Question resolved in the affirmative. Bill read a second time, and reported without amendment; report adopted. Motion (by **Mr. Hughes),** by leave, proposed - >That this Bill be now read a third time. {: #debate-24-s2 .speaker-F4S} ##### Mr JOSEPH COOK:
Parramatta -- I am afraid that this kind of thing is getting honorable members opposite into a bad habit. Unless they are putting two or three Bills through each night, they begin to accuse us of all sorts of things. I hope, therefore, that they will not regard our attitude how as indicative of what our attitude ought to be when other controversial measures are before this Chamber. I wish to say, in regard to something which occurred just now, that there is absolutely no desire on this side of the House to interfere with the business of the Government in any illegitimate way. We merely desire the right to discuss fairly some of these important controversial measures, and I am afraid that we must assert that right, no matter what honorable members opposite may say. {: #debate-24-s3 .speaker-F4N} ##### Mr FISHER:
Prime Minister and Treasurer · Wide Bay · ALP -- I take no exception to the exercise of the right of the Leader of the Opposition to discuss every measure which may be brought forward. But it will be the duty of the Government to see that urgent business is dealt with, and that honorable members are afforded sufficient time for its consideration. When matters of an urgent character are brought forward, we must do our best to get them through. {: #debate-24-s4 .speaker-KEA} ##### Mr KELLY:
Wentworth -- I take it that, when Bills are really urgent, we shall be afforded an indication of their urgency by their early introduction. If an important Bill is introduced which does not relate to the war, I hope that the Prime Minister will not seek to shelter himself behind the plea that it is of an urgent character, in order to avoid an awkward discussion at a delicate time. Question resolved in the affirmative. Bill read a third time. House adjourned at 11.8 p.m.

Cite as: Australia, House of Representatives, Debates, 18 November 1914, viewed 22 October 2017, <http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1914/19141118_reps_6_75/>.